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The purpose of this research is to establish a conceptual methodological 
framework that will facilitate effective cyber damage and mission impact assessment and 
reporting following a cyber-based information incidents.  Joint and service guidance 
requires mission impact reporting, but current efforts to implement such reporting have 
proven ineffective.  This research seeks to understand the impediments existing in the 
current implementation and to propose an improved methodology.  The research 
employed a hybrid historical analysis and case study methodology for data collection 
through extensive literature review, examination of existing case study research and 
interviews with Air Force members and civilian personnel employed as experts in cyber 
damage and mission impact assessment of Air Force networks.  Nine respondents 
provided valuable first hand information about the current implementation cyber damage 
and mission impact assessment.  This research identified several critical impediments to 
current mission impact assessment efforts on Air Force networks.  Based upon these 
findings, a proposal is made for a new operations-focused defensive cyber damage and 
mission impact methodology.  The methodology will address the critical impediments 
identified and will result in profound benefits in other areas of cyber asset protection.  
Recommendations for conceptual implementation and operationalization are presented 
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 TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFENSIVE CYBER DAMAGE AND 
MISSION IMPACT METHODOLOGY 
 
I. Introduction 
“Success in the twenty-first century battlespace will rely more and more on our 
ability to use and protect information. Quality information is the counter to the 
fog of war. Military operations make special demands on information functions 
and we must meet those demands if we are to give our commanders the 
information advantage. Information superiority is just like air superiority or 
space superiority: it gives us the freedom and ability to operate in the information 
domain while denying it to the enemy.” Statement of Lt. General Donahue before 




The past several decades have been witness to a revolution information 
technology (IT).  This revolution has resulted in an ever-growing reliance upon IT in 
developed and developing nations.  Networking technology, and the Internet in particular, 
has given both business and government organizations alike the promises of greater 
efficiency through networked computing.  The IT boom of the 1980s and 1990s produced 
a dependence on digital information assets making internal and external networks central 
to the modern organization’s information infrastructure.  In a relatively short time, cyber-
based digital information became a critical asset on which the operational and strategic 
operations of the modern enterprise depend (Denning 1999, pp. 13-15).  Information has 
become a transnational commodity and every modern business organization has become 
an information organization (Drucker 1993, pp. 89, 143-145).   
The Department of Defense (DoD) was quick to recognize the potential benefits 
of automating processes with IT and readily embraced the new technologies. Today the 
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daily operations of the virtually every United States government agency maintain a great 
dependency on IT and the light-speed exchange of information in cyber space.  This is 
especially true of the armed services when this dependence upon cyber information was 
first notably demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War; the first war where cyber 
technologies were used to great effect in support of combat actions in the air, ground, and 
sea (Gumahad 1997).  Organizations whose critical mission processes maintain such a 
great dependence on cyber information result in an environment where information 
compromise, damage, loss can equate to mission failure (Kemmerer 2003, p. 705).  This 
makes the need to protect and defend information assets in cyberspace a paramount 
requirement to ensure the organization’s success (GAO 2005).  Inevitably, such 
organizations are forced to deal with an information incident, whether by malicious 
intent, accident, or natural disaster.  When this happens, the organization’s decision 
maker must have a timely and clear picture of how the incident as impacted the 
organization’s ability to accomplish its mission.  Success in military operations depends 
on providing the commander rapid and accurate battlespace awareness.  Part of this is 
gaining an understanding how cyber incidents affect the organization’s ability to 
accomplish the mission. 
The Need for a Defensive Cyber Damage Assessment Framework 
Since the beginning of organized warfare, commanders have attempted to assess 
the impact of offensive actions against the enemy’s war fighting assets (Diehl and Sloan 
2005, p. 59), as well as understand the impact of a successful enemy attack against 
friendly warfighting assets.  As the DoD continues to integrate kinetic operations into 
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cyber space, the more valuable asset information becomes.  Annual surveys conducted by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) determined that the reported economic losses 
from cyber security incidents continued a four-year decline in 2006 (Gordon 2006, p. 12).  
This is a possible indicator that these organizations are more secure. It could be, however, 
that economic metrics are not accurately portraying the extent of damage that these 
organizations are truly experiencing from the cyber incidents.  Despite the best of efforts 
to prevent such security breaches, many attacks against cyber information assets 
successfully breach network defenses.  This is extremely worrisome for organizational 
decision makers who understand that the continued growth in successful attacks, coupled 
with the ever-growing dependency of kinetic operations upon cyber assets, creates an 
environment for unprecedented ‘hidden’ damage to warfighting capabilities.  In 2004, 
Department of Defense officials acknowledged that these successful intrusions had 
resulted in reduced military operational capability (Tiboni 2005b). 
Commanders are now beginning to ask the hard questions of ‘how’ a cyber attack 
affects both their respective organization and the mission operations as a whole.  In fact, 
recently amended military joint guidance (CJCSM6510.01 2006) requires commanders to 
ensure operational impact assessment is accomplished following a network incident.  In 
the cyber realm, however, DoD organizations are finding it difficult to accurately map 
damage assessment to operational impact after an information compromise occurs.   
In 1996, the Department of Defense (DODD5220.22-M) conducted a series of 
“day after” games to measure their ability to effectively respond to cyber attacks.  These 
exercises demonstrated that the DoD was not ready to respond effectively to such attacks. 
A report following these exercises cited four critical issues that must be addressed to 
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improve the DoD’s ability to respond to these cyber attacks if they were to happen in the 
real world. Among these was the need for “a ‘battle damage’ assessment process suitable 
for IW” (Alberts 1996, pp. 24-25). Ten years later, there still exists no standardized 
operational damage assessment model for information compromises on United States Air 
Force (USAF) networks (Thiem 2005).  
Despite the need to understand the organizational impact caused by information 
incidents, surprising little research has focused in this area (Horony 1999). The work that 
does exist tends to be funded by the private, for-profit sector and to focus providing 
awareness for decision making on the financial impact the organization.  The models 
established by these works yield economic metrics.  Economic measurements are more 
tangible than other forms of impact metrics (Horony 1999) and lend themselves more 
easily to complex calculation in damage models that attempt to quantify an incident’s 
financial cost to the organization.  Indeed, these models meet the decision-making needs 
of many for-profit, private sector organizations.  Nevertheless, such models and metrics 
are far less useful to those organizations with missions not economically driven; such as 
those that exist within the DoD and other critical branches of government.  In these areas, 
and especially in the context of military operations, the financial value of information is 
of very low importance.  Economic metrics simply do not provide commanders with the 
information necessary to make smart and timely decisions after an information 
compromise.   
To illustrate this point, consider the following real world example illustrating how 
cyber attacks on information assets can directly impact a military organization’s physical 
mission.  In early 2004, network defenders watching for suspicious activity on networks 
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supporting Multinational Force-Iraqi (MMF-I), at that time called the Combined Joint 
Task Force Seven, were reporting as many as 60 new computer network incidents each 
day.  With network control locations dispersed widely across the Iraq theater of 
operations, and no defensive damage assessment framework in place to predicatively 
assess potential impact to the mission in event of a successful cyber incident, computer 
incident response was extremely difficult.  In all cases, it was a “wait and see” activity to 
determine the extent of damage to both network operations and the ripple effect of impact 
to mission operations.  Damage assessment consisted of solely post-recovery analysis that 
reported the impact to mission capability long after the fact rather than assessed the 
impact in a timely manner.  No framework existed that allowed local information owners 
or custodians to both identify the information assets stored on potentially compromised 
systems and work with incident responders to assess damage to the overall mission.  This 
left many forward deployed units with limited and occasionally no access to important 
information stored on military servers at the rear.  This problem was compounded by a 
poor, disjointed framework for incident reporting, which in at least one case contributed 
to human casualties. 
There is a dire need for an efficient framework to assess the impact to an 
organization’s information assets and provide the decision maker with an understanding 
of the impact to the organization’s mission capability following a compromise.  By 
providing the commander with a timely and clear sight picture of any degradation to their 
own mission capability, the commander is better prepared to make better decisions in 




 Defensive cyber damage assessment metrics produced by damage assessment 
methodologies currently employed on Air Force networks do not enable commanders to 
see the mission capability impact resulting from a cyber compromise.  Nearly all existing 
methodologies assess the economic impact of a cyberspace incident.  While economic 
impact can be a factor a commander may consider when justifying IT and security 
upgrades, it is of little value as a decision input factor in military operations.  Attempts to 
assess damage following a compromise of Air Force networks have been less than 
successful for a wide range of reasons and the chief of these may lie in the Air Force’s 
fundamental approach and perspective regarding network security.   
The Air Force approaches cyber security from an infrastructure-focused 
perspective.  This approach focuses on protecting the organization’s IT infrastructure 
against known technological vulnerability-focused scenarios.  According to Soo Hoo 
(2005) this approach is inherently limited in its ability to identify the risks to the assets 
the organization means to protect (Soo Hoo 2000, p.11).  Vulnerability is only significant 
if it places a critical asset at risk (Stevens 2005, p. 14).  Rather than identifying the 
information assets within the system and determining the relative value they present to 
the organization organizational mission, this approach explicitly focuses on technical 
components of infrastructure technological assets.  This approach overlooks information 
and substitutes its value to the organization with that of the infrastructure components 
and cannot account the value of the organization’s most important asset—its information.  
The assumption that technology is an equitable substitute for information is a dangerous 
assumption and follows a proven path of failure (Davenport and Prusack 1998).   
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The DoD is beginning to realize that this approach imposes inherent limitations 
on attempts attempting to perform damage assessment.  When an information incident 
occurs, the agency responsible for incident response activities must conduct a mission 
impact assessment to quantify the value of the affected information asset contributes to 
the organization’s mission.  This is especially true in DoD agencies where the incident 
response agent exists outside the organization.  In nearly all cases, no documentation of 
information asset value exists to aid the incident response agent in understanding its 
value.  As a result, subsequent efforts to identify and quantify the impact are subjective 
and unreliable, and produce little or no usable for use in timely and reliable decision-
making.   
There is currently no effective methodology to assess the damage to information 
assets on Air Force networks, estimate the impact to organizational mission, and 
effectively report timely and accurate impact assessment to decision makers following a 
cyber security incident on Air Force Networks. 
Problem Approach 
The shortcomings in the current approach to damage assessment are evident in the 
failure to provide organizational decision makers with an understanding of how a cyber 
incident affects the organization’s mission.  Several issues may contribute to this 
problem.  This research will approach the problem with an examination of how the Air 
Force implements damage assessment and what issues may be impeding effective 
damage and mission impact assessment efforts.  The research will attempt to understand 
how the Air Force identifies and values its cyber assets, since understanding the value of 
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the organization’s critical cyber-based information assets is fundamental to determining 
the extent of damage and subsequent mission impact following a cyber attack.  
To this end, this research must discover what obstacles may be preventing cyber 
damage and mission impact assessment, as well as what issues may be contributing to 
these efforts.  Successful and accurate cyber damage and mission impact assessment 
depends on the successful and effective accomplishment of a number of supporting 
activities.  Such key supporting activities are identification of the correct cyber assets in 
an organization, determining their relative value to the organization, determining damage 
after an incident, and mapping that damage to an effect on the organization’s mission.   
Damage assessment is only the first step and mission impact assessment should be the 
ultimate goal of cyber damage assessment on military networks.   
Ultimately, this research will propose an ideal methodology for defensive cyber 
damage and mission impact assessment to allow organizations to understand how a 
successful cyber incident affects its mission. 
Research Questions 
 This research aims to answer three questions that are essential to the development 
of a Defensive Cyber Damage Assessment framework: 
R1. How can the damage resulting from a successful cyber attack be effectively 
measured in a non-profit driven organization? 
 
R2. How can such damage be mapped to impact to an organization’s mission 
capability? 
 
R3.  How must this assessment be reported to the decision maker to maximize the 




To effectively answer these questions, this research aims to determine how damage is 
currently being assessed, how to what degree impact to mission operations is assessed, 
and what, if any problems exist in the current methodology.   
Foundational Terminology 
Defining a canonical terminology is essential when communicating ideas to 
diverse communities of interest. For this reason, we now define the terminology used in 
the Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Assessment (CDA-D/MIA) framework 
proposed in this paper. First, the scope and purpose of defensive cyber damage 
assessment must be established. Joint Publication 1-02 defines military damage 
assessment as “an appraisal of the effects of an attack on a nation’s military forces to 
determine residual military capability and to support planning for recovery and 
reconstitution” (JP 1-02 2006, p. 336). Historically, the focus of damage assessment has 
been on the effects of offensive actions against the mission capability of enemy forces. 
Conversely, our work is focused upon defensive damage assessment which appraises the 
effects of a cyber-based incident that potentially impacts friendly mission capability. For 
the purposes of our research, a mission describes the overall purpose of the organization. 
The term mission is also used in a similar context to define the goals and objectives of a 
specific department, group, or unit within the organization. Thus, the overall mission of 
an organization is comprised of a hierarchy of subordinate missions, with an over-arching 
enterprise mission being supported by the missions of its organizations.  Each 
organization may have supporting departmental missions. This hierarchy is an “essential 
component of operational effectiveness” (Alberts and Dorofee 2005, p.4). 
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A mission is supported by one or more operational processes as shown in Figure 1 
below. Operational processes are those processes that enable people or systems to 
accomplish the mission. In modern organizations, most operational processes are 
supported by one or more information processes. Information processes are those 
information flows that support the operational process. An organization’s information 
processes depend on information assets. An information asset is a set of information that 
holds value to the organization’s mission. A cyber information asset is information that 
resides electronically within cyberspace.  A cyber information asset may be information 
stored on the organization’s server infrastructure or an information flow on which the 
organization depends.  A critical cyber information asset is one which the organization 
depends upon to accomplish its tactical, operational, or strategic mission.  Damage is 
defined as a reduction in value or usefulness of the object affected (Oxford, 1986).  
Damage or loss of a critical cyber information asset potentially would result in 
impairment of the organization’s mission.  This impairment to the organization’s mission 
is called impact.  Damage and impact are related, but are not the same. Impact is 
generally the result of some damage.  Since this research deals explicitly with defensive 
damage assessment of cyber-based assets, all references to information assets imply 




Figure 1. Mission Structure Hierarchy 
 
Most traditional approaches to damage assessment make no difference between 
data and information.  However, some very distinct and important differences between 
data and information exist.  Data is the elemental subset of information that possesses no 
inherent value, but is dependent on external application.  This external application assigns 
value to the information. Information is aggregation of data that is grouped in such a way 
that meaning and value are both inherent and vary contextually (Petrocelli 2005, pp. 180-
181).  This important characteristic of information is fundamental to developing a 
foundation on which to build effective cyber damage assessment.  All information assets 
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have producers, owners, consumers, and custodians. The information producer is the 
creator of the information or the originator of an information flow. The information 
owner is the entity that bears responsibility for determining the classification, value, and 
level of protection of the information asset commensurate with its value. The information 
custodian is the entity responsible for implementing the security measures that protect the 
information asset. An information consumer is any entity that maintains transitive 
dependencies on the information. It is important to understand that the information 
producer, owner, custodian, and consumer are all closely related; and they can be the 
same entity. 
Research Scope 
Defensive cyber damage assessment methodology is an important part of gaining 
a heightened level of mission assurance in any organization reliant on cyber-based 
information.  The overall perspective of this thesis research, however, is from a military 
operations perspective.  This research aims to develop a defensive cyber damage and 
mission impact assessment framework to provide decision makers, the commanders, 
situational awareness of how a cyber information compromise affects his/her mission 
capability through understanding the value of the critical information assets on which the 
mission relies.  This is primarily concerned with aiding the commander working in the 
tactical and operational domains of operations.  The framework intends to provide useful 
metrics for decision makers operating in the strategic domain of operations.   
This research recognizes that different communities of interest in both the public 
and private sector have specific requirements and expectations for a damage assessment 
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model.  It is also important to note there are varying assumptions of the methodology and 
scope of a defensive introduced by the widely varying experiential perspectives of the 
communities of interest that may desire to implement such a framework.  For example, 
the network security community of interest may feel strongly that the commander must 
know how and why an intruder was able to gain access to and compromise critical assets 
on the network.  These activities are extremely important and are accomplished by the 
agencies tasked with that responsibility.  This type of information, while important in 
preventing future malicious incidents, it may not be useful to the commander who needs 
to know how the incident has affected his immediate mission operations.  Development 
of a mission impact assessment methodology for organizations not driven by economic 
profit is the goal of this research.  For this reason, the scope of research is different from 
existing models that attempt to assign value as an economic function.  This research will 
attempt to discover a new way to determine cyber asset value in terms that are 
meaningful to an organization that is not driven by economic gain.  By determining asset 
value, the research intends to determine a damage assessment methodology that allows 
mapping between the asset and the mission operations that the asset supports.   
Thesis Structure 
This research employs qualitative research methods in order to answer the 
research questions.  The quest for answers to the research questions presented in this 
chapter require a multiple vectored approach to gathering appropriate data.  This chapter 
presents and introduction to the material, but Chapter 2 delves into an extensive literature 
review of the large information space that is required to develop a sound understanding of 
damage and mission impact assessment.    
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Chapter 3 presents a detailed discussion of the research methodology.  In order to 
understand the methods and problems with current damage assessment methodology and 
mission impact estimation techniques currently being used on the Air Force networks, 
this research depends on existing research and interviews with agencies involved with Air 
Force network operations and network defense activities.   
Chapter 4 discusses, analyses, and synthesizes the data collected through the 
extensive literature review, examination of existing case study research, and interviews 
performed in this research effort.  Chapter 4 will present the findings of this research as 
they relate to the investigative research question presented in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 5 presents a conclusive proposal for an improved cyber damage and 
mission impact assessment model.  The proposed Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission 
Impact Assessment methodology is a comprehensive methodology that if properly 
implemented would correct the weaknesses in the current approach that results in 
unsatisfactory impact awareness on Air Force networks. 
Research Limitations 
  The DoD has been admittedly slow to address the area of defensive cyber damage 
assessment and as a result this is still a relatively immature area of research.  The DoD 
maintains a highly segmented structure and this research effort proceeds forward with the 
understanding that there may be related work underway in other segments of the DoD to 
address this issue.  In an effort to present this work in an unclassified format, some issues 
will not be addressed to prevent potential disclosure of sensitive information; particularly 
those involving specifics of network offensive activities, network defense specifications 
and procedures.  However, this framework will maintain a generic quality to allow 
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application in these areas not explicitly addressed in this work.  Additionally, since the 
focus of this research effort is development of a defensive cyber damage assessment for 
military networks, the specific audience is limited to those potential users to do not utilize 
financial loss as a driver for decision making.   
 Another limitation is the absence of data to demonstrate the degree of 
effectiveness in a practical sense, and validity in an academic sense of this research.  It is 




II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
“Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear 
the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every 
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle. (Sun-Tzu 1993)” 
 
The information revolution changed the face of the modern organization.  In both 
government and private sector alike, the new technology of this revolution created new 
ways for information to flow through and within an organization.  These changes both 
flattened traditional decision-making hierarchies and forced a massive re-engineering of 
the way business is done (Drucker 1993, pp. 89).  Every organization that maintains 
reliance upon information cyberspace is in the information business.  For this reason, 
virtually every modern organization is an information organization (Drucker 1995).  This 
includes the military. 
The advent of cyberspace was a dual edged sword.  It offered great promises of 
efficient production and reduced operating costs, but also introduced new and unexpected 
risks and vulnerabilities. Organizations embraced the promises of cyberspace technology 
without thought for security; and many quickly found themselves ill prepared for these 
new problems.    Recent years have witnessed many private sector and government 
organizations fall victim to malicious activity, mishap, and natural disaster that has 
degraded or removed access to cyber information with grave impact to the organization’s 
ability to conduct normal mission operations. Literature review shows that despite the 
evolution towards stronger security, vulnerabilities and successful exploits maintain and 
annual increase (CERT 2006).  Since “perfect security is not attainable” (Mimoso 2005), 
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organizations must be prepared to efficiently handle the impact of a successful attack.  
An organization must also be able to understand how the incident impacts the 
organization’s mission capability. Mission capability refers to the organization’s ability 
to accomplish its tactical, operational, and strategic business goals.   Exhaustive literature 
review has demonstrated that relatively little research has been conducted on mission 
impact following a cyber attack.  With only a few exceptions, research in this area is 
limited to determination of the economic costs associated with remediation and recovery 
from a cyber incident.  As cyber warfare continues to evolve, many organizations that are 
not profit driven, such as military organizations, are discovering that cost loss does not 
provide the right input information for smart and timely operational decisions after being 
hit.  This literature review explores the essential concepts of cyberwarfare, information 
value, and other concept critical to the foundations of a defensive cyber damage 
assessment framework. 
Cyberwarfare and Defensive Damage Assessment 
Information is the center of gravity of cyberspace. The ever-growing American 
dependence on cyberspace has made information a critical center of gravity on which 
national security depends (Billo and Chang 2004, p. 22).  Denning identifies information 
as a valued asset to both owner and adversary; therefore, it is an asset that must be 
protected (Denning 1999, pp. 22-25).  President George Bush accurately noted, however, 
“…there is no such thing as perfect security. (Bush 2004) ”; and his words hold 
particularly true in the cyber domain. The DoD has recognized that successful attacks 
against cyber information inevitably occur and when such attacks successfully damage 
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the organization’s information assets real world mission operations can be affected 
(Tiboni 2005b).   
When an attack is successful, it is essential to perform immediate incident 
response to arrest propagation of the incident as quickly as possible.  Additionally these 
incident response actions are part of damage assessment activities that help the 
organization understand the impact and make the right decisions for recovery and mission 
operations (Lala and Panda 2000, p. 300).  Mission success can, and often does, depend 
on a clear understanding of how the cyber attack has degraded the actual or potential 
capabilities of kinetic mission operations.  This section will examine literature discussing 
the nature of cyber space and cyber warfare, briefly examine the evolution of military 
operational dependence upon cyber space, and the importance of defensive cyber damage 
assessment to ensuring successful military operations in both cyberspace and the real 
world. 
What is cyberspace?  
Understanding the cyber battlespace if fundamental to understanding cyber 
warfare.  The concept of cyberspace was originally conceived by science fiction author, 
William Gibson (1984) to describe a virtual and alternate world that existed in the 
electronic space between every computer in the human system. In Gibson’s vision, virtual 
cyberspace was a virtual domain of virtual dimension and space that imitated the modern 
world, the realspace of the human world.  Cyberspace and realspace are integrated such 
that the effect of activities in one domain could affect the other.  The American Heritage 




“The space in which computer transactions occur, particularly transactions 
between different computers. We say that images and text on the Internet 
exist in cyberspace, for example. The term is also often used in 
conjunction with virtual reality, designating the imaginary place where 
virtual objects exist. For example, if a computer produces a picture of a 
building that allows the architect to [walk] through and see what a design 
would look like, the building is said to exist in cyberspace. (American 
Heritage n.d.)” 
 
In many ways, Gibson’s predictive definition of the cyber realm has become 
something close to a reality.  Joint Publication 1-02 concisely defines cyberspace as “the 
notional environment in which digitized information is communicated across computer 
networks (JP 1-02 2006, p. 139).”  The Internet is often considered to be cyberspace, but 
it is actually only a part of it.  Cyberspace is that place between all computers—a massive 
exchange of information at light speed between “the sum total of all computer networks 
(Denning 1999, p. 22).”   
The United States government has realized that physical assets are vulnerable to 
attacks from cyberspace.  As Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge 
stated, 
“Cyber security cuts across all aspects of critical infrastructure protection. 
Most businesses in this country are unable to segregate the cyber 
operations from the physical aspects of their business because they operate 
interdependently (USCERT 2003)” 
 
Many security experts have expressed concern that America’s ever-growing dependence 
on cyberspace has become its Achilles heel (Blodgett 1999). 
What is cyber warfare? 
The term cyber warfare is often confused with information warfare.  Denning 
describes information warfare as consisting “of offensive and defensive operations 
against information resources of a ‘win-lose’ nature.  It is conducted because information 
 
20 
resources have value to people (Denning 1999, 67).”  Cyber warfare, itself, may be 
loosely viewed as that part of information warfare that occurs within the domain of 
cyberspace; and uses the technologies of that realm.  Cyberwarfare activities are part of 
the many constructs of Information Operations. (IO).  IO covers broad spectrum of 
activities and therefore overlaps the boundaries of many different communities of 
interest.  As a result, different communities maintain slightly differing perspectives of 
what cyber war is in relations to their respective interest.   
In 1993, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt introduced the concept of 
cyberwarfare to describe knowledge-centric conflict in military operations.  They 
describe cyberwar in this way: 
“Cyberwar refers to conducting, and preparing to conduct, military 
operations according to information -related principles.  It means 
disrupting, if not destroying, information and communications 
systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on which 
an adversary relies in order to know itself: who it is, where it is, 
what it can do when, why it is fighting, which threat to counter 
first, and so forth.  It means trying to know everything about an 
adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about 
oneself.  It means turning the balance of information and 
knowledge in one's favor, especially if the balance of forces is not. 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993, p. 30)" 
 
Three key concepts may be deduced from Arquilla & Ronfeldt’s description of 
cyberwar: 
1. information is central to cyberwar activities, 
2. the purpose of cyberwar is to effect the adversary’s kinetic military 
capabilities, while protecting your own, 
 
3.  it is important to effect decision making to understand the impact of a 





Cyber warfare has broad implications for both military organization and 
warfighting doctrine (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993, pp. 24-25). The technologies 
employed in cyber warfare can provide the commander with topsight.  Topsight is a 
greater understanding of the big picture and improved situational awareness of the 
battlespace. It delivers improvements to the decision-making processes by providing a 
more clear picture of battle space capabilities through both a more accurate picture of the 
enemy and friendly force capabilities (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993, pp. 30-31).   
In cyber warfare, however, gaining topsight may not be easy.  According to 
Gruber, a lack of deliberate planning to employ cyber technologies to objectives has 
traditionally hindered the full realization of the capabilities offered by these technologies 
(Gruber 2000, pp. 8-12).  The key to being successful in the continually evolving domain 
of cyberwarfare operations is to continually re-examine the existing paradigm and adjust 
as necessary. If areas of improvement are identified, the organization must strive to meet 
those needs.  Such an area with a need for improvement is providing the military 
commander with the topsight needed to understand how a successful cyber incident has 
impacted his/her ability to carry out the mission. 
The Evolution of Military Dependence on Cyberspace. 
Cyber warfare is a serious matter in military circles as more military operations 
continue to depend on computer networks and cyber space (Kumagai 2003, pp. 118-119).  
The first step in understanding how the Air Force approaches cyber information security 
is to “gain a common view of how information has grown into a critical component that 
directly affects the conduct of military operations (Gruber 2000, p. iii).”  From the 
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earliest military operations, information has been a key factor to success in warfare.  
Human history provides a nearly endless set of examples of the army with the superior 
information advantage winning the battle.  In his forward comments, prefacing Air Force 
doctrine, General John P. Jumper states that those with a “superior ability to gather, 
understand, control, and use information” maintain this advantage on the battlefield 
(AFDD2-5 2005).  America has traditionally been the leader in employing cyber-based 
information technologies to gain and exploit such an advantage in the battlespace.  As the 
technology evolves, so must our understanding of how to best employ this technology to 
fully exploit the cyber-based information assets gained from our adversaries—and our 
own.  It is important to understand how we arrived.  Sometimes we can learn from the 
problems of the past to improve our future.  Much is written about the evolution of 
information technology, the emergency of the Internet.  This sub-section concisely 
describes the gradual infusion of military operations into cyberspace.   
The DoD embarked on its first large-scale attempt at integration of computers, 
satellites, and communication systems with the issuance of DoD Directive S-5100.30, 
titled “Concept of Operations of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System 
(WWMCCS).  WWMCCS, although never fully integrating all functions of command 
and control, was the first large scale system designed to link information-bearing 
technologies to provide increased situational awareness to military commanders (Gruber 
2000, pp. 4-5).  Allard notes that WWMCCS development was influenced by the rapid 
and novel availability of both technology and resources to meet the requirements of the 
individual unified and specified commands, rather than by specified strategic goals 
(Allard 1990, pp. 133-135). The importance of WWMCCS to this research is that it 
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foreshadows the vulnerability of kinetic operations that depend upon digital information, 
as several real world mission complications resulted from WWMCCS computer outages 
(Allard 1990).  This may be the first time that the military realized degradation of 
operations capabilities directly attributable to the failure of computerized processing 
systems. 
The next milestone on the journey to technology-dependence was the emergence 
of networks, which eventually lead to the creation of cyberspace.  Integration of military 
operations and computer information systems had grown silently and steadily in the 
previous decades, but the promise of increased efficiency through new networking 
technologies and the Internet encourage the Air Force to embark in a characteristic rush 
to new incorporate these new technologies; reintroducing many of the problems 
experienced with the WWMCCS program.  This dependence of the flow of digital 
information and information technology was soon apparent in the evolution of the 
military as an expeditionary force with new and sophisticated weapons systems that 
pushed the envelope of the existing cyber-infrastructure (Gruber 2000, p. 16).   
The already straining infrastructure was quickly further burdened by the new 
emphasis in information warfare.  Gruber observes that there was little forward planning 
for fitting technology to objective, and the result was a reduced ability of the DoD’s 
infrastructure to support fully support combat operations. The underlying reason was that 
the DoD’s approach to information warfare forced a focus on watching for hostile 
computer attacks, which inhibited efficient information flow from CONUS to forward 
operating locations.  (Gruber 2000, pp. 19-21).  To correct this problem, Gruber makes 
several suggestions, some of which we seen implemented in 2004 and continue to date; 
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as witnessed within the United States Air Force by the creation of the Air Force Network 
Operations and Security Center (AFNOSC) (AFI 33-138 2004), consolidation of Air 
Force networks under a unified network operations command and control structure.   
The DoD has recognized many of the problems observed by Gruber and others 
and has made similar shifts in control and configuration of information infrastructure on 
which military operations are now so intimately dependent.  The Global Information Grid 
is a product of this shift and a clear indicator that the DoD recognizes that the military’s 
“ability to leverage the power of information will be key to our success in the 21st century 
(Grimes n.d.).”  The GIG vision is to overcome the problems described by Gruber by 
providing user with  a seamless, secure, and interconnected information environment for 
both the warfighter and the authorized business user (NSA n.d.).   
This carries with it a heavy implication of the level of dependence the military, 
and indeed the nation, has on the information flow of cyberspace.  In a study performed 
on the cyber warfare means and motivations of selected nation states by the Institute for 
Security Studies at Dartmouth College, Billo and Chang identify three general areas of 
vulnerabilities to national security of the United States exploitable through cyberspace 
operations.  These are: 
1. the United State’s critical infrastructure,  
2. its economic and financial sector,  
3. and the military and national security sector (Billo and Chang 2004, pp. 130-
131).   
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Billo and Chang cite the modern military’s high level of reliance upon cyberspace 
assets is opening up “more holes in critical military infrastructure. (Billo and Chang 
2004, p. 131)”  Billo and Chang further state that: 
“Much of the Pentagon logistics chain flows over public-switched 
networks.  Some of the intelligence gathering of U.S. intelligence agencies 
also flows over public networks. Secure IT is critical in making sure that 
the data received on both ends of an intelligence transmission is not 
compromised (Billo and Chang 2004, p. 131).” 
 
There can little serious disagreement that the United States military relies 
more heavily upon cyberspace than ever before and will continue to do so into the 
near future.  Drucker’s (1993) assessment that every organization is an now an 
information organization rings especially true for the modern United States 
military.  Many realize that our military operations are vulnerable and defensive 
cyber operations must evolve at a rate commensurate with our adversaries and 
ensure we are prepared to defend against a cyber attack (Winkler, O'Shea et Al. 
1996, pp. 2-4). 
The Kinetic Impact of Cyber Attacks.  
“This is the first time in American history that we in the federal 
government, alone, cannot protect our infrastructure. We can’t hire an 
army or a police force that’s large enough to protect all of America’s cell 
phones or pagers or computer networks.” Comments of Secretary of 
Commerce William M. Daley (2000) regarding cyber protection 
 
 It is commonly accepted that cyber attacks can affect real world functions and 
activities, but a debate exists over the extent to which the effects of cyber-induced 
damage may be realized in the real world.  Billo and Chang observe that the community 
of cyber-security experts holds widely ranging opinions on this issue.  Some experts feel 
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that an electronic Pearl Harbor is impossible while others herald that such a catastrophe 
is inevitable (Billo and Chang 2004, p. 12). James Lewis, a senior fellow and director of 
technology policy at the Center for Strategic and International studies, made the 
following statement regarding the impact of a cyber attack: 
"Nobody argues -- or at least no sane person argues -- that a cyber attack 
could lead to mass casualties. It's not in any way comparable to weapons 
of mass destruction. In fact, what a lot of people call them is "weapons of 
mass annoyance." If your power goes out for a couple hours, if somebody 
draws a mustache on Attorney General Ashcroft's face on his Web site, it's 
annoying. It's irritating. But it's not a weapon of mass destruction(Lewis 
2003)." 
In this interview Lewis also makes the following argument against the vulnerability of 
national infrastructure to a cyber attack: 
“The other thing you can look at is, we know what attacks on critical 
infrastructures are like. This is something the military has been doing for 
at least 80 years. What we've discovered is it's hard to knock out an 
infrastructure. Nations are a lot tougher than they look. You can put 
something out for a couple of days, and people work really hard to get it 
back online. So this isn't an easy task when you're using high explosives, 
and high explosives do permanent damage, unlike cyber attacks, which are 
not anywhere near as threatening (Lewis 2003).” 
Lewis is not alone in his view that the impact of a cyber attack is grossly inflated.  Joshua 
Green, an editor for Washington monthly states: 
“There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having 
been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there 
compelling evidence that al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted 
to computers for any sort of serious destructive activity. What's more, outside of a 
Tom Clancy novel, computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible 
to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale, and many scoff at the notion 




The literature review accomplished in this research begs the question, where are 
Green’s many scoffers?  The vast majority of literature available on this subject does not 
support the view of Lewis and Green.  It should be noted that their point of view glosses 
over a universally agreed upon issue that America is the world leader in dependence on 
cyber-based information, with as much as 95% of networks being connected to each other 
in some way (Billo and Chang 2004, pp. 14-17).  
And the degree of the dependency increases annually.  In interview with GCN 
magazine, Sami Saydjari, CEO of Cyber Defense Agency commented on this recent 
explosive growth. 
“Twenty years ago, the infrastructure operated separately from the Internet 
and other open networks. So in some sense, the level of vulnerability has 
gone up simply because the level of interconnectedness has gone up 
significantly (Jackson 2006, p. 20).” 
 
Billo and Chang point out that the experts with access to classified information 
sources express concern that “the growing tendency in advanced industrial 
economies to link internal business management tools and administrative controls 
to the Internet could be catastrophic for overall U.S security (Billo and Chang 
2004, p. 12).”    
Indeed, even skeptics such as Washington Post writer Chris Suellentrop, 
who called the idea of cyberterrorism both a hoax and a conspiracy by the 
technology companies to generate large profits, become convinced of the reality 
of the national vulnerability when seeing the extent of American critical 
infrastructure dependence on cyberspace up close.  After participating in a cyber 
terrorism exercise conducted by Dartmouth Institute for Security Technology 
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Studies, he realized the gravity of the vulnerabilities presented by cyberwarfare, 
reversing his opinion and going from “smarty-pants to scaredy-cat (Suellentrop 
2006).”   
Recent research studied the costs to the U.S. economy from damage 
caused by a successful large scale, well targeted cyber attack and produced 
disturbing findings.  Dynes’ study, Costs to the U.S. Economy of Information 
Infrastructure Failures (Dynes, Andrijcic et Al. 2006) examined the ripple effect 
a catastrophic cyber attack and determined that would cost the economy millions 
of dollars for cyberspace disruptions greater than a few days.  The study noted 
that a growing reliance on networks would result create the possibility for even 
greater impact in the future (Dynes, Andrijcic et Al. 2006, p. 20).   In February 
2002, a group of 54 distinguished Information Assurance professionals drafted 
and signed a letter for President George W. Bush expressing a deep concern over 
the large and continually growing risk to the nation from a danger potentially 
more devastating to national morale and the country’s economy than the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks (PCD 2002a).”  Richard Clarke, who served as 
the White House Cyber Security Advisor from October 2001 to March 2003, 
expressed great concern about the vulnerability of the United States to 
cyberwarfare, and made the following statement in an interview with PBS 
Frontline: 
“We, as a country, have put all of our eggs in one basket. The reason that 
we're successfully dominating the world economically and militarily is 
because of systems that we have designed, and rely upon, which are cyber-
based. It's our Achilles heel. It's an overused phrase, but it's absolutely 
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true….some enemy some day was able to come around and knock the 
whole empire over." That's the fear (Clarke, 2003).” 
 
Michael Vatis, the Director of the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth 
College, and director of the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) 
supports this view and states: 
“America remains highly vulnerable to another form of attack: a “cyber 
attack” against the computer networks that are critical to our national and 
economic security. Attackers might target banking and financial 
institutions, voice communication systems, electrical infrastructures, water 
resources, or oil and gas infrastructures. The growing complexity and 
interconnectedness of these systems renders them increasingly vulnerable 
to attack. While a physical attack is likely to be carried out only by 
terrorists or hostile foreign nation-states, cyber attacks may be carried out 
by a wide array of adversaries, from teenage hackers and protest groups to 
organized crime syndicates, terrorists, and foreign nation states.  As a 
result, the problem is of enormous breadth and complexity (Vatis 2002, 
p.3).” 
 
Certainly, the majority of literature publicly available serves as worthy 
and suitable evidence of the American vulnerability to a large and well-targeted 
cyber attack.  Considering that the experts closest to the problem, with 
presumably the better view of the dependencies and vulnerabilities within the 
American critical infrastructure and military operations, there can be little serious 
argument whether cyber-based attacks can cause impact kinetic activities in the 
real world.   
The extent of impact varies on the type of cyber asset successfully 
attacked and the degree of dependency the real-world function has on it.  It 
follows, therefore, that the better civilian and military decision makers know the 
potential impact when key cyber-supported systems are lost, the better prepared 
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America will be to recover.  This fact underscores the need for development of an 
effective cyber-damage assessment framework. 
Threats to Cyber Assets. 
Organizations that rely on cyber information face daily threats that could damage 
or destroy these information assets on which mission operations rely.  In an environment 
where loss of critical information can result in loss of operational capability, it is 
important to understand threat. Threats originate from both inside and outside the 
organization, and can be man-made or may be caused by an unpreventable disaster 
(Petrocelli 2005, p. 5).  This section will discuss some of the common forms of threats to 
an organization’s information assets. 
Outsider Threat. 
 
The term cyber attack generally brings to mind malicious activity from outside of 
the organization.  Too often generalized as “hackers” by the uninitiated, outside threat 
actors come in many flavors ranging from nation states, organized crime, cyberterrorists,  
and “hacktivists”.  They share a common goal of either directly attacking cyber 
information assets, or its container, the system on which the information asset resides 
(Stevens 2005, p. 5).  The motivation, for each varies widely.  Organized crime and cyber 
cartels, generally motivated by financial gain, often target cyber information assets of 
banks or other e-commerce sites to engage in a variety of illicit activities ranging from 
theft to extortion by holding to hold the victim information or systems for “ransom” 
(Winkler 2005, pp. 71-74).  “Hacktivists” and cyberterrorists generally attack cyber 
assets to promote political, ideological, theological, or similar causes.   Denning observes 
that the boundaries between the two latter groups are fuzzy (Denning 2001, p. 241).  
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Nation states may attempt to cripple American military and civilian command and control 
structure via external cyber operations (Shimeall, Williams et Al. 2002). 
Despite the best efforts to keep the outside actors on the outside, there are 
countless examples of successful intrusion, with many causing damage measured in 
millions of dollars (Tiboni 2005a).  In 2001, a Connecticut teenager hacked a presumed 
secure Air Force system that tracked the positions of Air Force planes worldwide causing 
more than $66,000 damage (Rosencrance 2001).  The year 2005 was both the widely 
publicized hacking of the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) data base in which 33,000 
Air Force officers was compromised (Mark 2005), and the less publicized but no less 
dangerous onslaught of “attacks: against United States critical infrastructure and military 
networks (Graham and Eggen 2005).  Both examples serve to illustrate the targeting of 
cyberspace information assets either directly or indirectly targeting information by 
attacking the infrastructure that contains the asset.  These indirect attacks against the 
asset’s container, attempt to affect the organization’s ability to use the asset effectively. 
Each type of attack bears the potential of causing some degree of mission degradation, 
whether damage and mission impact realized or not.   
Inside Threat. 
Chinchani, et. Al, define the insider as a legitimate user who leverages system privileges, 
“familiarity and proximity to their computational environment to compromise valuable 
information or inflict damage (Chinchani, Iyer et Al. 2005, pp. 108-109).” Existing 
literature agrees to the spirit of this definition.  Insiders have rapidly come to be 
considered “one of the most challenging problems facing the security of information 
systems today (Butts 2006, p. ii)”  For the past several years, the CSI/FBI survey has 
 
32 
reported a decline in the number of reported insider incidents (Gordon, Loeb et Al. 2006, 
p. 13).  This, however, is not a reliable indication of the threat, as damage caused by 
inside threat actors can be severe; accounting for more than 80 percent of annual losses in 
some organizations as shown in Figure 2 below. In a military environment where the 
economic impact of a cyber security incident is secondary to the impact upon operational 
mission capability the effects of insider activity may be catastrophic; as demonstrated 
when insider activity resulted in more than 36 hours of mission stoppage on Coast Guard 
networks (DiDio 1998).  Research on detecting and preventing insider activity continues 
to emerge, such as the Butts’ methodology (Butts 2006) for formalizing the inside threat 
to identify high-probability inside threat actors.  Regardless of preventative measures, 
inside threat actors will inevitably occur making the need for a defensive cyber damage 




Figure 2. Percentage of Reported Loss from Insider Threats (Gordon, et. Al 2006, p. 12) 
 
Human Accident and Natural Disaster. 
 Not all threats to cyber assets are necessarily malicious in nature.  Baskerville 
observes that many times cyber security programs focus too exclusively on malicious 
activity.  Important threats, such as the potential for human error and harm caused by 
accident, are excluded from the organization’s risk assessment.  Such exclusion allows 
the effects of accidents introduce overlooked threats and vulnerabilities to the 
organization’s critical cyber information assets  (Baskerville and Im 2005).  Mistakes and 
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slips by system or software developer and/or users can unintentionally create a mission 
impacting catastrophe or introduce security holes which allow unauthorized and 
potentially damaging activities to be carried out by malicious threat actors (Norman 
1983, pp. 254-255).  Human accident, while not malicious in nature can have the same 
impact on mission capability as a malicious attack.   
 Natural disaster is another area that Baskerville charges as overlooked by many 
security programs. As with human error, natural disaster can introduce exploitable 
vulnerabilities, or more often act as an independent agent to impact the ability of cyber 
security to function as expected (Baskerville and Im 2005).  Recent natural disasters, 
particularly Hurricane Katrina documented the vulnerabilities of our cyber-based 
information systems and demonstrated both how quickly an information infrastructure 
could be taken out and how a program that does not plan for these non-malicious events 
can find itself unprepared when natural disaster occurs (IEEE-USA 2006). 
An Incident Taxonomy. 
 An organization with a limited scope of risk to its assets can find itself unprepared 
when a risk is realized from a vector beyond the organization’s scope of assessed risk.  
This is especially true of organizations that plan for risks based on threat scenarios (Soo 
Hoo 2000, p.11).    Unfortunately, many widely accepted threat and incident taxonomies 
maintain a relatively narrow scope on risk.  One such widely cited taxonomy model is the 
Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy (see Figure 3 below) proposed by Howard 




Figure 3. Howard's Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy (1998, p. 16) 
 
Section Summary. 
Cyberspace is more than just the Internet.  It is all the space between networked 
computers where digital information is exchanged.  Cyberwarfare is a critical part of 
information warfare and IO that occurs in cyberspace.  Cyberwarfare activities can have 
kinetic effects on organizations whose operations rely on the information assets of 
cyberspace.  Military operations have developed a strong and ever-increasing dependence 
on cyberspace; which has introduced new vulnerabilities to new threats both inside and 
outside the network.  These threats can come from a variety of vectors, and a good 
security program must plan for all forms of threats to protect the cyber-based assets on 
which modern military operations depend.   
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 It is important to rely on a threat or incident taxonomy model the captures as wide 
a spectrum of risk as possible.  It is also important that the taxonomy recognize the value 
of information as an asset.  All cyber attacks against an organization are attacks on its 
information assets to some degree.  These attacks produce second and third order impact 
effects that the organization must address. 
Foundations of Defensive Cyber Damage Assessment 
 Military theorist and United States Air Force Colonel John A. Warren wrote that 
the commander is the center of gravity for all military campaigns.  Command, itself can 
be broken  down into three basic functions: information, decision, and communication. 
He states that one of the keys to effective command is exploiting an awareness of both 
sides of the front (Warden 1988).  Defensive cyber damage assessment is intended to be 
an exclusive form of mission capability assessment to provide the commander with 
awareness of how a successful cyber attack on his own networks has impacted his 
mission operations capability.    Research in this area is sparse. What research is available 
is designed for assessing financial losses resulting from an attack; a measurement not 
useful for decision makers in organizations not driven by other than profit.  Cyberspace 
operations affect both the cyber domain and the physical domain.  The reliance of 
military operations upon cyberspace establishes the need for a defensive assessment 
framework to provide commanders with the battlespace awareness needed to prosecute 
the modern campaign.  Surprisingly little research has been carried out towards 
establishment.  This section will examine literature supporting the necessary foundational 
concepts need for CDA-D/MIA framework development. 
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Battle Damage Assessment. 
Assessing the affects of actions against the adversary has been a critical factor in 
the outcome of battles and wars since the beginning of military history.  Battle damage 
assessment (BDA) continues to play a pivotal role in command decision making in 
modern military operations.  JP 1-02 provides the following definition for BDA: 
“The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the 
application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a 
predetermined objective.  Battle damage assessment can be applied to the 
employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and 
special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military 
operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence 
responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators (JP 
1-02 2006).” 
 
Early battle damage assessment was simple but became more complex as 
the complexity of war grew (Diehl and Sloan 2005, pp. 59-60).  The technology 
of warfare allowed faster conduction of military operations, which called for the 
commander to make more decisions in ever shortening time constraints.  
Unfortunately, the limitations of the existing BDA paradigm began to show.  The 
DoD’s Final Report to Congress: The Persian Gulf War, 1992 stated that 
traditional BDA methodology as it was employed in the Persian Gulf War was 
“too slow and inadequate”.  Changes were needed to improve the efficiency of the 
BDA structure (DOD 1992).”  Lt Col Hugh Curry (2004)echoed this sentiment 
argued for the use of  cyber technology to improve the timeliness of the BDA 
process. 
In 2004, Lt. Col Michael Masterson discussed an improved conceptual 
BDA framework to provide commanders with improved battlespace awareness 
 
38 
through assessing the effects of actions against the enemy.  Combat assessment 
(CA) is defined by JP 1-02 as “[t]he determination of the overall effectiveness of 
force employment during military operations (JP 1-02 2006, p. 97).”  Put another 
way, CA is the overall assessment of combat operations in relation to the intent of 
the command objectives, of which BDA is only a part (Sopko 1999).  Masterson 
states that CA is a hierarchy of assessment that begins with Tactical Assessment 
(TA) where BDA occurs.  TA supports component commander’s Operational 
Assessment (OA), which in turn supports campaign assessment, which is the joint 
force commander’s assessment the state of overall campaign mission (Masterson 
2004).   
Masterson’s description of the hierarchy of assessment bears an analogous 
relationship to the hierarchy of missions discussed in the previous chapter (Alberts and 
Dorofee 2005, pp. 3-4); and is a important concept to defensive cyber damage 
assessment.  Sopko, while citing problems with CA that affect the Joint Air Operations 
Center (JAOC) makes the following important differentiation between CA and BDA that 
will have strong ramifications for the development of CDA-D/MIA methodology: 
“The most common mistake among operators and intelligence 
support personnel alike is the confusion between BDA and CA. BDA is a 
familiar term with historical roots and tends to overshadow the CA 
process. Unfortunately, BDA is just one part of this process. BDA is 
intelligence driven while CA is the responsibility of the commander. BDA 
focuses damage to the target and target system while CA is much broader 
and tries to answer the question: "how well are we doing and what’s 
next?" Like BDA, CA provides information to commanders, battle staffs, 
planners, and other decision-makers. This wide audience complicates 
definitions and functions as it is applied across all components and joint 
staffs. The bottom line is that this audience must understand what type of 
information they need. Commanders must be educated in the process and 
be able to practice this. All too often, CA is an afterthought. CA must be 
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considered in the beginning of the targeting process with the development 
of the commander’s objectives. (Sopko 1999)” 
 
Defensive Damage Assessment. 
BDA as previously defined by JP 1-02, attempts to build “timely and accurate 
estimate (2001, p. 63)” of effects of offensive actions against an adversary.  Conversely, 
defensive damage assessment seeks to provide the same type of estimate of the effects of 
an enemy’s attack on friendly assets.   The goal of defensive cyber damage assessment is 
to assess the degree of degradation to one’s own mission capability resulting from a 
successful cyber attack.  In the private sector, such loss of mission capability may be 
measured in financial loss and related constructs, such as those discussed in the Horony 
model (Horony 1999) which discussed later in this paper. In military operations, 
however, factors such as customer loss, business expenses, and damage to reputation do 
not provide the commander with the situational awareness required to make smart and 
timely decisions in wartime. 
In military operations, commanders must make binding decisions that affect the 
overall success of a battle or campaign.  Defensive cyber damage assessment must 
provide the commander with timely and accurate assessment of any degradation in 
operational capability resulting from a successful cyber attack, which may impede his 
force’s ability to carry out the operational intent.  Failure to perform self-assessment 
accurately following a successful cyber attack may introduce unnecessary risk and error 
into the commanders’ decision-making process. 
The lack of a self-damage assessment model was an issue discussed more than a 
decade ago, when Alberts recognized the serious deficiency in the DoD’s ability to assess 
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the damage resulting from a successful compromise of friendly cyber assets (Alberts 
1996, p. 24).  Today, literature on defensive cyber damage assessment remains relatively 
scarce considering the awareness of the exploitable vulnerabilities of business and 
national infrastructure.  Available research literature nearly exclusively addresses private 
sector economic interests; with cost loss determination being the focal point of damage 
assessment.  Even research attempting to determine impact in an academic environment 
(Rezmierski, Deering et Al. 1999) elects economics as the impact metric of choice. 
Although establishing an effective CDA-D/MIA framework that is suitable for damage 
and mission impact assessment of military operations encounters many problems and 
challenges cited by Sopko (Sopko 1999), the issue is important enough that it must be 
accomplished.  When doing so, it is important that the approach to damage assessment is 
correct to ensure delivery of the right damage and mission impact assessment metrics to 
the military commander. 
Decision Superiority. 
Air Force doctrine describes decision superiority as being able to employ the constructs 
of decision making faster and more effectively than the adversary.  Decision superiority 
provides an advantage in the real world and cyber battlespace by allowing commanders 
to exploit a superior situational awareness of the battle space.  This situational awareness 
enables commanders and their forces to make and implement better-informed and smarter 
decisions faster than can the adversary (AFDD2-5 2005).  The Air Force utilizes the well-
known “OODA loop” as a grounded decision-making model.  The OODA loop is a 
theory developed by retired Air Force Col. John Boyd that asserts that all rational human 
behavior can be modeled as a continual cycling through four distinct tasks: Observation, 
 
41 
Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA).  According to Boyd (1996) , the key to 
competitive success is operating inside opponents’ OODA loops.   The Air Force has 
developed an adaptation of Boyd’s OODA loop to match its revised doctrinal concept of 
decision making in the IO environment (see Figure 4 below).  This model provides both a 
picture of the IO environment and a logical foundation for the constructs of IO 
capabilities in the information environment as it relates to Air Force IO doctrine.    
 
Figure 4. Decision Making in the Information Environment (AFDD 2-5 2005, p. 3) 
Information Quality. 
Joint Publication 3-13 explicitly states that “information is a strategic resource 
vital to national security (JP 3-13 1996, p. ix) ” The information that is used for making 
important mission decisions depends that the information is of high quality suitable for 
such use.  The criteria for quality information chart provided by JP 3-13 builds a solid 
foundation for determining the type of information to be presented in a damage and 
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mission impact assessment report (see Table 1 below).  The information in this report 
must be all of these things to allow the commander to make smart and timely decisions 
about issues that may arise following a successful cyber incident.   
Table 1. Information Quality Criteria 
   
(JP 3-13 1996, I-3) 
Development of Damage Metrics. 
Military operations supported by cyber technology can provide commanders a 
distinct advantage by equipping them with timely information.  Too often, though, 
military decision makers find themselves presented with the wrong information on which 
to base timely and smart decisions. When performing effective defensive cyber damage 
assessment after successful cyber attack, it is supremely importance that the 
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organization’s decision maker is presented with a timely and accurate assessment of any 
impact to mission capability.  In other words, to be effective a defensive damage 
assessment model must measure the right thing in the right way so that the result can be 
used effectively by the commander.  Doing this begins with creating the appropriate 
metrics.  
Although metrics are generally applied to process improvement, this research 
borrows some of the important concepts in metrics development.  According to Wesner, 
metrics must first and foremost measure the right thing (Wesner, Hiatt et Al. 1995).  In 
other words, the measurement must be bound to a goal or objective.  In BDA this may be 
a measure or performance (MOP) – measuring the efficiency of a task’s ability to meet an 
objective; or it may be a measure of effectiveness (MOE) – how efficient a task was in 
doing the right thing (Masterson 2004).  MOPs and MOEs intend to measure the “right” 
things to provide battlespace awareness; defensive cyber damages assessment must do 
the same thing.  Metrics must also be SMART: specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, 
and timely (Wesner, Hiatt et Al. 1995).  Each these constructs must be considered to 
develop an effective defensive cyber damage assessment framework which provides 
decision makers with the right information following a cyber compromise.  An effective 
defensive damage assessment framework can be crucial to giving the organization’s 
decision makers decision superiority.  Indeed, determining what the organization’s 
decision maker needs to see for decision superiority in the battlespace must be a primary 




IT and cyberspace can provide the organizational decision maker, and particularly 
the military commander, with the capability to have all the right information at arm’s 
length almost instantaneously.  In this way, IT affords the decision maker a tremendous 
advantage when desiring to attain decision superiority.  However, effective and smart 
decisions depend on having the right quantities of the right input information, meaning 
accurate and relevant information, to facilitate option development needed for effective 
decision making. In accurate or incomplete decisional input, the wrong amount of input, 
or a combination of both produces what is colloquially known as garbage in garbage out 
decision making (Bowman and Moskowitz 2001, p. 775).   
Providing the decision maker with input information of insubstantial quality or 
quantity will increase the probability of a bad decision.  Often overlooked, however, is 
the fact that too much information can have a similar effect on decision making; even if 
the information is correct and suitable to the situation.  Jensen observes that “too much 
information leads to incapacitation of the decision maker’s ability to make a timely 
decision. Information age leaders must caution themselves about this possibility. Sensory 
overload represents our human limitation to process information. Increased volume 
overwhelms not only our ability to consume, but also our ability to process and 
understand (Jensen 2005, p. 56).”   
In a time when many military leaders are calling for more real-time information 
about the battle space, it is important that the right amount about the right things are 
provided to them.  To much complex information can produce the same effect as no 
information.  Therefore, an effective defensive damage assessment framework must 
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assess the damage following a cyber security incident, estimate the impact to mission 
capability, and report it in a manner that provides the decision maker with the right 
quantity of information on which to make a required decision.  Above all the information 
prevented to the decision maker must be presented in a way the delivers the mission 
impact message in a simple and easy to understand format.  Otherwise, such reporting 
could become white noise in the sea of information provided to the commander. 
Critical Information. 
According to Joint Publication 3-13.3 (1996), Operations Security (OPSEC) is a 
process that identifies critical information to determine if friendly actions can be 
observed by the adversary to exploit vulnerability in friendly operations (p. vii).  This 
program requires that organization critical information lists created for the commander to 
understand which information resources he/she must protect (p. I-6).  The OPSEC 
program is not a suitable for vehicle for documenting cyber information assets.   
The intent of the OPSEC program is not to document potential cyber risk.  The 
program possesses a Global War on Terror (GWOT) risk focus.  In the early part of the 
GWOT, there was great concern about the large pools of personal and organizational 
information freely accessible through the Internet.  Information such as personal 
information, street addresses, maps of facilities, and locations of critical buildings of 
military and critical infrastructure organizations were freely available to anyone with 
Web access.   
OPSEC efforts almost entirely omit cyber information assets and there is no 
valuation process within the program.  As a result, the current OPSEC program 
implementation is not designed to provide a commander effective mapping from 
 
46 
information assets to operational or mission impact; a problem that caused by the type of 
information collected.  Critical documentation of cyber information is simply not 
available for damage and mission impact assessment efforts.  
Damage Assessment Reporting. 
 The purpose of a CDA-D/MIA framework is to provide the organizational 
decision makers with the appropriate situation awareness of impact to mission capability 
to enable and maintain decision superiority in the battle space.  Literature review thus far 
has established that this is one way in which CDA-D/MIA bears a close relationship to 
BDA.  However, without an effective mechanism to get the assessment report to the 
decision maker, there is little advantage in performing assessment, as was learned in the 
problems with BDA during the military operations of recent years (Curry 2004, p.13-15; 
Diehl and Sloan 2005, p. 60).  The Air Force, and each respective service, has fortunately 
established such a mechanism.  Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-138 sets cyber incident 
reporting procedures within the Air Force networks and facilitates linking to GIG 
command and control functions.  AFI 33-138 is discussed in detail later in this paper.   
Unfortunately, personal experience in the Iraq Theater of Operations in 2004 
demonstrated that the existing incident reporting structure at the time was not sufficient 
to get the right information to the decision makers in a timely fashion.  The development 
of a standardized and validated CDA-D/MIA framework that can be integrated into joint 
and service defensive IO components on DoD networks may help to correct these 
deficiency in future military operations. 
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Damage Assessment versus Mission Impact Assessment. 
Damage assessment is only part of the picture.  Damage assessment in the cyber 
realm is an inherently focused on technological assessment concerned primarily with 
rapid system restoration issues (Lala and Panda 2000, p. 300).  The Air Force Computer 
Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) stood up in 1993 with the mandate of incident 
handling responsibilities on Air Force networks, including incident damage assessment 
(FAS 1997).  Recent research (Thiem 2005) underscores the many problems with damage 
assessment efforts on Air Force networks, such as lack of standardization and validation 
damage assessment throughout the Air Force enterprise. 
Damage assessment however, is only a step towards the more recent and more 
operationally important problem with mission impact assessment.  According to 
Arvidsson, cyber damage is a consequence of “an attack that affects the normal operation 
of a system or service. (Arvidsson n.d.)”  Impact is the result of damage caused by the 
attack “in terms of the user community (Arvidsson n.d.).” These definitions reflect the 
common perception of damage and mission impact assessment, which leads to confusion 
between the two.   
Damage assessment and mission impact assessment must not be viewed as the 
same thing.  Damage was previously defined as a reduction in value resulting from some 
external action (Oxford, 1986).  Damage assessment, then, must be concerned with 
determining damage in terms of value loss  resulting from an incident..  This loss must be 
assessed in terms relevant to the organization.  Mission impact must be viewed as an 
evaluation of how the damage, or loss in asset value, impairs or potentially may impair 
the organization’s mission operations.   
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Damage assessment and mission assessment are not the same process, but they 
maintain a dependent relationship in that damage assessment must be accomplished to 
accurately understand mission impact resulting from a cyber incident. 
Section Summary. 
This section examined the foundations of defensive cyber damage and mission 
impact assessment by looking at literature on the key contributory issues to damage 
assessment.  Battle damage assessment seeks to determine the effects of offensive actions 
against an adversary, and has much in common with defensive damage assessment.  The 
purpose of both is to provide the commander with the battlespace awareness needed to 
make smart and timely decisions and achieve decision superiority in the battlespace.  
Both BDA and CDA-D/MIA face similar challenges to meeting this objective.  Both 
processes are extremely important to achieving a battlespace advantage.  However, unless 
the assessment process measures the right things and delivers the results to the 
commander in a timely and appropriate format, and in the right quantities little benefits 
may be seen to either process.  Even with all these things done, the information must be 
presented to the decision maker in a way that it can be used and understood.  The 
information in mission impact assessment reporting must be quality information to be 
suitable for making the right decisions in a timely manner. 
Risk Management on Information Networks 
The term risk management is widely used and has different meanings to different 
communities of interest (Kloman 1990, pp. 201-202). Risk management is the process of 
identifying and  assessing the risks to the organizations information assets; and applying 
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appropriate mechanisms to reduce, manage and control risks to information assets (Bragg 
2002).  Many enterprises ‘flirt’ with the idea of risk management, but research show that 
few actually implement it correctly (Hampton 2006, p. 33).  Research also demonstrates 
that organizations which fail to address risk will inevitably realize a greater degree loss 
than organizations which do (Whitman and Mattord 2004, p. 287).  Risk management is 
the most critical component of security planning; consisting of three important activities 
in two distinct phases.  The first two activities, risk identification and risk assessment, 
occur in the first phase.  Defensive damage assessment exclusively concerned with the 
activities of this first phase. The third activity, risk control, solely comprises the second 
phase (Whitman and Mattord 2004, p. 321), and is beyond the scope of this research.   
This section will discuss the main components of risk management and examine 
available literature on key approaches to risk management. 
Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk. 
The terms threat, vulnerability and risk are often confused and misused.  Threat is 
the potential for violation of security that exists when there is a circumstance, capability, 
action, or event that could breach security and cause harm (SANS 2006).  Vulnerability is 
a weakness in system security procedures, system design, implementation, internal 
controls, etc., that could potentially be exploited to violate system security policy (NCSC 
1988).  Risk is “an expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a particular threat 
will exploit a particular vulnerability with a particular harmful result (Shirey 2000).”  
Risk can be viewed as a measure of potential loss to an organization; or more 
specifically, as a measure of exposure to damage or loss (see Figure 5 below).  Two 
additional factors be satisfied:  1) there must be some uncertainty about the outcome, and 
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2) there must be some choice made about the course of action regarding the potential for 
loss (Alberts and Dorofee 2005, p. 5).  Without the potential for loss, there is no risk 
(Petrocelli 2005, pp. 5-6).  The magnitude of risk depends greatly on the assets at risk, or 
more specifically, the value of the assets at risk.   
 
Figure 5. Threat and Risk (Alberts and Dorofee, p. 5) 
 
The eighteenth century German scientist, Georg Lichtenberg (1775) once stated 
that, “Once we know our weaknesses, they cease to harm us.”  Risk actualization cannot 
be entirely avoided, but Lichtenberg was still partially correct.  An organization that 
understands the relationship of threat, vulnerability and risk to its critical assets can do 
much to mitigate the damage and impact to the organization when risk becomes reality.   
Risk Identification. 
Risk identification is the process of self-examination in which the organization 
defines, identifies, and documents its information assets into useful groups (Whitman and 
Mattord 2004, p. 290).  This process is not limited to simply risk and asset identification.  
The assets identified also are prioritized and assigned value in this stage. Risk 
identification can easily become a highly intensive task at the onset. Only by 
accomplishing this process, however, can an organization identify the assets vulnerable to 
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loss.  This process lays the foundation for all future steps of risk management; and failure 
to effectively accomplish results in a greater probability of inefficient protection 
measures and an incapability to provide management necessary visibility into the impact 
following a disaster (Charron 1987, pp. 80-81).  The risk identification process identifies 
critical assets.  Critical assets are those assets that if damaged or lost would affect the 
organization’s ability to operation efficiently.  
 Once critical assets are identified, they may be prioritized and valuated according 
to the respective ‘worth’ to the organization.  This is done through categorization, 
classification, and determining the contextual value of each asset (Whitman and Mattord 
2004, pp. 294-299).  Classification can provide a baseline estimate, but the contextual 
value of the information asset is the most complex, yet most important of the asset 
constructs to determine (Petrocelli 2005, pp.181-182). Without accomplishing effective 
risk identification activities to identify and valuate critical information assets to be 
protected, no “target” exists for which to accurately identify and enumerate the 
vulnerabilities and associate threats to assets requiring protection.  This is vital to any 
security planning effort. 
Risk assessment. 
It is possible for a system to appear safe, but actually have undetected 
vulnerabilities that put its assets at risk (Bishop 2003). There is little reasonable argument 
against risk identification and assessment as integral to establishment of the level of 
protection required to adequately protect organizational assets (GAO 2000).  Whitman 
and Mattord (2004 pp. 290, 308) draw a distinct and important difference, however, 
between risk identification and risk assessment. Risk assessment can is the process of 
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analyzing threats and vulnerabilities of an information system and the potential impact of 
the loss of information or capabilities of a system.  Risk assessment determines probable 
impact of loss of any asset identified in the risk identification stage (Whitman and 
Mattord 2004, pp. 308-309).  
Approaches to Risk Management.  
The past two decades have seen several approaches to risk management on 
information networks come and go.  The first generation approaches, such as the Annual 
Loss Expectancy (ALE)-based “common framework” developed by NIST, failed.  Kevin 
Soo Hoo (2000) attributes this failure to three fatal flaws: 1) an infeasible sized 
assessment task, 2) an expectation of deterministic values that resulted in an inability to 
handle uncertainty, and 3) required a large information harvest from a small field of data 
to populate the ALE model (Soo Hoo 2000, pp. 4-8).   
Integrated Business Risk Management. 
The second generation of approaches to risk management attempted to overcome 
the failures their predecessors.  The Integrated Business Risk Management (IBRM) 
approach holds that IT risks are analogous to business risks, and can be managed in the 
same way.  This approach is distinctly non-technical and focuses on the role of IT support 
for business goals (Soo Hoo 2000, pp. 9-10). Additionally, the IBRM implementation can 
be highly complex. While this approach is used widely in the business world, it may not 
be a practical for risk management of military networks.  More importantly to this goal of 
this research, a central part of the IBRM approach focuses on return on IT investment, 




The scenario-analysis approach is possibly the most common risk management 
methodology.  This approach focus on vulnerabilities within the security controls meant 
to protect the IT infrastructure.  Although, in wide use within the DoD, scenario-analysis 
methodology suffers the major drawback of limited scope (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 11), 
focusing primarily on threat detection and exploit prevention through direct focus on 
technology.  This focus on technical vulnerabilities makes establishing effective cyber 
damage assessment extremely difficult. 
Value-driven approach. 
Value-driven risk management approach is less complex than the IBRM approach 
and offers valuation-driven security specifications to information assets identified and 
valuated by an enterprise agent with sufficient perspective to determine relative value of 
the asset.  These specifications attempt to ensure security and standardize security 
practices within the enterprise.  According to Soo Hoo (2005), this approach avoids the 
technical complexities that crippled ALE-based methodologies, and facilitates focus on 
critical deployment issues.  Soo Hoo argues, however, that this approach is too simple to 
be effective, ignoring key capabilities such as cost-benefit analysis and the information 
technology that contains the asset (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 10).   
The OCTAVE method. 
There are asset-focused methodologies, such as Operationally Critical Threat, 
Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) method (Alberts, Dorofee et Al. 2003), 
that overcome many of the shortcomings of other approaches by integrating attributes 
from other methodologies.  The OCTAVE method was developed by Carnegie Mellon 
 
54 
University and allows organizations to balance the best practices of the previous three in 
one package (Whitman and Mattord 2004, pp. 347-349).  OCTAVE employs a three-
phase approach that is founded on information asset identification and valuation.  In 
Phase 1, the focus is on defining, documenting, and valuating critical information assets 
within the organization.  Asset profiles are created, documenting the critical information 
assets on which the organization relies.  These profiles record the information asset’s 
value, owners, required security controls, threats and vulnerabilities, and other critical 
constructs of the information asset.  Technological vulnerabilities within the 
infrastructure are not documented until Phase 2.  In Phase 3, risk is analyzed and security 
plans, policy, and other controls are created and employed to mitigate the risk (Alberts 
and Dorofee 2001, pp. D-19-21).  Because of its focus on the identification, 
documentation, and valuation of information assets and technology, OCTAVE is a 
comprehensive risk management approach that lays a solid foundation for CDA-D/MIA 
framework implementation. 
Air Force Operational Risk Management Program. 
The Air Force employs a risk management program entitled the Operational Risk 
Management Program (ORM) (AFPD 90-9  2000; AFI 90-901  2001).  Among the 
primary goals of ORM are enhancement of mission effectiveness at all levels, while 
protecting the organization’s assets and improving war fighting mission effectiveness and 
mission accomplishment (AFPD 90-9 2000).  Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-901 (2001) 
implements the ORM program and correctly identifies the critical risk management steps 
of identification, assessment, and control of risk to operational assets.  However, it is 
important to note that the ORM process does not explicitly recognize cyber information 
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assets in its assessment process. Air Force ORM deals exclusively with risk management 
of physical assets.   
Section Summary. 
An effective risk management is critical to establishing an effective information 
security program.  There exist distinct differences in the approaches to risk management, 
so an organization must carefully choose one the enables a comprehensive approach to 
effective information protection.  Many organizations do not perform effective risk 
management activities, or limit the scope of the risk management functions such that they 
are ineffective.  An asset-focused approach that enables identification and valuation of 
the information assets on which the organization depends, and identifies the business 
processes and goals which they support, such as the OCTAVE approach (Alberts, 
Dorofee et Al. 2003), is essential to building the foundation of defensive cyber damage 
assessment. 
Information Assets 
 This section will examine the relevance of information as an asset to the 
organization.  As Drucker (1995) correctly recognizes, information is the center of 
gravity for daily operations within the modern business organization.  This dependence 
exists because information holds relevance and value as knowledge to the organization.  
The distinction between information and the IT that enables organizations to effectively 
use it is often blurred.  Understanding this distinction is fundamental to creating an 
approach to cyber security that facilitates defensive cyber damage assessment.  This 
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section examines literature that provides a fundamental understanding of information as 
an asset. 
An Information Taxonomy. 
This aspect of CDA-D/MIA development research is primarily concerned with 
developing an understanding of the difference between data and information.  They are 
frequently confused and used incorrectly referred to interchangeably.  Some communities 
of interest mistakenly hold that there is little distinguishable difference between, data, 
information, and knowledge (Alavi and Leidner 1999). However, a better understanding 
of each reveals the distinct contextual differences that define each and provide the 
foundations for information taxonomy. Data is the foundation of this taxonomy. The 
information taxonomy develops as information progresses from raw data to information 
to refined knowledge suitable for decision-making  (Kanter 1999, pp. 8). The catalyst for 
development of the taxonomy is the assignment of contextual meaning through human 
application and utility (Petrocelli 2005, p. 181). 
Data is the subset of information and the focus of traditional cyber security 
schemes that focus on the storage, access, and protection of the container system on 
which the data is stored.  However, data has no inherent value. It is completely dependent 
upon its external application to produce value (Petrocelli 2005, pp. 180-181). Human 
utility drives organization and aggregation of data into usable groupings of contextual 
relationships that endow the data with relevance and purpose. Thus data becomes 
information which, by its nature, is inherently associated with meaning (Spiegler 2000, 
pp. 8-9). Information, not data, is the center of this taxonomy, as it is the basic unit that 
contributes to the development of knowledge for use in all forms of decision making. 
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Knowledge is information further aggregated into a more usable form that can be made 
actionable to provide value to the organizational mission (Kanter 1999, pp. 7-9; Vail 
1999, pp. 16-17). The ensuing information taxonomy reflects the increasing value as 
information is transformed and used within the organization for decision making 
(Spiegler 2000, pp. 9-11). Because information is the core asset of cyberspace, it must be 
at the center of asset focused security planning and risk management if cyber damage 
assessment is to be possible. 
Contextual Value of Information.  
 The classical economics theory of uncertainty holds that information cannot be 
valued like consumption good.  Information is useful primarily as an input to decisions, 
and is extremely difficult to assign a quantitative value (Van Alstyne 1999, pp. 328-329).  
The value of information is dynamic and changes from one organization to the next; and 
even within an organization as the context that assigns value changes (Petrocelli 2005, 
pp. 185-189).  This problem of context introduces a varying level of uncertainty in 
assigning value, and is one factor that has confounded many attempts at developing 
models to account for and definitively measure the value of an information asset (Soo 
Hoo 2000, p. 7).  Information value is not static explicitly because of this concept of 
context.  Its value is always relative to some target goal (Morrision and Cohen 2005, p. 
34). If the information asset aligns with the mission by strongly supports an 
organization’s strategic goal, the asset will prove to hold a high level of contextual value 
to the organization whole; especially if the asset is a direct contributor to some 
competitive advantage gained or held by the organization (Willcocks 2004, pp. 241-245).  
When the information asset directly aligns with the mission of the entire organization, its 
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contextual value is simple to understand.  However, an asset may exist within the 
hierarchy of missions that exist within an organization.  Determining the value of the 
asset may not be as readily determined without examining the assets utility in relation to 
its support for mission operational processes.  However, it is important to realize that the 
primary value driver for information is externally determined by how the owner tied the 
information asset’s usability to achieving some goal the owner desires (Buffett, Scott, et. 
Al. 2004, pp. 80-81; Morrison and Cohen 2005, p. 34).   
Remember that Albert’s hierarchy of missions says that an organization maintains 
an ordinal stacking of missions that work together to support the organization’s 
established goals. Each organizational function has its own goals and processes that 
support is mission. This functional mission supports the organizational mission, in turn.  
Each of these functions depends on information assets and systems with an inherent 
contextual value to the respective function.  An information asset that is critical to the 
mission of one function may have little or no value to another, but still have hold high 
value to the organizational mission. This supports Petrocelli’s assertion the value of 
information is not static, but is a function of context and perspective relating to mission 
(Petrocelli 2005 pp. 183-184).  Consider, however, that an information asset that is of 
high value to as supporting function within the organization can also be high value to the 
organization as a whole; depending on the degree of dependence of the organization’s 
mission depends of the function’s operational processes that rely upon that asset. 
 Information also holds contextual value that can change throughout its lifecycle.  
Information can age beyond usefulness. It can suffer compromise to its confidentiality, 
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availability, or integrity that may reduce its usefulness to the organization, which equates 
to degradation in value to the organization. 
Owners, Custodians, and Consumers of Information Assets. 
The traditional thought on information responsibility and usage hold that there are 
three basic categorical communities that “touch” information: information owners, 
information custodians, and information consumers, or users.  It must be noted that there 
is no commonly agreed upon definition of any of these and that different communities of 
interest include additional, more specific categories. A commonly accepted definition for 
an information owner, however, is “the person or group responsible for applying security 
policies to an information object” (Computer Desktop Encyclopedia n.d.).  Stephens 
states “owners of an information asset are those individuals who have primary 
responsibility for the viability and survivability of an asset” (Stevens 2005, p. 6). The 
information custodian is the individual or group of individuals within the organization 
that bears the responsibility for protection of the information asset as it is stored, moved, 
or processed.  Owners are responsible for establishing the security requirements and 
custodians are responsible for ensuring the requirements are carried out.  Stephens also 
states the information owner, not the custodian, is responsible for understanding the value 
that the asset maintains to the organization (2005, p. 7).  The custodian, however, is 
responsible for the infrastructure in which the asset resides; and is responsible for no 
more than the protection and assurance activities required to keep the asset safe and 
accessible.  According to Stephens (2005, p. 7), in many organizations the owner is 




The information user, or consumer, depends upon the information for some 
process, but does not necessarily bear ownership or custodial responsibilities.  This 
definition does not preclude the consumer from bearing any responsibility for protecting 
the information.  The consumer is most often closest to the asset and associated risk 
(Spears 2006).  For this reason, the consumer must bear some degree of custodial 
responsibility when using information. Stephens illustrates this with a scenario of a user 
accessing a database from a desktop.   
“In essence, the user, as the manager of that desktop, is temporarily also a 
custodian. Custodians are generally required to provide due care over the 
information asset while it is in their possession. Thus, the user should 
ensure that she protects this information asset as well as or better than it 
was protected at the container from which she received it. More 
importantly, the user should protect the information asset commensurate 
with its security requirements. If she cannot, the owner of the information 
asset should deny her access to it or deny her the privilege of acting as a 
custodian for the information. (Stevens 2005, p. 8)“ 
 
It is important to understand that these three categorical communities of 
information responsibility are not mutually exclusive.  An information owner can 
also be the custodian, with responsibility of determining value and security 
controls for an information asset, and responsibility for the technological asset 
that contains the information asset.  As this literature has shown that the user can 
bear some degree of custodial responsibility, the owner can also be any one of 
many consumers.  Stephens observes that in the real world, an information asset 
may have multiple owners, and thus, many different security requirements.  This 
is an important concept to understand when attempting to determine damage 
caused to an information asset by a successful cyber attack. 
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Information Assets vs. Information Technology Assets. 
 Operations rely on information, and this research has established that modern 
organizations rely largely upon information in cyberspace.  Because of this dependency 
upon specific information, operations regard the information on which it depends as an 
asset. Information technology is an enabler for operations to achieve improved access to 
that information. Consider that in IT non-availability, it is conceivable that operations can 
continue if another mode of information delivery is contrived.  However, with the 
scenario reversed, the presence of IT would not enable the mission without the 
information asset on which the mission depends. In his controversial article, IT doesn’t 
matter (Carr 2003, p. 41-42), Carr hits precisely upon this issue.  Too many organizations 
erroneously believe that IT will provide a competitive advantage and focus on IT as a 
vehicle to strategic success.  Carr correctly argues that IT offers no such guarantee (2003, 
pp. 41-43).  Carr’s stance supports Davenport’s assertion made earlier in this literature 
review that technology is not an equitable substitute for information (Davenport and 
Prusack 1998).   
An exclusive focus on IT is especially dangerous when attempting to establish an 
effective security program.  The first step of such a program must identify what must be 
protected.  If the focus is exclusively on a single target asset group, developing a 
comprehensive understanding of the value and potential impact from risk realized 
becomes difficult. (Soo Hoo 2000, pp. 10-11).  By first understanding and identifying 
information as an asset, followed by understanding the its relationship with it 




Valuation of Information Assets. 
Information and the systems that contain and process it are among the most 
valuable assets of any organization (GAO 2000, p. 2).  Virtually all existing literature 
regarding data, information, or knowledge value attempts to assign economic value to the 
asset.  This is not surprising, since the vast majority of the available work is sponsored by 
for-profit private sector organizations.  It is important to realize that the common thread 
is that information assets are not purely commodities with prefixed value.  The way 
information is valued varies in a large degree on the perspective of the information owner 
(Buffett, Scott, et. Al. 2004, p. 79).  It must be recognized, however, that the primary 
value driver for information is not internal.  The value of information is determined by 
how it can be used by its owner and this value is necessarily tied the utility in achieving 
some goal the owner desires (Buffett, Scott, et. Al. 2004, pp. 80-81; Morrison and Cohen 
2005, p. 34).   Therefore, any valuation of information must reflect this acknowledgement 
of utility as a value driver for the valuation to be meaningful to the owner. 
Section Summary. 
This section examined literature fundamental to establishing the concept of 
information as an asset within the modern organization.  Organizations depend on 
information to accomplish the mission.  Technology enables the flow of and access to the 
information.  Data has no inherent value, about must be organized in such a way that it 
becomes information and gains meaning and, thus, value to the organization.  The 
information asset has owners, custodians, and consumers that hold differing perspectives 
of the information, respectively.  Information is frequently forgotten when exclusive 
focus is placed on the technology that supports it.  This limits the understanding of the 
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value the information holds to these communities of interest and the organization as a 
whole.  Information, not technology, must be viewed as the chief asset in an information 
organization if value is to be realized.  Only then can damage and mission impact 
assessment be fully realized. 
Relevant Laws, Orders, Doctrine and Guidance Relevant to Cyberspace 
 A large body of law, directive, and guidance exists to govern the conduct of the 
various aspects of military and government operations in cyberspace.  This section will 
take a comprehensive approach to provide an exhaustive review of the literature and law 
applicable to conduct of cyberwarfare and the establishment of a defensive cyber damage 
assessment framework. 
Legal Implications of Cyberwarfare. 
Air Force Policy Directive 51-4 (1993) mandates that Air Force personnel are 
required to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) while engaging in armed 
conflict.  It defines armed conflict is defined as a situation where at least one state has 
engaged in use of armed force (1993).  There exists much debate about the legality of 
offensive cyberwarfare operations and what, in cyberspace, equates to an armed attack.  
The Air Force is keenly aware of this and addresses this subject in AFDD 2-5, 
Information Operations doctrine. Dr. Thomas Wingfield addresses this issue through 
review of international law. He reports that the Charter of the United Nations articulates 
the principle of jus ad bellum, which is “the portion of international law that governs the 
lawful resort to force (Wingfield 2006, p. 2).”  Wingfield determines that there are many 
issues when defining the threshold of escalation from cyber conflict to the equivalent of 
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armed conflict.  One of the many concerns raised in other literature is the issue of 
collateral damage which may have unexpected affects on unintended targets.  Collateral 
damage is a concern in the cyber domain because of the many interdependencies upon 
information assets.  Cyber attacks are not bound by the laws of physics and the effects of 
an attack may have unintended consequences on the other side of the world.  Failure to 
accurately assess the collateral damage of a cyber attack may be unethical at best, and 
illegal at worst (Rowe 2005).  Ultimately, however, Wingfield concedes that there is still 
no consensus on the legality of cyber warfare (Wingfield 2006, pp. 12-13).   
DiCenso comes to a similar conclusion by pointing out that no clear guidance 
exists to define what constitutes armed force (DiCenso 1999, p. 88).  DiCenso holds The 
Air Force’s definition of a weapon (AFI 51-04 1994) clearly indicates that there does not 
appear to be any legal issue of significance regarding the application of cyberwar in 
regards to LOAC.  The areas of cryptology and encryption have raised much interesting 
discussion regarding this, but primarily concerning policy and strategy rather than 
legality.  Both Wingfield and DiCenso agree that current interpretation of international 
law holds that a nation allows a nation to engage in defensive cyberwarfare operations to 
protect its cyber and real-world assets in any way, so long as these activities do not 
negatively impact another nation’s assets (DiCenso 1999 pp. 98-99; Wingfield 2006, p. 
12). 
Doctrine on Information Operations and Cyberspace. 
In 2006, both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the United 
States Air Force issued revised joint doctrine on Information Operations.  The DoD’s 
standard for military terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (2006), was also updated to reflect 
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these changes.  Prior to this revision, both doctrinal documents made a clear delineation 
between offensive and defensive activities in Information Operations (IO).  This recent 
update to JP 3-13, Information Operations (2006) states that Joint IO doctrine now 
“discontinues use of the terms ‘offensive IO’ and ‘defensive IO’”, but states that “the 
recognition that IO is applied to achieve both offensive and defensive objectives (JP 3-13 
2006). ” This revised joint doctrine places computer network attack (CNA), computer 
network defense (CND), and computer network exploitation (CNE) functions under one 
umbrella by establishing Computer Network Operations (CNO).  JP 3-13 cites CNO as 
one of the five core capabilities of joint IO doctrine (JP 3-13 2006).  The following table 
displays the notional revision of joint IO structure (see Table 2 below).  It is worthy to 






















Table 2. Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations 
(JP 3-13  2006) 
 
 The Air Force (AFDD2-5 2005) has created a network operations capability 
which is comprised of three functions mirroring the joint CNO construct.  The Air 
Force’s Network Warfare operations (NW Ops) are the integration of the military 
capabilities of network attack (NetA), network defense (NetD), and network warfare 
support (NS).  The intent of NetA is to perform offensive operations against the 
adversary’s cyber information assets with the desired effect of “influence[ing] the 
adversary commander’s decisions. (AFDD2-5 2005)”   In this way, Air Force IO doctrine 
acknowledges that cyber operations can impact the adversary’s mission capability, both 
in the cyber domain and in real world operations.   
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Federal Information Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347, Title III). 
The federal government has a limited role in the overall security of the national 
infrastructure.   The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal 
government’s primary agent for working with state and local governments, the private 
sector, academia, and the general public to ensure necessary measures are enacted to 
protect the national information infrastructure (Moteff 2004).  It has, however, produced 
requirements for securing those information systems under federal control through the 
passage of P.L. 107-347, Title III, commonly known as the Federal Information Security 
Act (FISMA) of 2002 (United States Congress 2002).  FISMA recognizes that the chief 
underlying factor in the majority of information security problems within federal 
agencies this the employment of an ineffective information security program; and 
attempts to create a comprehensive framework for more effective information security 
(GAO 2005).  FISMA authorizes the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) to develop the security standards and guidelines that will be used on federally 
“owned” non-national security systems.  Section 3542, subparagraph (2A) defines a 
national security system as any computer or telecommunications system that is operated 
by a federal agency, or agency contractor, and used in a function or activity which: 
• Involves intelligence activities; 
• Involves cryptological activities related to national security; 
• Involves command and control of military forces; 
• Involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; 
• is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or 
• “is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been 
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act 
of Congress to be dept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign 




Subparagraph 2B explicitly excludes systems that meet the above criteria, but are “used 
for routine administration and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, 
and personnel management applications) (2002).” 
 Of particular interest to this research is the requirement throughout FISMA to 
provide an information security program commensurate with amount of potential damage 
that could result from a successful compromise.  Furthermore, FISMA specifically cites 
the information stored on the system, rather than the information system exclusively. 
Section 3544, subparagraphs (2)(A-D) specifically tasks the head of each agency under 
the authority of FISMA to ensure senior agency officials establish an information security 
program based on risk to the assets that support operations.  This is extremely important 
as it implies the need for asset-focused risk assessment, which is the foundation of 
defensive damage assessment.  Section 3544, subparagraphs (2)(A-D) reads as follows: 
‘‘’(2) ensure that senior agency officials provide information security for 
the information and information systems that support the operations and 
assets under their control, including through— 
‘(A) assessing the risk and magnitude of the harm that could result 
from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction of such information or information 
systems; 
‘(B) determining the levels of information security appropriate to 
protect such information and information systems in accordance 
with standards promulgated under section 11331 of title 40, for 
information security classifications and related requirements; 
‘(C) implementing policies and procedures to cost-effectively 
reduce risks to an acceptable level; and 
‘(D) periodically testing and evaluating information security 
controls and techniques to ensure that they are effectively 




National Security Directive 42 (NSD-42). 
NSD-42 (Bush 1990) describes the foundational goals for information technology 
and telecommunications security within the federal government and provides basic 
implementation strategy for securing the systems designated as national security systems.  
This directive mandates the national security telecommunications and information 
technology must be reliable, effective, efficient, and have a sound technical base. NSD-
42 was signed by President George H. Bush on July 5, 1990.  NSD-42 explicitly names 
the Director, National Security Agency (NSA) as the National Manager for National 
Security Telecommunications and Information.  Among the many authorities granted to 
the National Manager is the responsibility to assess the overall security posture, to 
include threats and vulnerabilities to national security systems.  The contextual support 
provided by the other Directives and Orders examined in this section support the 
assumption that the intent is to protect the information procession systems and the 
information assets residing on these systems.   
HSPD-7 and the President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. 
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7 (HSPD-7) is an extension of 
basic policy established by the previous administration’s Presidential Decision Directive 
No. 63, and states that is the United States policy to enhance the protection of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure.  HSPD-7 is inclusive of both cyber and real-world infrastructure 
assets, but specifically directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to maintain and 
organization that serves as the cyber security focal point by coordinating protection 
efforts between public and private sector and academia (Bush 2003). 
 
70 
According to John Moteff  (2004), the President’s National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace (PNSSC)  (NIAC 2002)carries less weight than public law or presidential 
directive, it is still considered an important step towards bringing together all interested 
parties in securing those mission systems and processes dependent on cyberspace (Moteff 
2004). The PNSSC outlines the strategic importance and strategic objectives for 
protecting cyberspace-dependent systems and operations.  This document supports, and at 
times overlaps, other Executive Orders and Presidential Directives and recommends 
specific tasks which include vulnerability threat and warning sharing, integrated exercises 
to test cyber security response and effectiveness, coordination of national threat 
assessment.   
The recommendations PNSSC makes are only guidelines for suggested 
implementation.  Many experts feel that this plan falls short of its intended purpose.  In 
2004, the Professionals for Cyberspace Defense, an elite group of approximately 40 
concerned scientists and cyber security experts (PCD 2002b), expressed concern that no 
definitive research or validation had been conducted to assess the national vulnerability to 
date.  The PCD cited a “failure to establish the full nature of the problem represents a 
fundamental flaw in the White House strategy (Saydjari 2002, p. 125).”   
CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B, ENCLOSURE B. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) No. 6510.01 Change 3, 
Defense-In-Depth: Information Assurance (IA) And Computer Network Defense (CND), 
08 March, 2006 is a limited distribution document, therefore only a very specific section 
of this manual that is very important to this research will be discussed.  CJCSM 6510.10 
Ch3 Annex A to Appendix B to Enclosure B establishes the responsibilities of the Joint 
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Staff, combatant commands, Services, Defense agencies, DoD field activities and join 
activities.  This manual very explicitly prescribes the  operational impact assessment 
resulting from a successful cyber attack on DoD networks be provided to commanders 
and other responsible communities of interest (CJCSM6510.01 2006).  To meet this 
requirement, a validated defensive cyber damage assessment framework must be in place 
to provide commanders and other required personnel with timely and accurate 
operational impact report.  Without a validated framework, cyber damage assessment is a 
non-standardized, undependable estimate of the damage caused by cyberspace incidents 
on Air Force networks (Thiem 2005, p. 43). 
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-206 Operational Reporting. 
AFI 10-206 Operational Reporting establishes the Air Force Operational 
Reporting System (AFOREPS) and the Operational Status Event/Incident Report 
(OPREP-3).  AFOREPS is a set of reports intended to provide Air Force level leadership 
and intermediate commands with timely situational awareness information to make 
timely operational decisions.  The OPREP-3 is one of the key reports that contribute to 
the AFOREPS.  The OPREP-3 report is an immediate report issued to notify commanders 
of any significant event or incident that effects MAJCOM, HQ USAF, or DoD mission; 
to include events that impacts the commander’s mission capability in such a way that 
higher level mission is affected (AFI 10-206 2004).  The OPREP-3 report categorizes 
events and incidents according to their potential impact.  AFI 10-206 explicitly defines 
the criteria for each various types of OPREP-3 reports, and more importantly the report 
content and reporting procedures for each.  This AFI establishes the mechanism for up-
channeling incidents that impact an organizations mission capability; and therefore is 
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important guidance for establishing initial mission impact reporting following cyber 
damage assessment. 
AFI 33-138 Enterprise Network Operations Notification and Tracking. 
AFI 33-138, Enterprise Network Operations Notification and Tracking 
establishes a hierarchy of reporting for all issues and incidents occurring on Air Force 
networks.  It implements, among other guidance, the incident and vulnerability reporting 
requirements specified in CJCSM 6510.01, Defense-in-Depth: Information Assurance 
(IA) and Computer Network Defense (2006).  This AFI prescribes and explains the 
various notification and tracking processes required to direct and coordinate action and 
report status within the Air Force Network Operations (AFNETOPS) hierarchy.   
AFI 33-138 (2004) is establishes a unified and standardized reporting system that 
facilitates rapid dissemination of incident notification and the command and control 
direction for response actions throughout Air Force networks.  Specifically defined in this 
AFI are the reporting and directive actions required for such protective and preventive 
activities network security incidents reporting, Time Compliance Technical Orders, and 
Classified Message Incidents.  The reporting structure established by this AFI is 
especially well suited for rapid multidirectional information dissemination through the 
AFNETOPS command and control structure to the information owners affected by a 
successful cyber attack.  The unified and consolidated incident reporting structure 
established by this AFI is very important to ensuring the rapid and secure damage 
assessment reporting information to both AFNETOPS command and control, and 




This section considered the body of essential laws, directives, doctrine, and 
service instructions that provide guidance for the conduct of cyberspace and cyberwar 
operations, and the establishment of a defensive cyber damage assessment framework; 
and established that there are few legal complications associated with defensive 
cyberwarfare activities.  Particularly noteworthy is FISMA’s requirement that agencies 
under its jurisdiction establish security controls for both operations and assets that is 
commensurate with amount of potential damage that could result from a successful 
compromise.  This wording strongly implies asset-focused risk management, which is the 
foundation for an effective CDA-D/MIA framework.  Although FISMA does not apply to 
national security systems, commanders responsible for systems supporting military 
operations under CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 are required to provide operational impact 
assessment following a cyber security incident.  AFI 10-206 Operational Reporting and 
AFI 22-138 establish operational impact reporting requirements and establish a unified 
reporting system on Air Force networks. 
 
Related Research and Work 
This research has stated that the financial loss estimation desired by for profit 
organizations provide a less effective decision making tool for non-profit driven 
institutions such as the military.  This statement is true when considering the necessary 
decision input for tactical and operational decisions.  In strategic decision making, 
however, the military shares a common interest with the profit driven sector.  As 
shrinking budgets and an important war on terror cause DoD leadership to carefully 
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guard every dollar spent; wise investment in information technology and the security 
controls to protect the information assets within becomes highly important. In this 
context, understanding the financial losses caused by successful cyber security incidents 
has value for making important long-range decisions. 
Determining Large Scale Economic Loss. 
Damage assessment models that fit a military decision making framework are 
scarce.  In relative contrast, models that seek to determine the economic loss caused by a 
successful cyber attack seem to abound. If a model is to describe financial lose within and 
organization, such as the military, it must be able to address the effects of large scale 
attack distributed across a wide area.  One approach is to attempt assessment of large 
scale economic loss of time (Dubendorfer 2004).  The Dubendorfer, et. Al., scenario 
assumes an external attack via the Internet.  This attack specifically launches a dedicated 
denial of service (DDoS) attack against national infrastructure provider in an attempt to 
severely degrade wide area service and negatively impact companies.  This scenario 
further assumes that the attack has a relatively short duration, measured in hours to days.  
The attacker’s expectancy is that a significant degradation in Internet performance will 
result in financial loss and that the longer an attack lasts, the greater the potential 
economic impact (Dubendorfer 2004).  Furthermore, economic impact can increase past 
the duration of the attack, unlike technical impact, which generally ends with post-attack 
remediation.   
The Dubendorfer, et. Al. model approaches this duration of potential economic 
impact as ∞→t , where 0tt =  is the time of the attack start, and 1̀tt =  as the time of 
attack completion.  The interval following the attack is represented as ],[ 21 tt , where 2t  
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presumably represents completion of remediation and return to normal business.  
Duration of impact beyond 2t  is represented as 2tt > .   
This model attempts to estimate economic loss within categories of types of 
damage. Dubendorfer, et. Al, identify the following four categories: 
1. Downtime Loss:  Total downtime loss ( DL ) is comprised of two 
subcategories, productivity loss, where the incident forces employees to 
utilize less efficient means of accomplishing assigned tasks, and revenue loss. 
Downtime loss may be represented as the sum of these two; and may be 











D ⋅⋅⋅+⋅⋅⋅= , where caE  
represents annual cost per employee, ad  represents working time per 
employee per year, 0d represents working hours overlapping outage time, noE  
represents the number of employees affected, poE  represents productivity 
degradation during the incident, aR  is the total annual revenue, sad  represents 
annual service operating hours, sod  represents service hours affected by 
outage, 0R  represents that part of revenue affected by the outage, and 
0S represents the degree of service degradation (Dubendorfer 2004) 
2. Disaster Recovery:  Disaster recovery costs rL  include the time, material and 
additional incidental expenses incurred for restoration and recovery following 
an incident.  Disaster recovery costs may be modeled as the sum of costs 
incurred during downtime, cited by Duberdorfer, et. Al., as ],[ 10 tt .  It is 
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modeled as: crchrr MdEEL +⋅⋅⋅= , where rE represents number of 
employees assigned to recovery team, chE  represents hourly cost per team 
member, rd represents non-“duty” hours work, and cM represents material 
costs incurred (Dubendorfer 2004). 
3. Liability: In some cases the incident may result in the organization failing to 
fulfill contractual obligations with third party organizations.  These 
organizations may demand financial compensation, resulting in liability costs 
( cL ).  Liability costs may modeled as follows: ∑∑ += lC CCLc , where 
∑ CC represents the sum of all compensation claims, and ∑ lC  represents 
the sum of all liability claims (Dubendorfer 2004). 
4. Customer Loss:  The incident may result in loss of customers, depending on 
various factors.  The impact of customer loss cost ( CLL ) may accrue for a long 
time, and potentially have a negative on recruitment of new customers.  This 
long-term loss may be modeled by considering sum of actual customers ( AC ) 
and potential customers lost ( PC ) over time ( tΔ ), multiplied by the average 
revenue per customer ( CR ) and follows: )()]()([ tRtCtCL CPACL Δ⋅Δ+Δ= .  
Dubendorfer further notes that if CR  has a high variance, this model is 
inaccurate.  When this occurs, a detailed analysis should be used, representing 
only the critical customers (Dubendorfer 2004). 
It should be noted that this type of model may be suited specific non-operational, 
strategic decisions that military decision makers consider when determining budgetary IT 
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issues, such as level of investment in technological security controls.  Such a model can 
perform suitably for assessment of economic loss.  Associating the information’s value 
with an economic handle provides some tangibility to the information, but still cannot the 
intangible property of utility.  Development of such a model would provide some benefit 
to the decision maker of an organization not driven by economic profit motives. 
A Utility-Based Value Model for Information Decision Making. 
This section will briefly discuss the concepts of another model (Morrison and Cohen 
2005) that information value from a utility-based perspective.  This model focuses on the 
value of information being relative to some goal decision (Morrison and Cohen p. 34).  
This has important implications about developing value handles for the intangible 
properties by which information presents value to the organizations.   
 Morrison and Cohen present their base target decision model (p. 35, eq. 1) as a 
way to model simple decision making based, where the target hypothesis relates to the 
utility value of information.  This model is explicitly geared towards making economic 
based decisions based on , so no further discussion will entail about the details of the 
model.  The model is noteworthy, however since it provides one way to determine 
relative value through the information utility. 
Damage Assessment on Air Force Networks. 
 Case study research (Thiem 2005) conducted to understand how defensive 
damage assessment was being conducted on Air Force networks focused on information 
collected through interviews with subjects working in MAJCOM NOSCs and the Air 
Force Computer Emergency Response Team, now renamed AFNOSC NSD (AFI 33-138 
2004).  This effort established that some degree of damage assessment is attempted in 
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various places within the Air Force networks.  However, Thiem cites that “individual 
organizations within the [Air Force] are developing their own methods and models to 
perform network damage assessment (Thiem 2005, p. 43).”  The research notes that 
several of the assessment methodologies discussed did not apply guidance, such as AFI 
10-206 (2004) to ensure that impact to mission capability was considered in the 
assessment.  Without an established standard and validated methodology, cyber damage 
assessment on Air Force networks is unreliable at best. 
 Two interesting concepts are uncovered by Thiem’s research that underscore 
topics previously discussed in this chapter and are worthy of further examination.  First, it 
is noteworthy that one of the few commonalities between damage assessment 
methodologies was the focus on damage to the system.  Two respondents to the survey 
answered that damage assessment is unnecessary since it takes focus away from 
infrastructure protection.  Clearly, this response is symptomatic of the limited scope of 
understanding created by technologically focused scenario analysis approach to risk 
management discussed by Soo Hoo (2000, p. 11).  This mindset, as reflected by the 
respondents, holds protection of technology at a higher priority than protection the 
information asset itself.  This disregard for the technological enabler over the mission 
critical asset causes problems on many levels and may be indicative of a perspective that 
may be preventing effective and accurate damage and mission impact assessment on Air 
Force networks.   
Secondly, not a single respondent addresses the issue of mission capability impact 
that may result from a successful cyber attack.  Impact analysis, a predictive estimation of 
damage to the operational mission if an asset is lost, is not considered (Stoneburner, 
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Goguen, et. Al.  2002, p. 12).  The survey interviews conducted by Thiem (2005) shed 
light on several problematic issues regarding the current status of damage assessment on 
Air Force networks, and problems that may be preventing effective damage assessment 
and mission capability assessment being implemented under the existing approach to 
network security and risk management.  
The Horony Damage Assessment Model. 
Research (Horony 1999) conducted at the Air Force Institute of Technology 
aimed to develop a model for Information System damage assessment.  This research was 
exploratory and the model produced conceptual.  Horony identifies eight primary factors 
he states an Information Systems manager should consider during the risk assessment 
process.  The eight factors of the Horony model (see Figure 6 below) are:  
• Recovery  
• Data  
• Education/Training  
• Lost Revenue  
• Business Expenses  
• Reputation  
• Productivity  
• Human Life.   




Figure 6. Horony Damage Assessment Model (1999, p. 35) 
 
The Recovery Factor. 
Horony defines recovery as the “process that system administrator must take to 
restore an information system to the most current state prior to the incident (Horony 
2000, p. 30).”  Under this definition, the recovery factor of the Horony model includes all 
those activities involved with incident response, investigation, and remediation.   
Horony defines five sub-factors as subsets of the recovery factor.  These are 
investigation, restore, software / hardware, consultants / contractors, and accounts.  The 
investigation sub-factor consists of all activities undertaken to determine incident 
causality and consequential damage incurred.  Horony includes such things as intrusion 
detection, determining the damage, incident handling under this sub-factor (Horony 1999, 
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p. 37).  The restore sub-factor includes all infrastructure affected by the incident.  
Infrastructure items, such as servers, routers, bridges, gateways, desktop systems, etc. 
must be returned to the pre-incident state through means such as backup restoration, 
system rebuild, or purchase. The software /hardware sub factor considers damage or loss 
to infrastructure system software or infrastructure system component hardware that 
would require replacement.  Horony states that this could include hardware or software 
confiscated by an authorized investigative agency and any hardware or software deemed 
necessary to improve system security (1999, p.37). The consultant / contractor sub-factor 
consists of any outsourcing of manpower for assistance in investigative and/or recovery 
activities.  Such activities could include use of clean-room facilities for forensic 
investigation, or specialized data recover assistance from damaged storage media. The 
accounts sub-factor address actions required to bring affected accounts back online, 
providing users access to the IS systems, once available. 
The Education/ Training Factor.  
The second primary factor of the Horony model is Education / Training.  Horony 
states that “as an investigation proceeds the need for additional education and training 
within the organization may become evident.  Systems administrator and information 
security personnel may not have the necessary skill to perform a thorough investigation 
(Horony 1999, p.31).”  Therefore, this model takes into account the cost associated with 
providing training to organization personnel following an incident.   
The constructs of the Education/Training factor are System 
Administrator/Information Security Personnel and Employee COMSEC/INFOSEC. The 
System Administrator/Information Security Personnel sub-factor covers training for those 
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personnel with IS administration or security responsibilities.  The Employee COMSEC / 
INFOSEC covers training for system users.  Horony specifically identifies training on 
user security policy such as password security, system security and other issues normally 
covered by the normal security training program (1999, p.38). 
The Business Expenses Factor.   
The third primary factor is Business Expenses, which are defined all the direct 
business costs resulting from the incident.  This factor attempts to measure the impact of 
lost systems that affect both internal and business-to-business processes.  Only a small 
number of respondents to Horony’s survey agreed that business expenses are a useful part 
of damage assessment.  The sub-factors of this primary factor are Customer Service and 
Business to Business.   The Customer Service sub-factor attempts to factor in such costs 
as those associated with paying “late fees, overdraft fees, and other fees associated with 
accounts affected by a system outage (Horony 1999, p.31).  The Business to Business 
sub-factor attempts to capture the effect the incident had on the organization’s critical 
inter-business relationships on which the organization depends, such as the failure of a 
Just-in-Time inventory system.  
The Productivity Factor. 
This factor attempts to measure the impact an incident has on an organizations 
production costs.  When an incident occurs, the system or systems affected by the 
incident will, be affected, in turn, affecting productivity.  This factor is comprised of 
three sub-factors, Mission Impact, Downtime, and Communication.  The Mission Impact 
sub-factor prescribes measurement of an organization’s ability to maintain normal levels 
of productivity in its business processes.  For a military organization, this may be a 
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measurement of sorties launched.  For a corporate organization, this may be a 
measurement of any change in assembly line production.  The Downtime sub-factor 
prescribes measurement mission stoppage resulting from an incident.  The 
Communication sub-factor prescribes measurement of the effect the incident had on the 
communication infrastructure.   
The Productivity factor addresses extremely important constructs for information 
damage assessment, but unfortunately falls short of the mark in terms of implementation 
ability.  Horony prescribes measurement, but doest not propose how these items may be 
measured.  An examination of this primary factor in relation to its sub-factors creates the 
basis for the argument that Horony should have actually entitled the primary factor 
Mission Impact, with the sub-components changed, accordingly.   
The Data Factor. 
The fifth primary factor is Data.  Horony cites all respondents as identifying data 
loss as an important part of a damage assessment model (1999, p.32).  The Data factor is 
comprised of the four following sub-factors:  Restoring, Re-Entering, Unrecoverable 
Data, and Proprietary Data.  The first and second sub-factors, Restoring and Re-
Entering, appear to be related, although Horony does not explicitly state this.  Restoring 
is defined as those activities involved with restoration of data from backup media, while 
Re-Entering encompasses those activities involved with manually inputting data that 
could not be restored from backup. The manner in which Horony describes these sub-
factors presents a formidable challenge for implementation in an operational model. 
Although each is an important construct for measurement, it is arguable that it is in 
appropriate to include these sub-factors as measurements of impact to data.  It seems 
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more logical to include these under Recovery costs.    The third and fourth sub-factors, 
Unrecoverable Data and Proprietary Data, prescribe measurement of data that has been 
lost or compromised, respectively.  These two sub-factors are certainly important to any 
user of a DAM attempting to determine post-incident damage 
The Lost Revenue Factor 
This factor prescribes measurement of revenue lost due to an IS incident.  An IS 
incident may negatively affect an organization’s ability to generate revenue by damaging 
otherwise impairing the organization’s information systems associated with critical 
business processes.  Horony lists two sub-factors belonging to Lost Revenue.  These are 
Lost Sales and Lost Customers.  The Lost Sales sub-factor prescribes measuring the 
impact, real or potential, on sales.  The Lost Customers sub-factor creates a measurement 
requirement for determining customer loss  
 The Reputation Factor. 
Horony reports that only five of the twelve respondents were felt that reputation 
was an important factor for damage assessment (1999, p. 33).  It is important to note his 
citation that military respondents “were not overly concerned with reputation from the 
public’s view point; however, they did concern themselves with how they were viewed 
by other military organizations (Horony 1999, p. 33).”  Horony found that most, but not 
all, commercial organizations were interested in the post-incident affects on reputation.  
Reputation as a model primary factor is comprised of two sub-factors, Consumer/Public 
Confidence and Quality Employees.  Horony states that organizational reputation 
relatively volatile and easily damaged (1999, p. 40). The Consumer/Public Confidence 
sub-factor attempts to capture this affect.  While it may be argued that reputation may be 
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more resilient than Horony states, it is certainly true that once reputation has shifted 
negatively, it is both difficult and expensive to return to the previous states.  A collateral 
effect of negative reputation may be that a company with a poor reputation may have 
difficulty attracting quality employees, which may result in additional problems for the 
organization.  Horony attempts to capture this effect with the Quality Employees 
construct.  The relevance of this as a viable metric for damage assessment in military 
operations is debatable.   
The Human Life Factor 
The final primary factor of the Horony model is Human Life.  Loss of life is a 
serious concern for any organization, but especially military and other public service 
organizations in which an incident potentially could jeopardize human safety.  The 
military is an obvious example, but such public and private organizations associated with 
such public services as police, fire, and transportation must also consider this factor.  
Horony includes two factors, Loss of Life and High work load of ERT members.  The 
former prescribes measurement of the increased risk of loss of life following an incident.  
The latter prescribes a metric to determine the long-term stress effects on Emergency 
Response Team (ERT) members “causing undue stress and hardship on families (Horony 
1999, p. 40).  
The Horony model appears to be only one of a handful of attempts to develop a 
framework for assessing damage resulting from a successful cyber attack.  It serves as an 
excellent foundation.  Like other models, however, Horony’s model attempts to assess 
economic loss.  By doing so, the measurements are almost exclusively taken from the IT 
infrastructure that supports the information; therefore the infrastructure becomes the 
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center of the model, diminishing its ability to assess asset value.  The result is a damage 
assessment model that provides a framework for measuring damage to the information 
infrastructure constructs (training, human life, revenue, systems, etc.), but yields little 
indication as to the extent of damage done to the information itself.  This model lacks the 
critical measurement of devaluation of the information resulting from the incident.  
Information usability is a function of the value of information to the organization. 
Several of the primary factors, and/or their associated sub-factors, in the Horony 
model have questionable application to military operations, and indeed any organization 
seeking to understand damage and impact to mission operations following a cyber 
incident.  Many of the constructs have strategic use, but little immediate relevance in the 
tactical and operational mission domains.  Consider for example the primary factor, 
Education/Training.  Horony states that it may be necessary to provide training to 
administrators, InfoSec personnel, and users post-incident to ensure they understand 
system security issues and have required skills to prevent re-occurrence of such an 
incident.  While it is true that some organizations may retain employees who require 
training to effectively perform their required duties, the organization’s Security 
Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA) program must address this requirement.  
The SETA program is an integral and perpetual component of an effective organizational 
security program (Whitman and Mattord 2004, pp. 20-21).   Accordingly, a SETA 
program would likely fund both pre-incident and post-incident education and training.  
Any peripheral costs associated with improving or otherwise modifying the COMSEC or 
INFOSEC programs as a result of post-incident fallout would be absorbed by these 
programs.  For this reason, measuring impact to education and training from an IS 
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incident will produce little, if any, useful information for the user of such a model, 
rendering this primary factor invalid as a damage assessment area of measurement.  
Another area of concern lies among the sub-factors under the Recovery primary factor.  
Specifically, using the sub-factor entitled investigation is a misnomer that may confuse IS 
manager attempting to collect damage assessment data for this sub-factor.  As stated 
before, Horony describes this sub-factor as encompassing all those activities associated 
with detection, response, damage assessment, and forensic investigation.  The concern is 
that IS managers may only consider the impact metrics associated with the forensic 
investigation.  In fact, what Horony describes in this sub-factor covers five of the seven 
components of incident response; of which investigation activities comprise two of the 
components (Mandia, Prosise, et. Al 2003, pp. 12-15).  
Horony’s research may be the first attempt to assess damage to military networks.  
However, because it is primarily concerned with economic impact assessment resulting 
from a cyber incident it can only offer very limited contributions to decision making in 
military operations.  However, this model offers some utility in helping decision makers 
in the strategic domain understand the economic and human costs of cyber incidents on 
Air Force networks. 
NIST Best Practices. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed several 
documents that may be considered “best practices” guidelines for industry and 
government cyber security programs.  NIST makes these guidelines available through a 
number of ways, to include the issuance of its Special Publications (SP).  Four such SP 
best practice guidelines are examined in this sub-section. 
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NIST SP 800-12: The NIST Handbook. 
 
This Special Publication 800-12 (NIST 1996) is a comprehensive  introduction to 
computer security, providing an overall look at how to establish an organization security 
program, to include a walk through of incident response procedures.  SP 800-12 provides 
a general guideline for cyber damage assessment best practices and impact assessment.  
These are discussed in detail in subsequent publications. 
NIST SP 800-61: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide. 
This publication is intended to provide organizations with a best practices guide 
for cyber security incident handling and is especially geared towards newly formed 
incident response teams (Grance, Kent et Al. 2004).  The document provides guidelines 
to assist the incident response team in performing technical damage assessment after the 
incident occurs.  Additionally it provides guidance the impact assessment is an important, 
but distinctly separate assessment from technical damage assessment.  The publication 
states that by “combining the criticality of the affected resources and the current and 
potential technical effect of the incident”, a reasonable understanding of the impact may 
be gained (Grance, Kent et Al. 2004). 
NIST SP 800-30: Risk Management Guide for IT Systems. 
SP 800-30 is intended to enable an organization to accomplish its mission by 
understanding risk to improve the effectiveness of the organization’s security program 
(Stoneburner, Goguen et Al. 2002). This document is noteworthy for several reasons, but 
especially since provides to organizations a best practices guideline to implement impact 
analysis.  Impact analysis during risk assessment allows the organization to identify, 
understand, and document the potential impact if a system is lost or damaged due to a 
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cyber incident (Stoneburner, Goguen et Al. 2002, pp. 2-4).  NIST SP 800-30 prescribes 
the documentation of several key attributes about the asset including: 
• System mission (e.g., the processes performed by the IT system) 
• System and data criticality (e.g., the system’s value or importance to an 
organization) 
 
• System and data sensitivity 
This risk management framework provides explicit guidance for documenting asset 
vulnerabilities and impact analysis in the even the asset is damaged.  It is important that 
organizations document this information prior to an incident to ensure that effective 
damage and impact assessment is possible after an incident occurs.   
NIST SP 800-55 Security Metrics Guide for IT Systems. 
This publication (Swanson, Bartol, et. Al 2003) is primarily intended to assist 
organizations develop metrics for their security program.  There is little usable 
information in this document for development of damage assessment metrics.  The 
assessment criteria are heavily focused on allowing the organization to assess its 
technological security controls intended to protect the organization’s data  
. 
Section Summary. 
This section examined two models that possess some degree of potential 
contribution to military application decision making.  However, both models approach 
damage assessment from an economic standpoint.  While either or both model may have 
some application to military decision making, the economic nature of the approach will 
limit both to only long-term, or strategic, use.  Neither model is able to provide the 
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tactical or operational decision maker with situational awareness of how a cyber incident 
impacts the current mission in the appropriate time window, allowing the mission to 
conceivably be saved and loss of human life possibly prevented.  The lack of such a 
model or methodology is underscored by the case study research into current damage 
assessment practices on Air Force networks.  This research showed that current 
methodologies are non-standardized and producing non-validated damage assessment 
metrics.  The usefulness of these methodologies for providing commanders with 
situational awareness of damage after an incident is highly suspect. 
There are best practices for various aspects of computer security and incident 
response that have limited application to damage assessment efforts.  These are published 








This chapter outlines the methodology for data collection and analysis.  The 
subject matter involved with CDA-D/MIA research requires a qualitative approach.  An 
interview methodology was employed to gather the data for analysis and resolution of the 
research questions. 
Methodology and Research Strategy 
 
Selecting the methodology best suited for a specific research effort is difficult, yet 
important decision.  Quantitative research is the preferred method among researchers.  
This type of research is efficient and generally allows the researcher to identify causal 
relationships within the data (Leedy and Ormrod 2005, pp. 94).  Quantitative research 
cannot easily capture complex phenomena such as human or organizational behavior, 
however (Stevens 2001).  
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is well suited to “answer questions about 
the complex nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing and 
understanding the phenomena from the participants’ point of view. (Leedy and Ormrod 
2005, p. 94)” Strauss and Corbin (Strauss and Corbin 1990), provide five reasons for 
performing qualitative research: 
1. The researcher’s conviction based on research experience 
2. The nature of the research problem 
3. To understand a new or little understood problem 
4. To gain new perspective on a previously well understood problem 
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5. To provide understanding of the details in complex phenomena that cannot 
be easily conveyed with quantitative methodology 
 
Roberts notes that the qualitative approach to research is founded in the 
philosophical orientation called phenomenology, a discipline that focuses on first-person 
experience.  Qualitative research strives to gain a holistic understanding of the studied 
problem.  They collect data through methods such as observations, interviews, surveys, 
and even written documents. Qualitative research can focus on a range of complex issues 
ranging from the personal experience of individuals to organizational processes (Roberts 
2004, p. 10).   Qualitative research is an “umbrella term” that covers many different 
research strategies (Roberts 2004, p.11).  Determining which research strategy to utilize 
can be difficult to accomplish.  Yin (2002) provides a three-condition evaluation to assist 
in this decision:  
• Consider the type of research question posed, 
• Consider the extent of control the researcher maintains over the 
phenomena 
 




By applying these questions to a qualitative research strategy matrix, it is possible 
to determine a strategy best suited to the nature of the research (see Table 3 below).  By 
testing the research questions posed in the introductory chapter of this paper against 
Yin’s matrix, it becomes clear that no single research strategy perfectly fits the nature of 
the research questions. The questions explicitly ask how something can be done, with an 
implication that the research must discover both how it is being done now and why; what 
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historical events created the context in which damage assessment currently exists?  This 
leaves three strategic possibilities: 
• experiment, 
• historical analysis, 
• and case study. 
 
Table 3. Relevant Situations for Research Strategies 
(Yin 2002, p. 5) 
 
Since the research cannot control the events being studied, experiment is 
eliminated.  Because the nature of this study fits both historical analysis and the case 
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study as suitable research strategy, this research elects to employ a hybrid strategy that 
employs elements of each. 
 This historical/case study hybrid study is warranted to ensure the investigative 
questions of this research are answered appropriately.  It is commonly agreed in the 
network security community of interest that defensive cyber damage assessment 
methodologies are not as effective as they need to be.  In order to answer the first 
investigative question, the research must examine how damage assessment is currently 
being done and identify where these shortcomings lie.  The second and third investigative 
questions may be addressed in a similar manner, but each relies on the previous being 
answered.  All of the investigative questions, however, make assumptions about mission 
impact assessment that must be addressed if the research is to be valid.  For this reason, 
the research must understand the state of damage to mission impact mapping on Air 
Force networks and to identify what successes are present and what obstacles may be 
preventing efficient mission impact activities. 
 
Instrumentation and Data Collection 
 This research attempts to answer its three research questions by first gaining an 
understanding of the effectiveness of damage and mission impact assessment on Air 
Force networks.  This was accomplished through a combination of literature review, 
analysis of existing research, and interviews. It is common knowledge in the DoD that 
defensive damage and mission impact assessment is not being conducted as accurately 
and efficiently as it should be.  However, the causes and possible solutions are widely 
debated. The data collected in this research provides a foundation for proposing a more 
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effective way to conduct cyber damage and mission impact assessment following a cyber 
security incident in a non-profit driven organization, such as the military. 
Literature Review and Existing Research. 
Yin states that existing documentation is a suitable data source in case study 
research (2002, p.86).  Most of the documentation of damage assessment models and 
methodology is focused on organizations that operate for financial profits.  Relatively 
little research has been accomplished in the area of damage and mission impact 
assessment in organizations not driven by financial profit; and therefore, some aspects of 
available literature and documentation did not directly fit.  This is primarily true of the 
damage and impact models used by organizations that deal explicitly with various 
dimensions of financial loss caused by an incident.  These are of little direct use by non-
profit driven organizations.  However, for-profit organizations struggle with the same 
problems as the latter in damage and mission impact assessment efforts.  There was, 
therefore, a substantial amount of data available in the literature review that did 
applicable to this research effort that helped with identification of such problems in order 
to propose an improved methodology. 
Existing case study research of damage assessment efforts on Air Force networks 
(Thiem 2005) provides further and more detailed insight to problems existing in damage 
assessment efforts specifically on Air Force networks.  The existing research investigated 
cyber damage assessment methodologies used on Air Force networks by interviewing 
individuals intimately involved with both Net-D direct activities and Net-D command 
and control of incident response.  When combined with the literature review data, a 
strong case may be built for determining the state of damage and mission impact 
 
96 
assessment on Air Force networks and visibility into some of the suspected causes.  
Understanding the causes coupled with additional literature documentation may enable 
development of new damage and mission impact assessment methodology. 
Interviews. 
The qualitative nature of the case study lends itself to the use of the interview as 
an investigatory instrument.  The interview is one of the most important sources of case 
study information (Yin 2002, pp. 89-92).  There are two general categories of interviews.  
The structured interview consists of the research asking a set of questions.  This category 
is relatively rigid and leaves little room for the interviewee to discuss important related 
information that may lie just beyond the boundaries of the question.  In such cases, 
important information may be missed. The semi-structured interview, also called an 
open-ended interview, the research can ask open ended questions or follow the standard 
question with a specific question tailored to the interviewee’s experience to elicit further 
detail about the answer (Leedy and Ormrod 2005, p. 184; Yin 2002, p. 90).   
 Interview Structure. 
 The interview was specifically designed to address the second and third research 
questions.  These questions deal specifically with the core issue of this research: mission 
impact assessment.  The approach to the interview was to allow the professional experts 
in network defense incident response provide insight into the state of mission impact 
assessment.  The interview was designed to allow each respondent to answer in his or her 
own way and provide details and perspective into the subject through individual 
experience.  The intent was to elicit individual free formed responses providing multiple 
perspectives on the state of mission impact assessment as it is currently being 
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implemented on Air Force networks.  Since successful mission impact assessment relies 
on multiple other areas to be performed effectively, responses to the interview questions 
would necessarily touch on the activities that enable mission impact assessment to 
function correctly.  In this manner, the interview respondents will reveal the issues both 
contributing to and impeding mission impact assessment independently. 
 The interview was comprised of two distinct sections.  The first section was 
simply to identify the interviewee’s qualifications to provide valid responses to questions 
relating to the state of mission impact assessment on Air Force networks.  The second 
section was comprised of three questions designed to allow the interviewee the 
opportunity to discuss the issues relating to mission impact assessment on Air Force 
networks.   
Section 1 Questions. 
 This section is comprised of two questions to ensure that the interviewees have 
appropriate exposure to network defense and incident response activities to possess a 
reasonable observation of the state of damage and mission impact assessment on Air 
Force networks.   The first question asked the following:  
“Are you currently or have you recently (within the past 12 months) been 
professionally assigned to a position in Network Defense (Net-D) involved in 
incident response activities on Air Force networks, to include Network 
Operations command and control functions?” 
 
This question is designed to ensure that the interviewee has timely experience in a job 
with network defense incident response responsibilities.  
The second question in this section was designed to allow the interviewee to list 
the type of involvement.   
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“In what capacity was this involvement? (For example, incident handling, 
forensic investigation, response command and control, etc.)” 
 
Not all involvement possibilities were listed, allowing the interviewees to self-identify 
areas of incident responsibility that the researcher may have overlooked.  The 
interviewees identified six distinct areas of responsibility in network defense incident 
response.  These were: 
• Initial incident response 
• Incident handling 
• Incident investigation 
• Damage / Impact Assessment 
• Incident Recovery 
• Command and control 
The demographics discussed previously show the areas of involvement of the respective 
interviewees.  The range of involvement increases the likelihood of wider participant 
perspective of the issues affecting defensive cyber damage and impact assessment on Air 
Force networks.   
Section 2 Questions. 
This section consisted of three progressive questions to determine the state and 
effectiveness of mission effective.  The first question was stated as follows: 
1. “In your experience, does current incident damage assessment methodology on 
Air Force networks comply with the requirement of CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 Annex 
A to Appendix B to Enclosure B prescribing operational impact assessment of a 
DoD organization affected by a computer security incident?” 
 
This question was to gain an understanding of the interviewee’s perspective on whether 
Air Force damage assessment and mission impact efforts were meeting the requirements 
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(CJCSM6510.01 2006) for commanders to report how a network incident has impacted 
an organization’s mission.  The expected responses were a direct reflection of the 
interviewee’s perception of these requirements as defined in the governing joint 
document. 
 The second question was designed to be a progressive path to allow the 
interviewee to discuss his/her perceptions about the Air Force’s network defense incident 
response functions ability to meet this requirement.   The question was stated as follows: 
2. “ In your experience, how well are responsible Net-D functions (incident 
response, forensics activities, etc.) able to estimate the impact to an organization’s 
mission capability resulting from an incident on Air Force networks?  “ 
 
This question was followed by the third question, which provided an opportunity for 
the interviewee to elaborate anything they felt was relevant to the previous question—but 
specifically those things that affected the damage and mission impact assessment actors 
to successfully and accurately accomplish these activities.  The third question stated as 
follows: 
3. “Based on your response to question #2, what factors either contribute to or 
impede the ability to effectively estimate the impact to an organization’s mission 
capability following an incident on Air Force networks?” 
 
Interview Conduction. 
Interviews were conducted over the telephone.  The respective organizations were 
contacted in advance and appointments made to formally conduct the interview.  Each 
interviewee was asked all questions previously discussed.  The interview was conducted 
in a semi-structured format to allow each respondent to discuss and elaborate on any part 
of the response he/she felt was relevant to the questions.  The semi-structured interview 
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format allows the interviewee to discuss the context of his/her response to a particular 
question to reduce the likelihood of error introduced by misunderstanding by the 
interviewer of the context of the response. 
Sample 
 The sample population was selected from Air Force active-duty members and 
civilians that are employed, or have been employed in the past 12 months, in a Defensive 
Network Warfare (Net-D) capacity.  Interviewees in this sample must have experience 
with the incident response activities of Net-D provide usable data for this research.  
Specifically, the selected sample ranges from personnel with direct involvement in the 
technical aspects of network defense incident response to command, control, and 
coordination of Net-D activities at a level appropriate to understand “the big picture” of 
how damage and mission impact assessment support the operational mission at both the 
organization and enterprise levels.  By necessity, this requires that participants work in 
the top “tier” of network defense operations. These operations are, in fact, divided into 
three operational tiers (see Figure 7 below).  Network operations command and control of 
incident response and the incident response experts reside at Tier 1 and work with the 
responsible agencies at the subordinate tiers to ensure effective incident assessment, 
response, handling, investigation, and remediation.  Agencies at Tier 1 interact with all 
levels and directly plug in to the Joint GIG, providing it personnel with a unique 
perspective personnel at subordinate levels may not possess.  For this reason, the 





Figure 7.  Network Defense Tiers of Operations 
 
It must be noted that this produced a situation where the views of the interview 
responders are relatively homogenous in their experience and perspectives.   However, 
this issue is a necessity to ensure that all respondents possess the appropriate professional 
and personal experience to make qualified and reasonable independent judgments 
regarding the state and effectiveness of mission impact assessment as it is currently being 
implemented.  Allowing personnel with little or no experience in cyber damage and 
mission impact assessment on Air Force networks would certainly introduce weakness in 
the data collected in the interviews. 
Interviewees were self-selected by volunteering to participate in the research data 




Data Analysis Procedures 
 There are various approaches to qualitative data analysis, with some being more 
suited to certain situations than others (Lacity and Janson 1994, pp. 138-140).  Lacity 
cites three general approaches to text analysis with each being dependent on assumptions, 
to include the role of the researcher (see Table 4 below).  Because damage mission 
impact assessment activities are dependent on such a wide range of supporting activities, 
it is important that the researcher have an understanding of the network defense incident 
response and damage assessment environment to be able to accurately understand and 
interpret the qualitative data collected.  In this sense, the researcher must be an insider, to 
some degree, to understand the wide range of issues that may be discovered during 
research.  For this reason, Lacity suggests that an interpretive approach to qualitative data 
analysis be used (1994, p.140). 
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Table 4. Lacity Text Analysis Framework 
(Lacity and Janson 1994, p. 140) 
 
Intentional analysis is form of interpretivist data analysis that attempts to 
understand the speaker’s intention.  It assumes the research and interview have similar 
background in the research subject allowing the research to better understand the 
contextual factors that influence the research subject (Lacity and Janson 1994, p. 151). 
Intentional analysis allows the researcher to discuss with the participants the meaning 
they ascribe to their experiences.  Lacity states that this method is particularly appropriate 
for analyzing data collected in interviews and consists of four steps of analysis; described 
as follows: 
“In the first step of the intentional analysis, the researcher describes the 
‘facts’ of the phenomenon. ‘Facts’ are socially shared realities agreed 
upon by all participants.  For example, the analyst and payroll clerk may 
both attest to the “fact” that two payroll programs need to be changed. 
 
104 
In step two, the researcher determines the way participants ascribe 
meaning to their separate realities by how they perceive cause and effect. 
For example, the analyst may claim, “I decided to fix the payroll 
calculation first because if it were not fixed this week, people’s paychecks 
would be wrong next week.” Here the systems analyst perceives her 
behavior in terms of cause (erroneous payroll calculation program) and 
effect (erroneous payroll checks). 
In step three, the researcher identifies themes- or invariants -- that 
emerge from the text. The researcher then identifies themes that are used 
to develop common interpretations for an entire class of phenomena. For 
example, assume the researcher studies the entire set of relationships 
between information systems personnel and payroll personnel. A potential 
theme may be that systems personnel consistently prioritize users’ 
requests. 
In step four, the researcher abstracts the “essences” from the text. 
Essences are wholly subjective gestalts what is learned from studying the 
phenomenon. Abstracting essences requires creativity, intuition and 
reflection. The researcher no longer asks “What do the participants think 
about the phenomenon?” but rather, “What do I think?” (1994, p. 151)“  
 
 After the interview data was collected the responses for the three investigative 
questions of the interview are coded to allow graphical ‘mapping’ of the response data.  
 
Limitations 
 This research effort maintains several limitations.  The sample size is small.  
Ideally, a study attempts to obtain interview data from a large pool of potential 
interviewees to develop a more accurate picture of the problem.  This is especially true 
for the intentional analysis method employed in this research.  A larger sample size 
would better demonstrate agreement in the both the facts (Lacity 1994, p. 151) and the 
contextual influences reported by the interviewees.  However, it was important that 
personnel providing the data posses adequate experience and skill set to make qualified 
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and valid responses to the interview questions.  This, by necessity, reduced the sample 
size. 
 Another limitation is the introduced by the nature of intentional analysis.  The 
very quality that lends intentional analysis to interview data analysis, the common 
contextual factors between the subjects and researcher, introduces some degree of bias.  It 
must be noted that the researcher was previously professionally engaged in network 
defense incident response activities on both Air Force and joint networks.  The 
experiences gained were among the motivating factors for this research effort.  
Qualitative research inevitably introduces some degree of reflexivity (Leedy and Ormrod 
2005, p. 285), but all efforts to maintain objectivity and minimize bias introduced by this 
phenomenon.  
 The scope of this paper is also a concern.  In most research, the scope is brought 
down to a near level to allow the researcher to get close to the research subject in great 
detail.  Indeed, this was the initial goal of this research effort.  However, as research 
progressed through the methodology described above, it became apparent that the lack of 
research in this area created as situation where the current damage assessment and 
mission impact assessment methodology as a whole must be examined to accurately and 
effectively address the investigative research questions.  This fact prevented any one part 
of the current methodology to be examined in great detail without overlooking serious 
factors that contribute to the problem being studied.  As a result, the research scope is at 
the lowest level to provide a look at a comprehensive methodology, in hopes of 
producing satisfactory and effective recommendations for an improved methodology, 





This research attempts to answer three questions for which there is no quantitative 
data available.  The qualitative nature of the subject lends itself to a historical 
analysis/case study hybrid research strategy.  An examination of existing research 
provides some of the research context, but for a better understanding of the defensive 
cyber damage and mission impact assessment climate on Air Force networks, it is 
important to conduct interviews with the personnel actively engaged in these activities.  
Understanding why damage and mission impact assessment is not effective is extremely 





IV. Results and Analysis 
Introduction and Overview 
 It is well known and commonly agreed that defensive damage and mission impact 
assessment cyber security incidents on Air Force networks is not being performed as 
effective or efficient as it needs to be.  This research has collected data through extensive 
literature review, case study research on damage assessment on Air Force networks, and 
interviews with personnel directly professionally involved with network defense incident 
response activities.  This section will analyze and discuss the results of the collected 
research data; and is the most important part of the research effort.  Here the collected 
data will be presented and interpreted so that intrinsic meanings may be revealed to build 
a whole picture of the problems, ultimately leading to answers to the investigative 
research questions posed in the opening chapter.  
Chapter Structure. 
 The data analysis of this chapter will present and discuss the interview data first.  
Although the interview questions specifically address the second and third investigative 
research questions, the semi-structured format allowed the interviewees to provide 
additional data that they felt was relevant to the specific questions.  Some data in the 
interview responses has relevance to the first research investigative question regarding 
cyber damage assessment.   
 Next, the chapter will discuss the findings about the state of cyber defense and 
damage assessment currently employed on Air Force networks.  This analysis is based on 
literature review data and existing case study research (Thiem 2005).  The final part of 
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this chapter will provide a synthesis of collected data and discuss the findings to each of 
three investigative questions of this research. 
Approach to Analysis of Research Questions. 
The purpose of this research is to determine an effective and accurate 
methodology for defensive cyber damage assessment on Air Force and DoD networks.  
Three investigative research questions were formulated to build the framework for this 
research effort. These questions are: 
R1. How can the damage resulting from a successful cyber attack be effectively 
measured in a non-profit driven organization? 
 
R2. How can such damage be mapped to impact to an organization’s mission 
capability? 
 
R3.  How must this assessment be reported to the decision maker to maximize the 
quality of the assessment for use as decision input? 
  
To answer these questions correctly they must be approached and answered in 
order.  The research must first establish how damage is currently being assessed before 
proposing how damage assessment may be effectively measured in a non-profit driven 
organization.  As previously stated, it is common knowledge that there is ample room for 
improvement in the assessment of cyber damage and mission impact arena; so analysis 
will begin by laying out the facts provided by the data and identifies areas needing 
improvement as they relate to the research questions. 
 
Interview Data Analysis 
Intentional analysis was applied to the transcripts of the interviews.  Lacity states 
that intentional analysis is a form of interpretivist analysis that is well suited to this 
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particular research effort since the researcher may discuss the contextual meaning 
ascribed to experiences relayed in the interview.  This provides a more richly descriptive 
response to the questions posed during the interview (Lacity 1994, p.151).   
Intentional analysis is a four-phase process.  The first three analyze the facts, 
contextual perceptions issues of the respondents, and common themes presented by the 
interviewees. In the fourth phase, the research abstracts the essences of the text, as a 
whole (Lacity 1994, p.151).  
The first section of the interview establishes respondent qualifications to establish 
respondent demographics.  Intentional analysis will not be used on the questions in the 
section, and this data is discussed in the following the following section of this paper.  
Intentional analysis is applied to the data collected in the second section of the interview. 
Interview Sample Demographics. 
It was previously noted that the interview sample size was small.  The nature of 
the research required that the pool of potential interviewees be small by necessity.  The 
purpose of the interview was to understand the effectiveness of mission impact 
assessment as it is currently being implemented on Air Force networks.  It is important to 
identify any obstacles or catalysts to these efforts.  For this reason it was essential to limit 
the potential sample population to only those respondents possessing relevant experience 
in network defense incident response activities.  To ensure accurate responses were 
formed both from relevant experience and appropriate perspective in this area, the 
potential interviewees were purposefully limited to current or recent employment in a job 
with direct network defense incident response responsibilities at the Tier 1 level of 
network defense incident response activities.  These agencies at the Tier level are the 
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agencies tasked by the Air Force to lead and execute efforts for incident response, 
damage assessment and containment, mission impact assessment, and remediation and 
recovery following an incident on Air Force networks; and ensure netops integration with 
DoD networks.  The pool of potential interviewees was intentionally inclusive of those 
performing direct technical response, as well as those responsible for the command and 
control of NETOPS activities as they pertained to Net-D incident response coordination 
and actions.  This was important to the research as it ensured a full range of perspective 
into the capabilities and limitations of current mission impact assessment efforts. 
 There were approximately 18-20 personnel identified as potentially 
qualified interviewees.  Participation was voluntary and participates were advised that no 
personally identifying information would be collected which could attribute any 
responses to them.  Not all potential interview candidates elected to participate, however.  
Due to the voluntary nature of the sample selection, data on the reasons for participation 
declination was not collected.  Leedy and Ormrod note that this is a common occurrence 
(Leedy and Ormrod 2005, pp. 184-185).   
In all, nine personnel agreed to be interviewed.  All nine acknowledged that they 
were currently or and recently been assigned to a position in which their primary duties 
involved responsibilities directly related to network defense incident response and 
response support activities shown in the following table (see Table 5 below).  This table 
breaks the roles of network defense incident response involvement into six categories: 
• Initial Incident Response:  Those activities associated with confirmation and 
declaration of an incident and the coordination of initial response activities from 




• Incident Handling:  Those activities associated with the documentation, tracking, 
and administrative issues of network defense incident response. 
 
• Incident Investigation:  Those activities directly associated with investigating how 
the incident occurred and what systems were affected. 
 
• Damage/Impact Assessment:  The assessment and reporting of technical damage 
and/or mission impact assessment. 
 
• Incident Recovery:  Those activities associated with returning the effected 
systems to service, while simultaneously supporting ongoing incident response 
activities. 
 
• Command and Control:  Those activities associated with the coordinating and 
directive actions of incident response as they relate to netops activities.   
 
Table 5. Interviewee Involvement in Network Defense Incident Responsibilities 
 
Of these nine, eight were responsible for initial incident response activities.  Five 
reported that they were currently or had been directly involved in incident handling 
efforts.  Six indicated experience in incident investigation efforts.  Seven had been 
involved with incident recovery efforts after an incident. Five were responsible in some 
way for command and control of incident response activities.  All responded that they 
were involved in some aspect of damage and mission impact assessment efforts.   
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All interviewees were currently or had recently been responsible for multiple 
aspects of incident response activities.   Two interviewees were currently or had recently 
been involved in all aspects of the incident response process.  Only one respondent was 
neither involved in initial incident response nor command and control activities.  This 
interviewee likely specialized in technical aspects of incident investigation and recovery. 
Intentional Analysis of Interview Response Data. 
This section discusses the interview response data.  Lacity defines the data facts 
as the “shared realities agreed upon by all the participants (1994, p.151).” Since the pool 
of individual interviewees may hold differing perspectives on the same problem, this 
section will discuss the data in terms of commonly shared facts, conflicting data, and any 
unexpected findings in each question.   
Fact Analysis of Section 2, Question 1.  
The first interview question of Section 2 was:  
 
“In your experience, does current incident damage assessment methodology on Air 
Force networks comply with the requirement of CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 Annex A to 
Appendix B to Enclosure B prescribing operational impact assessment of a DoD 
organization affected by a computer security incident?” 
 
This question elicited a unanimous negative response.  All nine interviewees cited that 
the current incident damage assessment methodology on Air Force networks is not 
meeting the intent of this requirement for mission impact damage assessment reporting.   
All but one respondent elaborated on this question in some way by stated that mission 
impact assessment is being attempted, but is not being carried out effectively.  Three 
respondents stated in this question that there are breakdowns occurring at the Tier 2 and 
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Tier 3 levels that prevent effective mission impact assessment.  The others deferred to 
question 3 to provide additional information. 
 The nature of these responses were expected since it is commonly accepted the 
current damage and mission impact assessment is not being performed at an effective 
level.  There were no unexpected responses to this question. 
Fact Analysis of Section 2, Question 2 
 The second question of this section was: 
“In your experience, how well are responsible Net-D functions (incident response, 
forensics activities, etc.) able to estimate the impact to an organization’s mission 
capability resulting from an incident on Air Force networks?” 
 
This question gave the interview respondents the opportunity to provide independent 
evaluation of how each viewed the effectiveness of the Air Force’s implementation of 
mission impact assessment.  The responses to this revealed general agreement that the 
current implementation of damage and mission impact assessment is not doing an 
effective job.   A general agreement was expected for the same reasons stated in the 
analysis of Question 1. 
Since the response to this question was free-formed, all interviewees respond with 
soft responses to this question, meaning that that no respondents provided a direct 
answer, such as “we’re doing a poor job.”  Possibly, due to the wording of the question, 
all respondents provided answers that were more suited to a performance range, rather 
than a discrete performance value. Examples of answers to this question ranged from, 
“somewhere between a bad job and a really bad job” to “we’re doing the right things in 
some areas, so overall we’re doing alright but still need to improve a lot.”  This type 
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qualitative response is difficult to measure, so to capture the intent of these responses, the 
responses were coded as ranges of performance.  The coding was based on a five-point 
graduated scale from very poor to excellent. Each point on the scale was assigned a 
coding value as follows: very poor = 1, poor = 2, moderate = 3, good = 4, and excellent = 
5.  The coding for each question was assigned to reflect the overall nature of the response 
to this question. Each respondent’s answer was coded as a range of two values that best 
reflected the respondent’s response intention and the range was averaged to produce a 
score, as shown in the raw data table for this question (see Table 6 below).  This coding 
was designed only to aid in understanding the trends among the qualitative responses to 
this particular question through a visual representation of the responses.   
 
Table 6. Coded Response Ranges for Interview Section 2, Question 2 
 
 
The attitudes of nearly all interviewees' responses to this question tended towards 
the lower end of the coding scale.  Five of the nine respondents provided a response that 
indicated the Air Force's implementation was poor to very poor.  Three provided 
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responses indicating that the Air Force's ability to estimate mission impact after a cyber 
incident is only poor to moderate.  One respondent stated that "we're not there yet, but we 
are getting better that we were."  This respondent still did not give high marks to the 
current process, but indicated perceived performance in the moderate to good range. 
Expected Results. 
The researcher expected a wide range of responses with the respondents closer to 
the "operational end" judging mission assessment efforts to be less effective than those 
handling the more technical issues involved with damage and mission impact assessment.  
This expectation was based on the researcher's experience and analysis of existing 
literature and research that indicated the strong focus on technology that exists in Air 
Force Net-D activities. 
Question 2 Findings. 
The data collected for this question produced the opposite result as those expected 
by the researcher.  The data showed that the majority of those involved in operational 
command and control positions held a relatively more favorable view of mission impact 
effectiveness than did those involved with the technical aspects of damage and mission 
impact assessment.  This finding is very important to this research, especially when 
considered in context with the data in Question 3.  It is also important to note that only 
one respondent rated damage assessment as moderate to good.  The majority of responses 
evaluated the effectiveness of mission impact assessment efforts as poor. 
Fact Analysis of Section 2, Question 3.  




“Based on your response to question #2, what factors either contribute to or 
impede the ability to effectively estimate the impact to an organization’s mission 
capability following an incident on Air Force networks?” 
 
This final question provided the interviewees the opportunity to elaborate on the issues 
that they viewed as affecting their assessment of question 2.  The question produced 
several common but independently provided responses that the interviewees felt were at 
the core of the problems with cyber damage and mission impact assessment.  The first 
and most common was that the wrong agencies are being tasked to perform mission 
impact assessment.  Seven out of the nine interviewees made direct reference mission 
impact assessment being the responsibility of the system or asset owner; but that the 
responsibility is resting with the incident response agency to determine the damage and 
impact to the organization’s mission.  Three of the respondents stated that this reliance on 
the wrong entity existed in all three operational tiers, but was most problematic in the 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 levels.   When an incident occurs, commanders at base and Tier 2 levels 
expect the technical experts of the 33 IOS to tell the commander how his/her mission was 
affected.  All three respondents assert that this is a task that cannot be accomplished by 
an agency external to the organization whose mission was affected by the incident.  
These respondents state that the organization that owns the mission must bear the 
responsibility for mission impact assessment since only it can possess visibility of the 
relationship between the systems, the information, and the mission.   
A second common problem cited by six of the nine respondents is the local 
commanders rely upon base-level system administrators that are improperly equipped for 
damage assessment responsibilities.  Five of the respondents cited this as a training and 
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education issue.  Four respondents reported that the Tier 3 administrators tasked to work 
with Tier 1 responders to perform local damage and mission impact assessment regularly 
provide incorrect or meaningless damage and mission impact assessment information.  
Two respondents noted that there have been many cases where Tier 3 administrators 
provided fabricated damage and mission impact assessment information because the did 
not understand the relationship between the system and the mission.    Several 
respondents stated that these system administrators lack essential technical skills to 
perform the mission impact, even with the assistance of the incident response agent, 
which compounds the problems of determining damage and mission impact.   
It is also important to note that two respondents explained the problem being that the 
incident responders work with system administrators belonging to the organization 
affected by the incident, not than the system users.  These system administrators are 
neither users of the affected system, nor have an understanding of how the information 
processed by the system supports the organization’s mission.  The information reported 
back to the incident responders is strictly limited to technical information that has no 
factual mission impact relevance.  One interviewee cited that the system administrator 
intentionally provided impact reporting metrics from a system unaffected by the incident 
because it was easier than getting it from the affected system.  This, of course, negated 
any benefits of damage and mission impact efforts; and the interviewee attributes the 
problem as a lack of understanding of the damage assessment process that is a direct 
result of a training failure.  
Another important issue mentioned by several of the respondents was a perceived 
misunderstanding of the role of technical assessments performed by the network defense 
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incident response agents.  The interviewees that mentioned this as a problem stated that 
often commanders misunderstood the role of the technical assessment as a substitute for 
the mission impact assessment.  These respondents stated that this failure to understand 
the role of the technical assessment as a foundation for mission impact caused problems 
and “push back” from these units at both a system administrator and command level.  The 
interviewees stated that this friction slowed and occasionally crippled mission impact 
assessment efforts after an incident. 
An associated issue mentioned by several of the respondents was a perceived 
misunderstanding of the role of the technical assessments performed by the network 
defense incident response agents.  The interviewees that mentioned this as a problem 
stated that often commanders misunderstood the role of the technical assessment as a 
substitute for the mission impact assessment.  These respondents stated that this failure to 
understand the role of the technical assessment as a foundation for mission impact caused 
problems and “push back” from these units at both a system administrator and command 
level.  The interviewees stated that this friction slowed and occasionally crippled mission 
impact assessment efforts after an incident. 
 A third common issue was that a lack of understanding of the relationship 
between the system and the information used by the system to support the mission exists.  
This is similar to the previous issue, but differs in perspective.  The previous facts 
identified the misunderstanding as a result of technical training failures.  Five of the nine 
respondents to this question independently provided anecdotal examples of breakdowns 
in cyber damage and mission impact efforts directly attributable to a focus on the system 
technology such that the connection to the mission not understood.  All five who cited 
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this as serious problem included examples of the focus on the technology and a failure to 
understand that the system processes information supporting some aspect of mission 
operations.  Two respondents specifically relayed that this misunderstanding exists in 
both the command structure and the technologically focused system administrators on 
which the commander depends.  One respondent stated, “Its common sense, but the 
commanders don’t get it and the system admins don’t get it.  It’s a simple concept, but 
they’re missing that the data and information processed on the system is what is 
important to the mission.”  Another interviewee referring to this same problem responded 
that, “the Air Force is sometimes blinded by technology…which leads to a 
misunderstanding of what can and can’t impact the mission.”  Four of the respondents 
relayed problems that this lack of understanding made it impossible to determine second 
order impact elsewhere in the Air Force enterprise.   
Another response commonality supported the previously discussed issue.  Three 
respondents stated that the problem of failing to understand the system to mission 
relationship was compounded by a lack of usable documentation listing the assets owned 
by the organization and the associated relationship to the mission. These respondents 
independently noted that the documentation that did exist, such as system accreditation 
packages, was not conducive to cyber damage activities since it primarily focused on 
technical issues.  One respondent noted that the system administrators, not being users, 
could not use this documentation to understand how to the affected system supported the 
organization’s mission.  Two respondents stated that mission impact assessment efforts 
could be enhanced if documentation of the systems contents and support for the 
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organization’s mission was documented at some time prior to the occurrence of an 
incident. 
Expected Results. 
  The researcher expected a wide range of “problems” to emerge from the data 
collected from this interview question with the hope the several central themes would 
emerge.  The hope is that the emergence of these themes would create a “path” to lead the 
researcher to the source of the problems.  These themes did in fact emerge.  The majority 
were in the general area expected by the researcher, but there were some surprises that 
uncovered unexpected problems in the mission impact assessment processes that the 
researcher had not previously considered.   
Question 3 Findings. 
The fact analysis has identified commonly agreed upon “facts” reported by the 
nine respondents.  However, there were also interviewees that felt a strong focus on 
technology was important and appropriate.  One interviewee stated that the technical 
assessments produced by the incident response agents was meeting the needs of cyber 
damage assessment, and the problems with mission impact assessment lay with 
incompetence at the “NOSC and base-levels”.  Additionally, although all interviewees 
agreed that mission impact assessment is falling short of its mandate, not all agreed on 
the cause of these shortcomings.  The consistencies in responses have been discussed, but 
there also areas of non-agreement that were mentioned by individuals.  For example, one 
respondent felt that the DoD netops function was asserting too much authority into the 
implementation of network defense and mission impact efforts on Air Force networks.  
This respondent felt that this was creating unnecessary work and constraints on the 
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incident response efforts.  Another respondent independently provided a countering view 
to this by stating that the current efforts in mission impact assessment were not providing 
sufficient upward feed to the commanders watching the overall health of the GIG and the 
mission operations that are supported by the GIG.  This respondent established that Air 
Force networks are only one piece of the GIG, and mission impact assessment activities 
on Air Force networks must provide sufficient support to the higher-level missions.  This 
respondent also noted that the big picture is often forgotten by those focused on technical 
issues.   
 Another difference worth noting was that two of the respondents expressed a 
feeling that those involved in the command and control aspects of incident response 
activities did not possess an understanding of the problems that were preventing 
successful mission impact assessment.  One respondent with command and control 
experience responded that those agents responsible for technical mission impact 
assessment activities, were not providing mission impact assessment reports in a timely 
fashion.  As a result, mission impact reporting negatively affected since commanders 
could not get results quickly. 
 Intentional Analysis of Contextual Perceptions in Responses. 
 The demographics of the sample population were discussed previously in this 
chapter.  It worth stating again, however, that the sample of interviewees was small and 
relatively homogenous by necessity.  Since interviewees were self-identified, it became 
important that the pool of potential interview respondents be comprised of individuals 
with appropriate professional experience in cyber damage and mission impact assessment 
on Air Force networks to provide accurate and qualified individual responses to the 
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interview questions.  All interviewees must possess current or relatively recent 
professional experience in network defense incident response activities.   As a result the 
interview respondents possess similar contextual perceptions about cyber damage and 
mission impact assessments on Air Force networks.  This may be considered an 
explanation for the great consistencies in the facts reported by the interview respondents.  
However, the fact that all respondents agreed that mission impact assessment efforts are 
failing to meet the intent of joint guidance points towards the thematic problem area in 
current efforts.  This is important because it must also be remembered that the 
interviewees work in differing areas of network defense incident response, providing 
each with a potentially unique perspective on the problems and strengths of these 
activities.  Yet, these contextual differences allow interviewees to arrive at similar 
conclusions about the problems.  The differences in responses are few and are mainly 
attributable to personal perceptions of responsibilities between the agents providing 
coordination and oversight and those performing technical assessment. 
Intentional Analysis of Findings in Interview Responses. 
There is general agreement that the current implementation of damage and 
mission impact assessment on Air Force networks is not being conducted effectively.  As 
can be seen in the following chart (see Figure 8 below), the majority of respondents with 
command and control experience rated the effectiveness of mission impact assessment as 
between moderate and poor.  This was a higher assessment than provided by those with 
more technical involvement. All but one respondent without command and control 






Figure 8. Bar Chart Results of Interviewee Response to Section 2, Question 2 
 
Question 3 allowed respondents to independently identify issues that the 
respondent felt impeded or contributed to effective mission impact assessment efforts.  
There were several themes that became evident when all interview responses were 
examined.  These can be summed up in the following bullets: 
• Mission impact assessment and reporting must be accomplished locally 
 
• Organizational Failure to Understand System to mission relationship 
 
• Current mission impact assessment is too heavily focused on technology 
• Current mission impact assessment is not producing usable metrics 
• New perspectives introduced by mission impact assessment 
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These themes will be discussed in the following subsections. 
Mission Impact Assessment Must Be Accomplished Locally. 
Data collected in the interview process revealed that the current implantation 
relies heavily upon the incident responders to assess both the damage caused by the 
incident and the associated mission impact related to this damage.  The current state of 
mission impact assessment is evidence that this approach is not working.  The Air Force 
is an enormous enterprise with each organization having a specialized and independent 
mission that provides direct support to one or more additional missions in the enterprise.  
Cyber security incidents that occur on Air Force and DoD enterprise networks require 
that an incident response agent that is external to the affected organization come in and 
provide a technical assessment of the damage incurred by the incident.  In nearly all 
cases, the response agent is entirely unfamiliar with the affected organization’s mission.  
Mission impact requires that the assessor have an understanding the affected assets’ 
relationship to the organization’s mission.  Such a task is impossible for an external agent 
to perform, as the interview respondents have noted.  As a result, the mission impact 
assessments are best guesses based on an extremely limited understanding of the 
organization’s mission.  Accurate damage assessment is dependent upon mapping 
damage to the organization’s asset to it mission in order for mission impact to be 
understood.  The majority of respondents identified this problem as one of the chief 
impediments to effective damage assessment on Air Force networks.   
Organizational Failure to Understand Mission Relationship.  
The second theme presents a problem for local mission impact assessment.  The 
ability for an organization to be the primary agent in local mission impact assessment 
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assumes that the organization understands how its systems support its mission.  The 
failure of Air Force organizations to understand this relationship is a pervasive theme 
throughout the interview responses; and a serious obstacle to effective mission impact 
assessment efforts.  The respondents cite that this failure to understand the critical 
mission support relationship exists in all levels of the organization, but especially in the 
command structure.  Most commanders view a cyber security incident on the networks as 
a technical issue and rely exclusively upon their system administrators to provide local 
input for damage and mission impact assessment.  There are many problems that result 
from this approach, the chief problem being that the system administrator is not a system 
user.  The system administrator has a technical responsibility as the organization’s cyber 
infrastructure custodian.  The system administrator simply does not possess the 
perspective in to the use of the system, and rarely possess an understanding of how the 
system supports the organization’s mission.   
Interview respondents alluded to this problem multiple times in different ways.  
The common issue was centered on the problem that neither commanders nor the system 
administrator understood how the information the system processed was used within the 
mission.  This is evidence that there is no understanding of information ownership within 
the organization; and no concept and assignment of information ownership within the 
organization.  The commander is tasking the information custodian to perform an 
assessment that only the information owner would have the perspective to perform.  It is 
particularly important to note that several of the interviewees made this point by 
specifically citing this failure of the organizations to understand that the systems process 
information supporting the mission.  This underscores the kernel of understanding that 
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information is the asset within the organization.  By failing to understand this ownership 
is not established.  By failing to establish ownership of the information, mission impact 
assessment is unfocused and unproductive.  Commanders must have a mechanism by 
which to establish information ownership, thereby allowing mapping of information 
assets on the affected systems to the mission which they support.  Additionally, 
commanders must realize that the system administrator is the information custodian, not 
the information asset owner.  The system administrator may not be equipped to perform 
accurate damage assessment without the necessary technical skills and understanding of 
the value of the information on the affected system 
Heavily Focused on Technology. 
There is agreement among the interview respondents that mission impact 
assessment is not being conducted effectively.  Causality is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible to establish without “hard” data.  However, based on the responses provided 
by the interview subjects and themes discovered in existing research on cyber damage 
assessment on Air Force networks the researcher asserts that the Air Force maintains too 
strong a focus on technology that is obstructing its ability to conduct defensive cyber 
damage and mission impact assessment accurately and in a timely manner. 
The Air Force has always considered technology to be an important mission 
enabler.  However, the interview responses indicate that too heavy of a focus on 
technology may be impeding mission impact assessment efforts.  This issue is a 
consistent theme in a majority of the interviewees’ responses and must not be 
downplayed.  Six of the nine respondents directly attribute this issue as a contributor to 
the problems with current mission impact assessment efforts.  The respondents report that 
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this problem manifests itself in many ways.  The responses indicate that this focus on 
technology has created confusion about cyber damage determination and mission impact 
assessment methodology that is prevalent throughout the Air Force structure.  
Commanders view mission impact as a technical issue.  They then find that the technical 
and economic metrics produced by the current cyber damage and mission impact 
assessment methodology are not applicable for decision making input for their mission 
operations.  The results of the interviews indicates that the technologically focused 
approach is not working well for Air Force mission impact assessment and a new 
approach that facilitated mission impact assessment. 
The problem with technological focus manifests itself in many ways, and the 
symptoms may be mistaken for the illness.  This researcher asserts that the problem lays 
in the identification of technology as assets, rather than the treating and viewing the 
information the system processes as an asset.  This view is supported by many of the 
respondents that indicate the focus on system technology is causing confusion and 
misunderstanding about the role the system plays in supporting mission objectives.  This 
is tied to the concept of value; a term not specifically used by any of the respondents, but 
the concept was prevalent by those respondents that discussed the relationship between 
technical cyber damage assessment and mission operations impact assessment.  These 
respondents used terms such as “worth” and “important to the mission” when discussing 
the data and information processed on the systems affected by the incident.  The 
implications are that this information has value to the organization.  It follows, therefore, 
that one of the key failings of technical focus to establish value meaningful to mission 
impact assessment and mission operations decision-making. 
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Lack of Asset Documentation. 
Many of the respondents noted that organizations did not understand the 
relationship between the systems that they used and the mission operations the systems 
somehow supported.  Several of the respondents noted that no usable documentation 
exists to facilitate this understanding.  Documentation such as system accreditation 
packages exists, but are by design technologically focused and are not providing the local 
system administrator the perspective needed to perform mission impact assessment.  The 
respondent indicated that mission impact assessment efforts would benefit greatly from 
documentation accessible to both the local system administrator and the incident response 
agency that would facilitate a better understanding of the system value and utility to the 
mission, but understanding the value and utility of the information stored on, or 
processed by the system as it supports the organization’s mission operations. 
Failure to producing usable and meaningful metrics. 
 Based on the interview responses and the interview data, the researcher asserts 
that the technical focus is resulting in an unusable mission impact assessment product.  
This is not a surprising finding since it was reported in several of the responses. The 
focus on technology leads to the exclusion of other important issues in mission impact 
assessment, and indeed, risk management and cyber security on the whole.  Since the 
current cyber damage and mission impact assessment methodology exclusively relies on 
technologically focused methodology and agents to accomplish mission impact 
assessment, the result is a technologically focused product that cannot comprehensively 
measure mission impact accurately and provides unusable and applicable reporting 
metrics to the organization’s commander.  
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This is true because the value presented by information technology is limited in 
scope, and attempts to determine damage to technology traditionally produce economic-
based metrics; and these metrics are not helpful to standard military operations.  This is a 
failure to produce usable metrics.  Attempts to measure mission impact through 
exclusively technical metrics cannot capture all the potential mission impact which may 
result from a cyber security incident.  This is a failure to produce accurate metrics.  
Currently commanders are gaining neither usable nor accurate measurements as a direct 
result of the problems identified in the interview process. 
State of Defensive Cyber Damage Assessment on U.S. Air Force Networks  
This section discusses the findings of an extensive examination of literature 
review, existing related research, and interviews of personnel with professional first-hand 
knowledge of the state of network defense activities on Air Force networks as they relate 
to defensive cyber damage and mission capability impact assessment.  It is commonly 
agreed that the current methods of cyber damage assessment and mission impact 
assessment need to be conducted with more accuracy and effectiveness.  Research of 
cyber damage assessment methodologies have shown that such efforts are being 
employed ad-hoc and with neither standardization nor validation (Thiem 2005, p. 43).  
Furthermore, the models they rely upon are producing ineffective and irrelevant 
assessment report information since they measure damage exclusively in terms of 
recovery costs and infrastructure availability.  These metrics provide insufficient 
information to the commander to present an accurate picture of impact to the 
organization’s mission operations. 
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Air Force guidance (AFI 33-138 2004) has designated the Air Force Network 
Operations Center (AFNOC) Network Security Division (NSD) as the agency responsible 
for leading incident response efforts on Air Force networks.  The AFNOC/NSD is tasked 
to lead and coordinate damage and impact assessment of an organization’s mission 
capability following a successful compromise. This is an extremely difficult and often 
impossible task under the current implementation of security management practices on 
Air Force networks.  
In this section, the findings of literature review, existing research, and interview 
response data are examined to paint a clear picture of the factors that are confounding 
efforts to perform accurate and timely defensive cyber damage assessment and mission 
capability impact assessment.  By understanding and documenting these factors the stage 
is set for answering the investigative questions of this research. 
Current Approach to Cyber Security. 
The Air Force’s Network Defense (Net-D) activities are exclusively focused on 
the network technology rather than on the information assets contained within the 
information systems.  Net-D is highly effective at defending networks.  However, a 
technologically focused network defense scheme cannot work alone and Net-D must be 
part of a larger information protection scheme.  The areas of responsibility assigned to 
the Net-D function are blurred.  In practice, the Air Force tends to rely exclusively on the 
Net-D function as the vehicle for all aspects of defensive cyber operations; to include 
cyber damage and mission impact assessment.  Literature review, existing research 
(Thiem 2005) and interview data demonstrate, however, the damage and mission impact 
assessment efforts are falling down in terms of providing effective and useful metrics. 
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Net-D is the implementation of technological security policy to establish 
technologically secure networks.  The technologically exclusive approach of Net-D 
acknowledges the existence of data within the infrastructure, but cannot value it as an 
asset.  Without explicitly recognizing and acknowledging information as an asset that 
directly supports mission operations, one of the chief failings of a highly technologically 
focused approach to cyber security is exposed in terms of damage assessment.   Because 
data is without inherent meaning and appropriate value, exclusive reliance on Net-D 
cannot establish value handles to data to measure the support data provides to mission 
operational decision making.  As a result, subsequent effective damage assessment is 
defeated before it can begin. 
In terms of performing effective damage and mission impact assessment, the Air 
Force is finding that its information policy and doctrine do not translate well into Net-D 
implementation.  Thiem’s case study research (2005), when coupled with the interview 
data of this research effort, shows that reliance and focus on the technical assessment 
only is causing current damage assessment efforts to fall short damage assessment.  The 
interview data provided evidence to an implication of Thiem’s case study research on Air 
Force damage assessment that current damage assessment efforts are not actually 
assessing damage.   Instead, agencies are simply producing technical and economically 
focused metrics that are of little use in understanding the full effect of the incident 
(Thiem 2005, pp. 34-35).   
Net-D is a highly effective implementation of technological security policy, but it 
cannot continue to be solely relied upon to provide all aspects of cyber protection and 
security.   Net-D must be implemented in support of a cyber protection scheme that 
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recognizes and understands information asset value protection.  The current exclusive 
reliance on Net-D cannot support this effective damage and mission impact assessment.  
The Air Force must encompass an effective risk management program that allows it to 
identify, valuate, and document its information assets.  The clear area of responsibility of 
technologically focused network security can be passed back  to the Net-D function to 
protect these critical information assets that exist within the infrastructure. 
Lack of Effective “Cyber” Risk Management. 
Virtually all contemporary security planning methodologies include risk 
management as the foundation for a successful information security program. The Air 
Force understands the importance and benefits of risk management and employs risk 
management processes throughout the various aspects of its operations to achieve a high 
level of operations security. However, it fails to perform effective risk management of its 
information assets. The risk management that is accomplished is driven by the 
technology focused approach to cyber security.   
The Air Force implements what Soo Hoo calls scenario-analysis risk management 
techniques (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 11).  This form of risk management is very limited in 
scope. The Air Force tends to focus on those mitigation steps for those vulnerabilities 
identified explicitly identified through scenario. The Air Force is perpetually concerned 
about the damage and mission impact that may be caused a zero-day exploit.  Since the 
Air Force does not deliberately assess cyber risk in terms of assets and value, it is 
discovering that it is largely blind to mission impact determination until after the impact 
is manifest.  As the interviews and existing case study research (Thiem 2005) data 
demonstrate, the Air Force is finding damage and mission impact assessment exceedingly 
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difficult to perform effectively since organizations do not understand the assets owned 
and what these are worth to the organization’s mission.  An effective risk management 
program allows an organization to develop this understanding.   
The Air Force is failing to implement a deliberate and effective risk management 
program. In practice, technology is the center of value against which degrees of security 
controls are established.  When an incident occur, damage and mission impact cannot be 
done with accuracy and effectiveness.  The problem created by putting technology 
exclusively at the center of risk management is analogous to only accounting for the 
hangars on a flight line and ignoring the aircraft and assets within. When catastrophe 
occurs, either through attacks or accident, and the hangar is lost simply reporting the cost 
of the damage to the hangar building provides the commander little understanding to the 
impact the attack had on mission capability.  The commander must know what and how 
many aircraft and support assets were lost to understand the impact of the incident on 
mission capability and his ability to support the air campaign.   
By implementing a risk assessment practice that focuses exclusively on 
technological assets, and fails to deliberately consider cyber information assets within the 
organization, the Air Force is simply inventorying hangars and ignoring the mission 
assets within. The failure to effectively perform asset-focused risk assessment is the chief 
contributor to the failure of damage assessment efforts, and is confounding subsequent 
mission impact assessment efforts. 
Lack of Information Asset Documentation.  
One considerable problem mentioned by interview respondents as impeding cyber 
damage assessment is the lack of usable documentation of cyber information assets used 
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within an organization.  Interview data revealed that many Air Force commanders rely on 
commander’s programs, such as the Operations Security (OPSEC) program to identify 
document critical information resources within the organization organizational structure. 
The OPSEC program was not designed for this task and cannot accomplish such an 
objective.   The current implementation of the OPSEC program does document the 
organization’s critical information resources, but it excludes most information in the 
cyber domain, other than information GWOT-focused information such as personal 
information published on a publicly accessible web page.   There is no valuation of the 
assets collected in any way that is meaningful for cyber damage and mission impact 
assessment. 
System accreditation documentation, another existing documentation of systems 
on Air Force networks, tends to be heavily focused on the technical aspects to be usable 
in cyber damage and impact assessment activities.  Several interview respondents noted 
that this accreditation documentation is of little use in determining damage and mission 
impact after a successful incident.  As a result, the Air Force has fallen short of 
establishing a platform of documentation to assist both the incident responder and 
information owner to damage and impact determination. 
Current Attempts to Assess Damage and Mission Impact. 
The Air Force’s approach to cyber security is also directly driving it approach to 
damage assessment.  This approach to cyber asset damage assessment attempts to 
determine the damage caused by an information security incident through assessment of 
technical impact to systems and/or infrastructure.  It is fundamentally limited in its ability 
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to measure impact in a value-focused manner and is finding that it does not possess the 
ability to accurately measure mission impact following an information compromise.  
Figure 9 is a conceptual graphical of how existing incident response process 
currently works and how damage assessment is determined and communicated within 
USAF networks. When an incident occurs and is detected, the IRT is dispatched to 
investigate the incident as shown in step 1. The incident process conducted by the IRT 
will focus on investigation, remediation, restoration, and a preliminary damage 
assessment as shown in step 2. The IRT team will work with the system owners in an 
attempt to determine the impact of the incident. In many cases, the system owners are not 
fully aware of all of the information assets that are contained within the system. This is 
due, in part, to the dynamic nature of information systems and the fact that information 
assets are often deposited on (or deleted from) a system without the explicit knowledge of 
the system owners. Next, a preliminary assessment of the incident is reported through 
AFNOC NCD to all affected sites as shown in step 3. In this high-level example, the 
report consumers are all those agencies that have a vested interest in receiving the 
incident report.  Current damage reporting is integrated in the narrative of incident 
reporting consists mainly of tangible technical metrics (loss of availability of data and the 
man-hours required to remediate the incident). A subjective operational impact 
assessment may occur based upon the relative understanding the system owners have 
about the use of data affected by the incident. In most cases, this understanding is very 
low and incident responders are force to make a “best guess” based on their interaction 
with the system owners.  As a result mission impact assessment is, for all intents and 
purposes, currently an unattainable goal due in large part to the lack of documentation of 
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the information assets on the system and identification of organizations that depend upon 
the information.  
 
Figure 9. Current Incident Response and Damage Assessment on AF Networks 
 
 
Step 4 illustrates this disjoint between the OPSEC program and cyber security 
efforts.  As previously stated, the OPSEC program in its current is not designed to 
provide a commander any mapping of cyber information assets to operational or mission 
impact.  There exists no other program or initiative in the Air Force enterprise to ensure 
identification, documentation and relative valuation of information assets that support 
mission operations and reside within the Air Force network infrastructure.  
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  When an information incident occurs, the Incident Response Team is forced to 
conduct a mission impact assessment with little or no documentation that shows how the 
information supports the organizational mission. As a result, the primary assessment is 
based upon economic factors (remediation and recovery costs) and availability. 
Subsequently, an effort is made to identify and quantify the impact by contacting a 
representative within the information owner’s organization. Unfortunately, this often 
leads to a subjective assessment and unreliable assessment of impact. 
Scenario Illustrating the Current Approach. 
To illustrate the impediments to damage assessment introduced by the currently 
employed approach to cyber protection, consider the following notional example based 
on actual events on Air Force networks where network defenders investigating suspicious 
activity have confirmed the compromise of multiple passwords to military systems. The 
systems are multi-function, but bear trust relationships with systems that are known to be 
critical to the organization’s mission. The incident response team (IRT) determines that at 
least one password has allowed administrator access to the system; and the mission 
critical systems were accessed numerous times. All findings, including time of access, 
information accessed, and other important information, are reported through the standard 
reporting chain, and the commander at the site of the incident is included. The 
commander requests more information from the IRT regarding how the incident affects 
his mission. The IRT is unable to provide this assessment as there is no documentation of 
how the information provides value to the mission. As a result, the commander may 
decide that since his system’s availability is intact, no action is necessary. The truth, 
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however, may be that the confidentiality of a planned operation was breached which 
undermines the OPSEC of the mission.  As a result, the mission may be jeopardized and 
materials and lives exposed to unnecessary risk since the commander cannot be provided 
with a clear picture of the battlespace that enables him to understand the impact to is own 
mission capability. 
Synthesis of Research Data and Investigative Research Questions 
 This section will address the investigative research questions and discuss the 
research data in terms of these questions.  Each section will discuss how the data supports 
or weakens the investigative research questions.  
Investigative Research Question 1. 
The first research question asked:  
R1. How can the damage resulting from a successful cyber attack be effectively 
measured? 
 
This research has uncovered substantial data from literature review, existing case study 
research, and interviews to indicate that the current damage assessment methodology is 
inefficient at best, with non-validated damage assessment procedures being implemented 
piecemeal in various pockets of the Air Force enterprise (Thiem 2005, p. 43).   Despite 
the Air Force implementing damage assessment and reporting command and control 
through standardized guidance (AFI 33-138 2004), there are still many problems as 
evident from the interview data. 
The Air Force is attempting measuring damage in technical and financial terms, 
although these damage assessment metrics note have been proven beneficial to the 
 
139 
commander seeking to understand impact to his/her mission after an incident.  The 
interview data of this research directly supports the findings of Thiem’s research (2005) 
that damage assessment is an inherently technologically focused activity being conducted 
ineffectively throughout the Air Force enterprise.   
Understanding Damage Assessment. 
Damage assessment, mission impact assessment and mission impact reporting 
form a chain of dependent activities.  Conceptually, one activity cannot be accurately 
performed without successful completion of the prior activity (see Figure 10 below).  
Cyber damage assessment must set the stage for mission impact by determining damage 
to the asset on which the mission depends.  The damage is in terms of value loss.  In 
other words, damage assessment must assess damage.  In the literature review, damage 
was defined as a loss in value or usability in an asset (Oxford, 1986).  Analysis thus far 
has shown that a failure to accurately perform damage assessment confounds any effort 
to perform mission impact reporting to the operational decision maker.   
 
Figure 10.  Damage Assessment to Impact Reporting Chain of Dependency 
 
 The previous statement is true because mission impact reporting is at the end of a 
chain of interdependent processes.  The mission impact assessment is failing because of 
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the focus on the technical aspects of damage assessment.  Air Force damage assessment 
is conducted in a disjointed manner and in many cases is limited to technical reporting 
without actual damage assessment being performed.  Damage in terms of value loss is 
difficult to measure since the Air Force risk management program is a scenario-focused 
scheme that introduces limited scope to risk, and very little deliberate determination of 
asset value.  In all cases, the central asset of damage assessment efforts is technological 
and which holds only a single dimension of value to the organization; loss of availability. 
However, as the research data demonstrates, the failure to understand the system-to-
mission relationship is rendering even this simplistic, single dimensional form of damage 
assessment ineffective.  The chain of dependencies must be corrected for mission impact 
assessment to be possible.  
Ideal Cyber Damage Assessment. 
Cyber damage assessment methodology must include a mechanism that provides 
a reasonable estimate of loss in the value of an organization’s asset.  This statement holds 
several important implications.  It implies that an asset is something that holds value to 
the organization.  Since damage is defined as a reduction in value or usefulness of the 
affected object (Oxford, 1986), effective damage assessment methodology must assess 
any reduction, or loss, in the asset’s value.  This, in turn, implies that effective damage 
assessment must also measure value loss in the correct asset in order to produce metrics 
that are relevant to the organization’s mission.  Such assets must directly support the 
organization’s mission and the value of the supporting relationship must be understood 
by the asset’s owner. 
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This research has found that Air Force organizations are not looking at the right 
assets for damage assessment, due largely to a failure to recognize what assets support 
the mission.  Interview data and literature both support the strong focus that the Air Force 
maintains on technology over its information.   The interview respondents cited a 
prevalent failure to understand how systems processed information that supported the 
organization’s mission.  The focus on technology has blinded organizational 
understanding of what assets are owned and how those assets contribute to the mission.  
Moreover, the interview data shows that this focus on technology prevents the 
understanding that the asset not simply the affected system, but it is the information 
processed by the system that supports the organization’s mission.  The literature review 
and interview data support the concept that the asset’s value lies in the relationship 
between this information and the mission.   
Additionally, the case study of damage assessment on Air Force networks 
revealed that the focus on damage assessment was exclusively on technical assessments, 
and in some cases a lack of understand of why damage assessment is being conducted 
(Thiem 2005, p. 35).  There is no indication that an assessment of damage in terms of 
value loss is being conducted.  This observation is supported by the interview data of this 
research effort in which every respondent discussed some aspect of the meaningless 
mission impact assessment metrics consisting of exclusively technical reporting from the 
Tier 3 custodians.  If no damage is assessed in terms of utility value loss, mission impact 
assessment becomes even more difficult and less accurate.  Indeed, one of the common 
themes among the interview respondents in this research effort was that the focus on 
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technical issues was producing meaningless damage assessment metrics that prevented 
mission impact assessment.   
Ideal cyber damage assessment depends on the identification of the correct assets 
and an understanding of the value these assets maintain in the organization. Ideal damage 
assessment, therefore, is explicitly dependent on the identification and documentation of 
the information asset before the incident occurs.  This documentation must account for 
the assets value in terms of mission relationship, its key attributes and containers, and an 
explicit mapping to the mission which indicates potential mission impact if the asset is 
lost or damaged.  Value must be expressed in some way that is relevant to the 
organization.  Literature review data supports that the value of information lies in its 
utility to the organization (Buffet, Scott, et. Al. 2004, pp. 80-81; Morrison and Cohen 
2005, p. 34).  In organizational decision making where mission is not motivated by 
economics, such as military operations, the value of the asset must be expressed and 
understood in terms of utility-based value estimation.  By identifying the correct asset 
and understanding its relative value before an incident occurs, damage assessment then 
becomes possible.  More importantly, identification, valuation, and documentation of the 
asset and it mission relationship opens the door to mission impact assessment.   
This allows the information owner to work with the incident responder’s technical 
assessment to understand the damage to the asset in terms of estimated value loss.   Since 
documentation of the asset’s key attributes exists, the asset owner can now map the 
technical report assessing adverse effects against the organization’s systems to the assets 
on the systems.  The documentation further assists the owner and incident responder in 
determining how the asset supports the organization’s mission. The asset owner can 
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readily understand the relationship between the system and the asset.  Any estimated 
reduction to the asset’s utility value may be assessed as damage in terms acceptable for 
translation to mission impact assessment. 
Investigative Research Question 2.  
The second research question was: 
R2. How can such damage be mapped to impact to an organization’s mission 
capability? 
The previous section established that once the correct assets are identified and their value 
understood before an incident occurs, accurate damage assessment may be accomplished.  
Damage to mission mapping depends on accurate pre-incident determination and 
documentation of asset-to-mission relationships.  If accurate identification and 
documentation of the organization’s assets, asset value in terms of mission operational 
utility, and key asset attributes is accomplished before an incident occurs, a great stride is 
made towards mapping the asset to a potential impact on the mission if the asset is 
damaged.   
The chief theme revealed in the research data was an exclusive focus on 
technology produces an organizational environment where the relationship between a 
system affected by a cyber incident and the organization’s mission is misunderstood.  
Such a failure to understand the critical mission relationship frustrates attempts to assess 
both damage and mission impact in the affected organization.  Several respondents cited 
the lack of any documentation to assist the Tier 3 damage assessors in understanding this 
relationship.  The establishment of such documentation facilitates a new ability to 
perform both the foundational cyber damage assessment activities and more important 
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mission impact assessment activity.  Therefore, pre-incident documentation of the asset, 
its value, and its mission relationship lift the fog which currently exists.  With a clearly 
documented mapping between the asset and the mission, cyber damage to mission impact 
assessment becomes possible. 
Another key finding in the interview data was the fog produced by this exclusive 
focus on technological assets and lack of documentation was the misunderstanding of 
ownership.  The literature review Stevens discussed the many problems associated with 
failure to establish and understand ownership (Stevens 2005, p. 30).  The research data 
revealed evidence that organizations did not understand ownership roles of the system 
and the associated damage assessment processes.  These agencies  depended on the Tier 1 
agencies to determine damage and mission impact assessment.  However, only the asset 
owner has the perspective to understand how the mission is impacted when the asset is 
damaged.  Establishing and documenting explicit ownership of the organization’s assets 
facilitates both damage assessment and mission impact assessment by mitigating 
ambiguity about the asset attributes and ensures that the entity with the appropriate 
perspective can work with the Tier 1 agency to establish an effective mission impact 
assessment. 
Damage assessment mapping to mission impact may be accomplished through the 
foundational activity of identifying and documenting the organization’s assets and 
appropriate attributes before an incident occurs.  These attributes must include at 
minimum, the asset owner, the asset’s value in terms of mission relationship, and such 
information as the asset’s location.  By doing so, the first key activities of damage and 
mission impact assessment may be accomplished.   
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Investigative Research Question 3. 
The third investigative research question was: 
 
R3.  How must this assessment be reported to the decision maker to maximize the 
quality of the assessment for use as decision input? 
 
Mission impact reporting is the summit of all damage and mission impact assessment 
activities.  Appropriate and effective reporting can provide the commander with an 
increased situational awareness of potential and actual impact to his/her mission 
following an cyber incident that may lead to improved battlespace decision making 
through decision superiority (AFDD2-5 2005).  However, literature review (Bowman and 
Moskowitz 2001, p. 775) has shown the usefulness of the reporting data is only as good 
as the effectiveness of the preceding assessment process.  Additionally the information 
must be of decision-making quality in terms the decision maker can easily understand 
(Jensen 2005, p.56; JP 3-13, 2006: I-3). 
Mission impact reporting inherently assumes all previous supporting activities 
have been accomplished effectively and accurately and must be approached from an 
operational perspective.  Technical issues relating to damage assessment must be 
translated into a report that is free from technical details.  Mission impact assessment  
reporting must present information that is relevant to the commander’s needs and in 
terms of the commander’s frame of reference.   The mission impact assessment report 
must be simple to understand quickly with minimal technical information.   It must 
produce an immediate understanding allowing the commander to quickly assess the 
impact information as it relates to his/her mission.   
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Literature review and interview data has shown that the primary guidance for such 
reporting (CJCSM6510.01 2006) does not explicitly provide such a reporting format that 
is free from the ambiguity that results in overly technical reporting.  But as previously 
stated JP 3-13 (2006, p. I-3) does provide a generic framework for the establishing the 
quality of information that must be included in mission impact reporting.  If the quality 
criteria are used as a standard for developing report content a good start is make towards 
effective reporting.  To ensure that the report is populated with assessment information 
that is relevant to the commanders needs, asset owner involvement in impact assessment 
and reporting is essential. 
Timeliness is also a critical issue to ensure the appropriate decision maker gains 
situational awareness in appropriate time frame.  Ideally, report distribution should be 
automated through some centralized reporting system to ensure all organizations, such as 
Tier 1 Netops functions, and ordinate agencies are aware of the mission impact resulting 
from the incident on the enterprise networks. 
From the first phase of asset identification to the final phase of mission impact 
reporting, the needs of the operational decision maker must be at the forefront of all 
activities.  Only by maintaining this operational focus will information, rather than 
technology, become the evident asset for mission, and its value realized.  By doing so,  
the fog that obscures the relationship between information asset, system and mission is 
lifted and true cyber damage assessment and mission impact assessment becomes 




This chapter presented and analyzed data collected through the interviews, 
existing case study research on damage assessment practices on Air Force networks, and 
extensive literature review.  The interviews focused on understanding the problems with 
current mission impact assessment activities.  The literature review and case studies 
examination analyzed data relating to the Air Force’s approach to risk assessment and 
damage assessment.  The key finding is that the foundations of all network defense 
activities are so exclusively rooted in the technological focus that accurate mission 
impact assessment is not currently possible.  Mission impact reporting is at the end of a 
chain of interdependent processes.  It is failing because the preceding steps are failing.  
Damage assessment is conducted in a disjointed manner and in many cases is limited to 
technical reporting with not real assessment of damage in terms of value loss.  Value loss 
cannot be measured since the Air Force risk management efforts do not deliberately 
identify and valuate cyber assets. 
This chapter answered the research questions after building an understanding of 
why current damage and mission impact assessment is not working efficiently.  Damage 
from a successful cyber attack may be measured effectively only if the value of the asset 
if known before the incident.  Damage assessment must consist of both a technical 
assessment and a damage assessment that estimates value loss.  Mission impact 
assessment depends that damage assessment is successful and accurate.  Both damage 
assessment and mission impact assessment explicitly depend on accurate asset 
identification and documentation prior to the incident.  Mission impact reporting is the 
end goal of all damage and mission impact assessment activities.  It depends on 
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successful and accurate accomplishment of the previous activities and must provide the 
results in a timely and clear manner to allow the decision maker to make smart and timely 
decisions based on the mission impact report information. 
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V. Conclusions and Proposals 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the finding in current Air Force implementation of 
damage and mission impact assessment.  The chapter also provided answers to the 
research questions by discussing how damage assessment can be translated to mission 
impact and clearly reported to the organizational decision maker. 
This chapter discusses conclusions of this research regarding improved defensive 
damage assessment methodology. The first section of this chapter presents foundations 
for improved damage and mission impact assessment.  The second section proposes an 
improved conceptual methodology for defensive cyber damage and mission impact 
assessment.   
Foundations for Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment  
Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment (CDA-D/MIA) is a 
system of interdependent activities that allow an organizational decision maker to 
understand the mission impact resulting from a successful cyber incident.  The 
methodology attempts to help an organization identify its critical information assets in 
such a way that effective mission impact assessment and reporting is possible.  This 
research effort has determined that current attempts of both damage assessment and 
mission impact assessment are unsuccessful due to a number of independent failing that 
prevent its effective implementation for a number of reasons.  This section will discuss 
essential foundational principles that establish an improved methodology. 
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Information Production, Consumption and Ownership. 
The literature review discussed traditional concepts of information ownership, 
custodianship, and information users.  Understanding these respective communities of 
responsibility regarding information is extremely important for the foundation of damage 
assessment.  The information owner is responsible for identification, definition, 
valuation, and documentation of all information assets owned.  Asset profiling must be 
accomplished by the information owner since only the owner maintains a perspective to 
understand how the information is used to support the organization’s mission and its 
relative value.  Assets must be identified, documented, and profiled before an incident 
occurs.   
In the best of conditions, information production, ownership, and consumption are 
easily and frequently confused, and in many organizations information asset ownership is 
assigned without due diligence to ensuring the owner can accomplish the assigned 
ownership responsibilities.  Ownership must be assigned correctly or any benefits are 
negated.  The assigned owner must both understand the responsibilities of ownership and 
possess the authority to perform ownership duties.   
Ownership must not be confused with production.  In many organizations, the 
producer and owner may be the same person if the information asset is produced within 
the organization.  In a large enterprise, the information producer may exist outside the 





In a business organization, it is likely that information is produced somewhere 
within the organization’s boundaries.  In such a case, the information producer and 
information owner may be the same.  It may be reasonably expected that since they reside 
within the same organization they are subject to the same organizational policies 
governing information and information asset protection.  This situation creates an 
opportunity to create a tangible assignment of ownership.   
The tangible owner possesses reasonable assurance that the information asset will 
be subject to the consistent information policy and guidance as established within the 
organization.  Additionally, the tangible owner maintains a reasonable relationship with 
the information custodian since, as with the information producer, both operate within the 
policy environment of the same organization.  Furthermore, since the tangible asset 
owner and asset are within the same organization, the owner is in a position to place a 
value upon the asset relative to its contextual worth to the organization with reasonable 
assurance that the relative value of the information asset is sustained throughout the 
organization.  Tangible ownership can only exist in organizations where information 
assets do not cross organizational boundaries. 
Relative Ownership. 
In a large enterprise, such as the military, tangible ownership is impossible to 
achieve.  Military operations rely heavily on information assets produced beyond the 
boundaries of the organization, service, or even the nation of the information consumer.    
On military networks, the traditional role definitions  information producers, owners, 
custodians and consumers are obscured as traditional concepts of ownership become 
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relative to the individual needs of widely diverse organizations within the same 
enterprise.  Asset ownership gains a new fluidity, and becomes relative to the contextual 
value within an organization.  The same asset will have widely differing values and 
security requirements as it moves from organization to organization throughout the 
enterprise.  Assignment of a single owner is impossible in this case, therefore ownership 
is relative to the organization. 
To illustrate this concept, consider the following scenario.  An organization 
receives intelligence information input from multiple external organizations, services, 
and allied nations. External information producers may classify the information at the 
point of origin, but because the external producer has no perspective of how each 
consumer organization will use this information within the context of each mission, 
definitive value for the information cannot established.  Therfore, classification can only 
serve as a baseline value for the asset.  As the information enters the organization and the 
organization finds that the information is useful to its mission, the information becomes 
an asset to the organization.  The organization, therefore, may store and use the 
information.  At this point, the organization becomes more that just a consumer of the 
information asset. Now the organization is a relative owner of the asset.  
In this way, relative ownership resembles tangible ownership, local to an 
organization for the purposes of risk management, security controls, and even damage 
assessment. As with the tangible owner, the relative owner is responsible for 
identification, documentation, and valuation of the information asset.  However, each 
organization within the enterprise that uses the asset may realize asset value differently in 
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the context of its mission usability.  Each organization, therefore, bears a relative 
ownership to the asset within the context of their organization. 
The concept of relative ownership is extremely important to establishment of an 
effective cyber damage assessment model in a large and diverse enterprise, such as the 
DoD.  Relative ownership implies that the buck stops here for determining asset value.  
Relative ownership allows each organization to look within itself to identify, document, 
and valuate the critical information assets that allow it to maintain daily mission 
operations.  For the purposes of this research, the term information ownership implies 
relative information ownership to more easily deal with information ownership and 
damage to information assets local to the organization in which the incident occurred. 
Measuring Cyber Damage as Value Loss. 
This research has concluded that traditional methodologies for assessing cyber 
damage are not suitable for use on military networks.  Traditional methodologies tend 
assess damage in terms of economic loss and produce reporting constructs that are not 
adequate contributors to decision making in organizations not explicitly profit-driven.  
.Additionally, this research determined that Air Force damage assessment efforts do not 
effectively measure damage in terms of value loss.  This is one contributing reason why 
current damage assessment cannot facilitate impact assessment.  The other contributing 
reason is a failure to understand value in terms that are relevant to an organization such as 
the military.  Without establishing relative value, damage cannot be assessed.  This 
section proposes a conceptual method for establishing value and assessing subsequent 
damage resulting from an incident. 
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Establishing Value for Information Assets. 
Determining the value of information is a complex task due to its innately 
intangible qualities and contextual derivation of value that thwarts attempts to assign a 
definitive value to information assets in many models.  Understanding information value 
as a reflection of the relationship it presents in supporting the achievement of 
organizational mission goals is critical.   
The value of information is contextual; it is derived from its utility within a given 
organization.  Utility is an intangible quality that is extremely difficult to quantify 
because it is dependent on the context in which the owning organization uses the asset in 
achieving its mission goals.  The value of information may deviate greatly from one 
organization to the next due to context.  Consider for example, live unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) feeds providing real-time battlespace information may be broadcast across 
a classified network.  Personnel in the finance organization may access this information 
at any time to see what’s happening.  As interesting as the feed may be to the personnel 
in the finance unit, the UAV feed holds little or no value to the mission of the finance 
organization.  If a cyber incident impairs the live feed, there is no immediate impact to 
the mission of the finance organization.  Therfore, the feed holds little value to the 
finance organization.  However, the information holds great value to the commander in 
the Joint Air Operations Center (JOC) making mission decisions based on the 
information provided through the feed.  The information is the same to both, but the 
value of the information is contextual and driven by utility.  The problem encountered is 




The greater the utility of the information asset to making decisions supporting the 
mission goals the greater the instrumental value the asset presents to the organization.  As 
more decisions can be made on the information asset supporting the organization’s goals 
the more the asset’s value increases.  As this value increases, the tangible aspects of 
measurement tend to decrease (see Figure 11 below).    
 
Figure 11. Information Value Hierarchy 
 
To assess damage to information and the associated mission impact, however, 
some approximation of value must be determined prior to incident occurrence.  On 
military networks, classification is an intial baseline, but it is not a sufficient 
measurement of potential or actual value.  Therefore, a new model for value assignment 
must be devised to assign a handle to represent the instrumental value the information 
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asset holds relative to its support of organizational mission operations.  When doing so it 
is critical that focus remains on the information asset as the foundation on which specific 
mission operations rest.  By approaching asset value determination from a mission 
operations perspective, the complexity of identification and valuation may be reduced by 
approximating it value in relation to its value drivers. 
Asset Value. 
Value is an abstracted concept and there are many things that go on under the 
hood  to establish the concept of value, and it is frequently confused with its unit of 
measurement.  It is worthwhile to briefly discuss value as it relates to damage and 
mission impact assessment, because understanding how to determine value is essential to 
understanding how to determine damage. 
  The conclusions of this research assert that an asset possesses value in two 
distinct ways:  potential value, and actionable value.  Potential value represents the 
absolute value that an asset may hold for an organization, real or theoretical.  Potential 
value tends to remain constant so long as its value driver remains constant.  Actionable 
value represents the degree in which the value is presented to the organization.  
Actionable value is based on the organization’s ability to utilize the asset for its needs at a 
given time.  Where potential value is relatively constant in regards to its relationship with 
its value driver, actionable value is relatively fluid and is readily influenced by external 
factors.  For example, an asset with high utility by critical mission processes may be 
unavailable as the result of a server failure.  The asset’s potential value remains 
constant—it is still an important asset to the organization—but the actionable value is 
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diminished.  Since the asset’s ability to be used is diminished, the value it provides is 
diminished for the duration of the reduction in utility.  
This concept is important since military operations depend upon these values 
differently in operations across the strategic, operational, and tactical domains of 
operations.  The strategic domain is primarily concerned with the asset’s potential value 
to establish predictive understanding of potential mission impact.  In the operational and 
tactical domains, however, mission operations depend on the organization’s ability to 
effectively use all the constructs of the information asset, therefore relying upon the 
asset’s actionable value.  The asset’s value must be established before the incident occurs 
and by necessity, through an asset-focused risk management methodology which 
facilitates asset identification and valuation.  On initial valuation the asset’s potential and 
actionable values are presumed to be the same.  To assign value to the asset, however, 
there must be value constructs established to which value may be assigned and damage 
may be assessed.  These constructs are discussed further below. 
Classification as a Baseline Value Construct. 
All information stored on its networks is assigned classification through a 
standard system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security 
information (EO13292 2003). The classification is established at the point of production 
in terms of value to national security rather than value to a specific organization’s 
mission.  However, this classification is maintained across organizational boundaries 
regardless of an organization’s mission.  A system must be accredited and classified at 
the highest classification level of the information processed on it.  Thus, all information 
stored or processed on the system must be assigned a classification level equal to that of 
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the system.  As a result, there can be no guarantee that the classification is a reflection of 
the asset’s value to the individual organization making classification only suitable as a 
baseline for establishing asset value. 
Utility as a Contextual Value Driver. 
Information asset value is contextual, since its value is in its support of the 
organization’s accomplishment of its mission goals through operational processes that 
depend on the information asset.  Remember that contextual value is the most important 
component in information asset valuation, and derives its value through its degree of 
utility in supporting the organization’s mission.  Contextual value allows the same asset 
to be worth more or less from one organization to the next as its utility changes.  The 
more usable the asset is, the greater its contextual value.  The greater the utility to a 
process critical to the organization, the more critical the asset becomes.  This also means 
that when something occurs that affects the utility of the asset in its relative ability to 
support mission goals, its contextual value is affected.  Such a change could be the result 
of a shift in the organization’s mission that makes the asset less useful.  More often it 
may be the result of an incident that affects one or more of the asset’s contextual value 
constructs. 
Contextual Value Constructs. 
The model below proposes an asset value model in which assets can be assigned 
value based on their criticality to the mission.  Valuation must be done in the pre-incident 
stage of the strategic operating domain of the CDA-D/MIA model.  CDA-D/MIA 
domains of operation will be discussed later in this paper. Valuation of the asset 
constructs is a critical component in the success and effectiveness of the CDA-D/MIA 
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methodology.  This model allows a discrete value to be assigned to the qualitative 
relationships between the asset and the mission it supports.  These relationships are 
identified in the model through asset constructs which model the utility bindings of the 
key areas of support for the organization’s mission (see Figure 12 below).  Remember 
that this support for the organization’s mission is realized through layers of support of 
information processes which support mission processes and ultimately the organizational 
mission.  The constructs of the contextual value of information are mission binding, age, 
and state.   
 
Figure 12. Information Asset Value Construct Model 
 
The Mission Binding Construct. 
Mission binding is an assessment of how closely the information asset is bound to 
the organization’s mission through its supporting information process.  An asset that is 
closely bound to an operational process is assigned a relatively high value, especially if 
the operational process itself is critical to the organization’s mission.  Therefore, the 
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criticality of the supported process and the strength the relationship between the process 
and the asset comprises the value driver for the asset’s mission binding construct.  The 
nature of this relationship enjoys a relatively greater degree of permanency in comparison 
to the other contextual value constructs, especially those sub-constructs under the state 
construct discussed below.  Mission binding is qualitative in nature.  
The Age Construct. 
Age is a concept common to all lifecycles. As information ages, it’s relevance to 
the organization may change.  This construct could conceivably be call timeliness, but 
since the degree of relevance reflected in this construct is function relevance over time, it 
is more appropriately called age.  Some information assets may possess a more volatile 
age construct than others.  The value of the age construct of a weather report will 
potentially alter more rapidly than the age construct of electronic patient records.  An 
asset which ages beyond its relevance will see a reduction in utility.  Assessing the value 
of this construct is arguably more useful in those assets that age at a more gradual rate.  
The value of this construct is also qualitative. 
State Constructs. 
State is the most fluid of an information asset’s contextual value constructs. The 
state construct refers to the state of the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) 
model of information quality and reflects the asset’s state of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability.  Each organization may place a greater or lesser value on each of these 
constructs depending on how the asset supports the particular mission process.  Certain 
processes may depend on the state of a certain construct to be maintained more than the 
others.  For example, some information assets, such as secrets, may not need to be 
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immediately accessible, but unauthorized exposure could be devastating to the 
organization’s mission capability.  Others, such as medical prescription information 
stored in a system depend on the maintenance of the integrity over confidentiality and 
immediate availability. 
An information incident can affect the state of the information asset causing it to 
be of less value to the information owner. During initial valuation, it must be assumed 
that the state constructs are intact unless there is reason to believe otherwise.  Like the 
mission binding construct, the constructs which comprise the asset’s state construct are 
qualitative estimations of the value the asset provides to the organization is achieving its 
mission goals. 
Damage and Value Loss. 
Loss is value reduction in the asset.  However, value loss is not necessarily the 
result of damage.  Value loss can result from either external or internal influences, such 
as organizational mission changes or incidents that affect the relationship maintained 
between the asset and the supported mission processes, or internal factors such as life 
cycle issues that diminish the asset’s relevance to the mission.  Value loss can occur from 
information life cycle issues, where the asset outlives its relevance to the organization, 
thus experiencing value reduction.  If the organization’s mission changes, the asset’s 
value may decrease if it is not as critically bound to the organization’s new mission. 
Damage is something more specific.  Damage is the result of an incident that 
reduces the asset’s utility to the organization; generally and most frequently affecting the 
asset’s context value constructs.  Damage is always the result of an external influence on 
the asset’s value.   
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This research is primarily concerned with damage.  However, both damage and 
general value loss are reductions in value, so it is important that a methodology for 
damage assessment is also able to recognize other forms of value loss in the 
organization’s information  
Value Loss in the Mission Binding Construct. 
Generally speaking, the mission binding will remain relatively constant so long as 
there is no change in the value driver.  A change in the organization’s mission may cause 
a cause a change in the value of the asset if the supported process becomes more or less 
critical to supporting the organization’s mission.  Another factor that could influence the 
mission binding is age.   
Value Loss in the Age Construct. 
As previously stated, an asset that has aged beyond its relevance is less useful for 
decision making. Since decisions are made upon information, the information must be 
timely and relevant to the situation to possess utility in decision making. If the 
information asset is no longer applicable its utility is reduced, with potential collateral 
impact to the mission binding construct. 
Following with the previous example of age, consider that a weather report may 
be updated and revised multiple times throughout the day to provide the commander the 
opportunity to maximize the potential for improved mission decisions.  Each successive 
report supersedes the previous as the previous ages beyond relevance to the mission.   
Damage in State Constructs. 
Because of the nature of state constructs, value loss will be experienced as 
damage.  These constructs are not directly influenced through time or mission alignment.  
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Changes to the value in these constructs will come from some external influence or 
compromise.  Therefore, such value change is damage.  Each of the sub-constructs of 
state, confidentiality, integrity, and availability, can experience damage independent of 
each other, or collectively.  Each holds in independent value that reflects the value state 
of the construct at the time of its valuation; presumably also its ideal state.  An incident 
that results in any degree of value reduction in any one or any combination of the sub-
constructs of the state constructs reflects a reduction in the utility of the asset for the 
duration until the asset may be restored to its pre-incident state.  Again, keep in mind that 
discussion of loss in these sub-sections refers to reduction in the actionable value. 
Damage in Availability Construct. 
There are multiple avenues for a compromise of availability.  Loss of availability 
can be caused by malicious activity, such as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack against the information infrastructure, or non-malicious incident, such as natural 
disaster or infrastructure failure.  Consider the following example of damage resulting in 
mission impact following from a compromise of information asset availability. 
The air campaign is in its second day.  One of the wing commanders supporting 
the campaign wants to know the wing’s BDA for the previous day’s missions; and 
specifically why he is attacking the same target for the third consecutive day.  He calls 
the Director of Combat Operations (DCO) for BDA report, but is informed that an 
ongoing system outage is delaying access to the BDA reports.  The DCO states that the 
cause of the outage is unknown at this time, but his Intelligence officers will be able to 
resume completion of the first phase BDA report as soon as the system is operational.  
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The Colonel on the phone is frustrated because he cannot get the information that he 
needs about the next day’s missions. 
In this scenario the critical information asset was unavailable to support the 
organization’s mission.  The availability construct was perturbed by a container failure, 
resulting in a degradation of the asset’s actionable value.  Damage in this case is realized 
since the asset is not available for use and the mission capability, or at minimum 
efficiency, is directly affected until such time the information asset is made available 
again.  The potential value of the asset has not diminished.  It cannot be acted upon, 
however, there the availability sub-construct’s value is diminished reflected as damage to 
the asset’s value until it is made available again. 
Damage in the Confidentiality Construct. 
Consider the following notional example that illustrates how a confidentialiy 
compromise can result in damage to the confidentiality value sub-construct that translates 
to mission impact.  As the build up for impending operations to regain control of Fallujah 
begins, CENTCOM network defenders notice an increase in suspicious activity on MNF-
I networks.  The widely dispersed network and necessities of combat operations 
introduce delays in the incident response activities necessary to secure and investigate a 
cluster of potential root-level compromises on systems located somewhere on Camp 
Victory.  Administrators and incident response personnel attempt to locate and secure the 
systems suspected have sustained Category I (CAT I), but are met with resistance from 
operators to shutting the systems down as they are mission critical.  The suspected 
compromised systems operate for another 9 hours before being secured.  In all the 
systems processed critical mission information for 36 hours after the initial notification 
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by CENTCOM network defenders of suspected root level compromise.  Within 24 hours 
the number improvised explosive devices (IED) and other hostile actions on all convoy 
routes increased by three hundred percent, with at least two IED detonations causing 
multiple coalition casualties, including loss of life.  This forced a change in movement 
time tables and routes.  Forensic investigation revealed that two systems used for 
processing mission critical information had, indeed, been compromised at the root level. 
Both systems were classified systems that had been connected to an unclassified network, 
providing the intruders access.  The intruders did not alter information on the system, but 
quietly accessed and retrieved large quantities of sensitive and classified information, 
including all convoy times and routes for the next several days.  Since the impact of the 
confidentiality compromise did not immediately impact mission operations as with an 
availability compromise, the severity of the compromise was not understood until too 
late.  As a result mission operations were affected, and human lives lost. 
A breach of confidentiality is more difficult to detect than an availability 
compromise.  The effects of confidentiality may not be immediately apparent, as in the 
above scenario, but this very fact may cause the impact to be greater.  Some information 
assets, such as secrets, will suffer significant devaluation if known by another entity with 
the capability to exploit the information.  When such a confidentiality compromise the 
asset experiences a actionable reduction in actionable value, since the secret is no longer 
a secret.  Even if the decision maker elects to proceed with the asset to make a decision 
on mission operations, the value presented is still not equivalent to the its potential value. 
Damage in the Integrity Construct. 
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The following notational scenario illustrates who damage to the integrity 
construct can result in mission impact.  Recent weeks have borne witness to a growing 
number of network incidents, and MNF-I leadership is concerned about network 
operations and cyber security problems that have recently affected Multinational Corps – 
Iraq (MNC-I) mission operations.  The MNF-I/J-6 has tasked the MNC-I/C6 to ensure 
that all units in the Iraqi theatre of operations provide owned and used IP ranges to  3d 
Signal Brigade to aid in more rapid isolation and location of system outages and 
suspicious activity.  Unfortunately, not all units comply. CENTCOM network defenders 
watching both CENTAF and CFLCC intrusion detection sensors report new potential 
CAT I activity from systems on MNF-I networks.  Although the IP of the suspected 
compromised systems are assigned to CENTAF at Balad Air Base, the system cannot be 
located immediately and the suspicious activity continues intermittently for three weeks.  
During this time, medical staff at Balad Air Base experience an unusually high number of 
anomalies such as patients being administered the wrong drugs or dangerously high 
dosages, incorrect blood type, and other life-threatening issues.  When the suspected 
compromised systems are located and secured, compromised is confirmed.  The intruders 
had intentionally altered patient medical records placing several patients in life 
threatening situations. 
Like a confidentiality compromise, a compromise of information integrity may be 
difficult to initially detect and have severe impact to the organization’s mission.  Decision 
makers ultimately utilize information assets as the foundation of their decisions.  Altering 
the information asset can force the decision maker to make a bad decision that negatively 
impacts mission operations.  Integrity compromise degrades the actionable value, by the 
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degree of alteration and can be synonymous to an available compromise it the integrity 
violation makes the asset unusable.  The potential value remains constant so long as the 
asset can be restored to its original state. 
Establishment of a Relative Value Scale. 
This research has established that value is the result of the asset’s usefulness to 
the organization, whether utility in decision making or other, more abstracted mission 
dependencies.  In any case, as this dependency increases, the tangible aspects that allow 
more simple value modeling in physical assets begin to diminish.  Commonly measured 
tangible value qualities tend to focus on economic contribution of the asset, resulting in 
dollar-centric damage assessments that are of little use to the non-profit focused decision 
maker.  In fact, previous research and existing models have shown that precise value of 
information cannot be determined with complete accuracy, or arguably even a high 
degree of accuracy.  The best approach, therefore, is to develop the closest approximation 
of this value as it relates to the organization. 
 This research proposes that information assets possess two general areas of value: 
classification, which can only serve as a baseline value, and contextual value, which is 
the true indicator the support the asset has for the organization.  Development of a 
methodology for cyber damage and organizational mission capability impact assessment 
require an information value model that can capture the qualitative estimation of the 
value an information asset holds to the organization; and present the measurement of this 
value with enough simplicity that it is easy to understand and work with.  To meet this 
need, this research proposes a five-point value scale for value assignment to the 
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constructs of information assets in a non-profit driven organization such as the military 
(see Figure 13 below) 
 
Figure 13. A Five Point Value Scale for Information Assets 
 
 This proposed value scale reflects the value of an information asset, through the 
value assigned to its constructs, as it supports mission operations.  Understanding that the 
value reflects the asset's utility in supporting mission operations is essential to proper and 
correct value assignment.  Value levels are assigned to contextual value constructs, with 
total contextual value being a function of a weighted average of the value constructs. 
Value Level 5. 
Value Level 5 reflects an asset or asset construct that provides critical support of a 
mission process.  Loss or degradation of this asset or construct will directly result in a 
failure of the information process it supports.  It is important to note at this point that the 
CDA-D/MIA methodology focuses on the identification, documentation, and valuation of 
critical information assets to determine impact to mission capability when such critical 
assets are compromised.  It is important to understand at this point that the methodology 
is designed to be self-scoping to exclude all but those assets critical to mission 
operations.  The CDA-D/MIA methodology for identification, documentation, and 
valuation of assets is discussed later. 
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Value Level 4. 
 Value Level 4 reflects the value of an asset or asset construct that provides an 
important contribution, but not critical support.  Loss or degradation of the asset or 
construct assigned this value will greatly impede the information process it supports, but 
not singly cause process failure.   
Value Levels 3 through 1. 
 The remaining value levels reflect a graduate reduction in the utility value of the 
asset for mission operations through the supporting information processes.  Value Level 3 
reflects the value of an asset or asset construct that provides some utility contribution, but 
would not result in significant impediment to mission supporting information processes if 
the asset or construct was compromised.  Value Level 1 indicates the asset presents very 
little mission critical utility within the organization.  This is not to say the asset is 
valueless in other ways.  However, if the asset was compromised in some way, there 
would be little or no impact to the organization as a result of the asset’s compromise. 
Due to the self-scoping CDA-D/MIA methodology, it is not expected that a great 
number of the critical assets identified and ultimately valuated will be initially assessed a 
value less than Value Level 3.  However, this is just an expectation of the researcher.  
The nature of the asset and its contextual value may produce wide deviation between the 
Value Levels assigned to individual constructs.  It should also be noted that this 
expectation addresses pre-incident asset valuation only.  A compromise may cause a high 
level of temporary asset devaluation caused by degradation in the asset’s utility within 
the organization through some compromise of confidentiality, integrity, or availability.  
Such devaluation is damage, and will be discussed further below. 
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Estimation of Damage through Value Loss. 
The goal of the CDA-D/MIA methodology is to assess mission capability impact 
through cyber damage assessment following a successful cyber attack.  Value is assigned 
to all constructs of the asset value model to determine pre-incident value and value loss 
can occur from both internal and external factors.  The scoped nature of damage, as 
previously discussed, implies that damage determination need primarily deal with those 
constructs which may be directly impacted by external factors introduced through an 
incident; specifically those sub-constructs, confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
which comprise the asset’s state value construct. 
This research defines damage is some function loss of value within the contextual 
value constructs caused by an incident.  This loss of value is a direct reflection of the 
asset’s utility caused by some external influence that affects the asset’s confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, or any combination of these three.  Generally, damage in 
information asset is not permanent and is only becomes so if the asset is compromised in 
such a way that it cannot regain its previous level of utility to the organization.  Examples 
of permanent damage are a compromise of confidentiality that prevents the information 
from being used anymore; or a natural disaster where the information asset, its container, 
and all backups are destroyed and the asset cannot be restored. 
Damage in the Domains of Operations. 
The tactical, operational, and strategic domains of operations are defined and 
identified by their respective time constraints. Assessing damage across the various 
domains of operations requires assessing different constructs of the asset’s state value to 
determine loss in terms relevant to the constraint of the specific domain.  This section 
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will concisely discuss each and describe how critical asset damage occurs in the value 
constructs. 
Damage in the Tactical Domain. 
Information assets that reside exclusively in the tactical domain of operations 
generally have a relatively short life cycle.  Often, the information assets used in the 
tactical domain are not stored in a static container, but exist as an information stream.  
Examples of tactical domain information assets include such important real time 
information on which decision makers depend, such as UAV feeds and other targeting 
feeds that provide the commander battlespace awareness in the here and now.  These 
real-time assets have become critical to AOC operations and loss or damage would 
certainly affect the commander’s mission.  However, it should be noted that not all assets 
that exist in the tactical domain of operations reside exclusively in this domain.  There 
exists many information assets with extended lifecycles that still present commanders 
with utility in tactical operations. 
The difficulty in measuring damage to tactical assets is a product of the short 
lifecycle of the information asset.  This domain of operations require that damage and 
mission impact assessment occur rapidly to provide the decision maker with assessment 
information for timely use in the time constraints of tactical operations.  When an 
incident occurs, there may be insufficient time for an incident response team to work with 
the incident owner to assess fully the damage in terms of a value loss model. This holds 




These issues underscore the previously discussed importance in the difference 
between potential and actionable value.  When an incident occurs in the tactical domain, 
the primary concern is the availability construct.  In terms of actionable value and 
damage, this availability can directly be translated to the organization’s ability to use the 
asset—can he get the information he needs right here and right now?  If the answer is no, 
the actionable value is reduced and damage has occurred because of the incident.  
Incidents affecting the confidentiality and integrity constructs are not forgotten, but will 
generally not be assessable in the time constraints imposed by tactical operations.  Since 
the CDA-D/MIA methodology advocates the pre-incident valuation of critical assets, it 
becomes possible to immediately know the potential mission impact resulting from the 
incurred damage.  By estimating the potential mission impact through strategic 
determination of asset potential value, some degree of predictive damage and mission 
impact can be accomplished in the tactical domain; even without explicit technical 
support provided by an incident response agent.   
This, however, is only a first step and meant to describe those CDA-D/MIA 
methodology actions that may occur in the time constraints of the tactical domain.  Most 
incidents outlive the tactical time constraints and move into the operational domain.  
Determination of defensive cyber damage in the operational domain is discussed in 
greater depth in the following section. 
Damage in the Operational Domain. 
Damage and mission impact assessment in the operational domain is the area 
most suited for employment of the CDA-D/MIA framework, and the domain in which the 
greatest benefits are realized.  In this domain, information asset life cycles span a time 
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great enough for the incident response to coordinate with the information owner to 
determine value loss.  Since the asset’s potential value is determined in pre-incident 
activities, the information owner can know immediately the potential damage and 
potential associated mission impact caused by the incident.  It is important to understand 
that the information owner is responsible for assigning the degree of construct and asset 
devaluation based on the technical assessment analysis provided by the incident 
responder and the levels of criticality assigned in the initial asset valuation. 
The constructs suitable for damage assessment in the operational domain are 
illustrated below (see Figure 14 below).   These constructs allow the information owner 
to model the assessed damage affect on the usability of the information asset by reducing 
the actionable value in the constructs that were affected by the incident.  This reduction in 
value reflects loss of asset utility in support of organizational goals, affecting the 
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actionable value but not the potential value of the asset. 
 
Figure 14.  Asset Value Constructs Susceptible to Damage-induced Devaluation 
Value Loss in the Strategic Domain. 
Since damage is defined as value loss resulting from a successful cyber incident, 
value loss resulting from damage is generally restricted to the tactical and operational 
domains.  Construct value loss can occur in the strategic domain however and must be 
reflected within the asset’s value constructs to ensure effective and proper asset risk 
management and accurate values which facilitate accurate damage assessment when a 
cyber incident occurs.  Construct value shift can occur as the result of changes within the 
organization, or simply through the passage of time.  Some examples of this are changes 
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in the organization’s mission which affect the asset’s utility in supporting the new 
mission objectives.  Likewise changes in infrastructure technology may result in the 
creation of a new information asset that makes the current asset obsolete.  Both of these 
examples directly affect the asset’s mission binding construct.  Time is also a factor if the 
information asset outlives it relevancy to the organization.  Since the information is less 
relevant, the asset’s utility to the organization is diminished and the value of the asset’s 
age factor must be made to reflect this shift.   
The value of the identified critical information assets must be re-assessed at 
regular intervals to ensure that the previously assigned value is still meaningful and 
useful in damage assessment.  This maintenance is as critical to successful damage and 
mission impact assessment as the initial asset identification and valuation. 
Measuring Mission Impact as Mission Degradation. 
The CDA-D/MIA methodology is founded on identification and valuation of 
information assets for the ultimate purpose of mission capability impact assessment 
following a cyber incident. The CDA-D/MIA methodology employs a top-down 
methodology for identification of these critical assets which identifies the dependency 
relationships between the critical information asset and the critical mission operational 
process or processes it supports.  This inherent asset-to-mission mapping which results 
from this methodology is a central part of the CDA-D/MIA methodology.  It is the 
catalyst that allows critical asset damage to be mapped to mission capability impact. 
Establishment of an Impact Scale. 
Impact assessment, like damage assessment is a qualitative estimation.  For any 
mission impact metric to be useful, it must accomplish two critical tasks.  First, it must 
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translate damage to the cyber information assets on which the organization depends into 
an accurate reflection of the impact to the organization’s mission.  Secondly, it must 
present this impact to the organization’s decision maker in terms that allows the design 
making agent to make smart and correct decisions quickly and accurately.   
This thesis has discussed loss as a qualitative estimation of reduction in actionable 
value of the critical information asset.  Remember that assessing this loss it to estimate 
the degree to which the critical information asset’s utility has been reduced; and that 
reduction in the critical asset’s utility implies a potential reduction in mission capability.  
This reduction in mission utility is realized as mission impact in those processes that 
depend on the effected asset.  As this value decreases, the theoretical impact increases.  
All things being equal, therefore, value and impact maintain an inversely proportional 
relationship. The decision maker operating in the tactical or operational domain cares 
little about these technical aspects of value reduction that about mission impact, however. 
The decision making must be presented with impact assessment metrics that immediately 
provide situational awareness regarding the impact to his/her organization’s mission 
capability.  To meet this need, this research proposes a scale similar to the Value Rating 
scale proposed earlier in this paper (see Figure 15 below). 
 
Figure 15. A Five Point Scale for Mission Impact Assessment and Reporting 
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This proposed scale serves the purpose of providing a simple to understand 
estimation of the qualitative mission impact assessment.  The scale is designed to provide 
a human decision-maker with a single-look situational awareness of the mission impact 
assessment at the time of reporting.  The impact scale is meant to be a part of a graphical 
executive summary of the impact level.  The Incident and Impact Report in which it is 
presented will contain further detail about the technical details and potential or actual 
mission impact specifics.   
Ideal Implementation of the Impact Scale. 
The impact scale will ideally be presented in a graphical user interface of an 
automated reporting system.  Refined damage models will ideally translate damage 
assessment to mission impact will provide the commander with the incident and impact 
report rapidly, producing faster battlespace awareness of friendly mission capability.  To 
be most effective the scale must be presented in a graphical format, with mission impact 
Y-axis shown over time on X-axis.  This would allow the organization decision maker to 
visualize both potential and actual mission impact as more technical information about 
the incident becomes available over time.  The following figure presents a conceptual 
graphical application of the value scale from initial potential mission impact assessment 




Figure 16. Conceptual Graphical Application of Value Impact Scale 
Conceptual Methodology for Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment 
This section presents a conceptual methodological framework for establishing and 
implementing cyber damage and mission impact assessment.  Cyber damage and mission 
impact assessment is not a single task.  Instead, it is a system of activities that rely upon 
each subsequent activity to correctly implement its responsibilities correctly to facilitate 
the ultimate goal of providing the operational decision maker with improved situational 
awareness through accurate and efficient mission impact reporting.  As this research has 
shown in the state of Air Force and DoD damage and mission impact assessment 
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activities, a failure in any of the subsystem activities results in a failure in mission impact 
assessment capability. 
Overview of the CDA-D/MIA Methodology. 
The CDA-D/MIA framework is comprised of three main stages: pre-incident 
activities, damage and mission impact assessment, and reporting.  The foundation of 
defensive cyber damage and mission impact assessment is pre-incident asset 
identification, valuation, and documentation.  For accurate defensive damage assessment 
to occur, the organization must have developed a portfolio of profiles of its critical 
information assets before the incident occurs.  When the incident occurs, the asset owner 
and the incident responder must work together in their respective roles to determine what 
information assets were affected by the incident and what damage was incurred.  The 
incident responder is responsible for producing a technical assessment of the incident to 
allow the information owner to understand which assets were affected by the incident.  
The information owner may then use the asset profiles of the affected assets to determine 
the damage.  Assuming the asset was correctly documented, the owner may then quickly 
determine the impact to mission capability.  This impact assessment may then 
consolidated and reported through existing reporting channels to provide fast notification 
and reaction to the incident.  
The CDA-D/MIA methodology is founded on the identification, valuation, and 
damage assessment of critical information assets.  Modern organizations and especially 
military operations depend on vast amounts of digital data and information stores to 
operate.  Attempting to identify and document all information assets within an 
organization would quickly prove an overwhelmingly vast and insurmountable objective.  
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The loss of certain information assets would cause great harm to the organization’s 
mission capability; the loss of others may hardly be noticed.  Critical information assets 
are those information assets which directly support the organization’s mission.  Therefore 
the CDA-D/MIA methodology’s seeks to identify, document and valuate those critical 
assets owned by the organization to allow accurate and effective defensive cyber damage 
and mission impact assessment when an incident occurs.. 
CDA-D/MIA Application Across Domains of Operations. 
The military recognizes three primary domains in which operations occur: 
tactical, operational, and strategic.  The CDA-D/MIA methodology can provide the 
decision maker situational awareness in each of these domains.  However, as the time 
constraints existing within each operational domain grow smaller, constraints are 
introduced in the CDA-D/MIA methodology’s application.  The CDA-D/MIA 
methodology requires certain activities to occur in certain operational domains more 
often, and restricts activities form occurring in others.  The following figure provides a 
conceptual illustration of how the CDA-D/MIA activities on an incident timeline 
approximately map through the domains of operations (see Figure 17 below).  This figure 
is only a notional example, but provides a good example of how activities would align 





Figure 17. Key Mission Impact Activities Across Domains of Operations 
 
For example, risk assessment that facilitates critical asset identification and 
valuation must occur prior to the incident to allow effective damage and mission impact 
assessment. These pre-incident activities occur in the strategic domain.  The tight time 
constraints of the tactical domain often preclude all but the basic response activities since 
the tactical commander cannot wait until incident investigation to understand how/her 
mission has been impacted.  
Pre-incident Activities in the Strategic Domain. 
All assumptions of the CDA-D/MIA methodology are based on accurate 
identification, documentation and valuation of the organization’s information assets 
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before an incident occurs.  Therefore, the preparatory activities an organization takes 
before an incident occurs are essential to the successful cyber damage and mission impact 
assessment (see Figure 18 below). The pre-incident activities of CDA-D/MIA 
methodology that allow the required front loading of the damage assessment framework 
are accomplished in four essential phases.   Each of these comprises a step in the top-to-
bottom identification of the critical assets that enable the organization to accomplish its 
mission.  A validated and asset-focused risk management framework such as OCTAVE 
can effectively assist the information owner to identify and document information assets 
that are valuable to the organization and focus risk analysis activities on the critical assets 
identified (Alberts, Dorofee et Al. 2003, pp. 3-5).  The asset identification methodology 
advocated by this research is a top-down, operations-oriented, and asset-focused 
approach.  A high-level view of critical pre-incident steps are as follows: 
• Define the organizational mission 
• Identify, define, prioritize, and document the operational processes that support 
the mission 
 
• Identify, define, enumerate, prioritize, and documents the information processes 
that support operational processes 
 
• Identify, define, document, and valuate the information assets that the information 
processes depend upon. 
 




Critical Information Asset Identification. 
Before valuation of critical information assets within an organization can be 
accomplished, they must be identified.  To do so, employing an effective information 
asset-focused risk assessment methodology is essential.  The approach to risk 
determination is very important, and this research proposes a departure from risk 
assessment methodologies that focus on technological assets.  
Risk exists where threat to an asset and a vulnerability in the asset intersect.  
However, identification of the wrong asset negates the benefits of risk analysis.  This 
research proposes that risk to cyber information assets exists explicitly as risk to the 
information assets that exist within the technological infrastructure and vulnerabilities are 
shortcoming in the security controls designed to protect these information assets from 
malicious or non-malicious incidents (see Figure 19 below). 
 
Figure 19. Risk To the Asset Within the Container 
 
There are several proven asset-focused risk assessment methodologies from 
which to choose, including Carnegie Mellon University’s OCTAVE methodology.  It is 
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imperative however that the methodology selected facilitate a top-down, operations 
oriented approach to identifying the critical information assets on which the organization 
depends. 
Critical information assets exist within every organization with information 
dependencies. These assets are the at the core of modern military operations.  The 
dependencies upon information exist in dependency layers of organizational processes, as 
show in the following figure (see Figure 20 below).  Accomplishing the organizational 
mission depends on individual and integrated mission operational processes.  Many of 
these operational processes depend upon information flows, or information processes.  
These information processes rely upon one ore more information assets.  A failure of a 
critical information asset could generate an upward ripple effect that impairs one ore 
more critical information flows, which cripples a mission process with the ultimate effect 
of impairing the organization’s mission.  By following this internal chain of dependencies 
the information owner can identify the organization’s critical information assets by 
drilling-down from the top, starting with identification of the organization’s mission, and 




Figure 20. Information Assets as the Core of the Mission Operations 
 
Establishing Relative Ownership 
As the head of the military organization, the commander is the information owner.  
The information owner bears the responsibility for identification of critical information 
assets, which is an important but difficult task at the onset.  For this reason, the 
commander will necessarily delegate ownership to an a responsible organization member 
to act on his/her behalf to execute asset ownership duties and responsibilities.  However, 
the commander must be diligent when delegating this responsibility.  Accurately 
establishing information ownership is essential to successful CDA-D/MIA efforts.  The 
delegate information owner must possess both a clear understanding of the organizational 
mission and the appropriate operational perspective to identify the critical processes 
within the organization that directly support the mission.  When acting on behalf of the 
commander, the delegate effectively becomes the information owner. 
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Identification of Critical Mission Processes. 
 Accurate and comprehensive mission impact assessment through cyber damage 
assessment depends explicitly on identification of those critical cyber information assets 
without which the mission would be impaired or fail.  Therefore, the CDA-D/MIA 
methodology strongly advocates the identification of these critical assets by starting with 
the mission they support.  This is the reason why the information owner must possess the 
appropriate level of operational perspective when beginning to identify the critical assets 
in the organization. 
 First, the information owner must clearly define the organization’s mission, to 
include the upstream missions it supports, and the downstream mission that support its 
mission.  This is important, as it aids in identifying other organizations whose mission 
may be affected by a mission-impacting cyber incident.  When the mission and any 
important high-level mission dependencies are identified, the information owner must 
next identify, rack and stack, and document the mission’s operational processes which 
enable the organization’s mission to exist.  The information owner must identify, 
enumerate, and prioritize each process, defining how the each operational process 
supports the organization’s mission.   
 It is important to understand that prioritization of operational processes is to 
facilitate identification of the organization’s critical processes.  Prioritization and 
assigning criticality values to each identified operational process facilitates the self-
scoping process to exclude those processes that are less important to the organization’s 
mission operations.  This basic establishment of criticality is the first step in identification 
and valuation of the critical information assets that will be ultimately identified.  The 
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CDA-D/MIA five-point value scale should be used to rack and stack each process.  A 
Value Level 5 is assigned to those processes assessed as critical to mission support.   
 Each critical process must be documented to ensure record of its mission support, 
mission criticality rating, and other important information is maintained.  It is important 
to ensure accurate documentation for further identification of supporting processes, and 
ultimately facilitation of damage to mission operations impact mapping after an incident. 
This documentation will be maintained in the associated information asset profile 
discussed later. 
Identification of Critical Information Processes. 
The next phase is the identification and documentation of critical information 
processes.  In this phase, each operational process identified as critical to the 
organization’s mission must be examined to identify the information processes that 
support that operational process.  As with mission processes, these information processes 
must be enumerated and prioritized by criticality using the same five point value scale to 
annotate the information process’ criticality to the critical operational process it supports.   
Also like the previous phase, the critical information processes that support critical 
operational processes must be documented in the same way as the previous phase. 
Identification of Critical Information Assets.   
The process thus far has been a self-scoping process to identify the organization’s 
most valuable cyber information assets in terms of mission enablement.  Beginning with 
the mission, organization’s most critical operational process are identified; allowing the 
most critical information processes supporting these critical processes to be identified.  
The stage is now set to identify the information assets that directly support these critical 
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information processes.  Identification of the critical information assets within the 
organization is the most important activity of the CDA-D/MIA methodology.   
 Once critical information processes have been identified, the information owner 
must determine what digital information supports these processes.  As in the previous 
stages, the information must be identified, documented and assigned a value.   Critical 
information assets are the epicenter of the CDA-D/MIA methodology, so it is important 
to understand how value is assigned.  As previously discussed, the value of the 
information asset is derived by its utility for the organization to meet its mission goals.  
Since the identification methodology has led the information owner to the information 
assets supporting the organization’s most important information processes, which in turn 
support its most critical mission operational processes, the assets identified are all very 
important to the organization’s mission capability.  However, not every asset is equally 
critical since damage to one asset may result in a lesser degree of degradation to the 
information process that it supports.  
Identification of Critical Asset Containers. 
 It is important that the infrastructure asset on which the information resides be 
clearly identified and documented.  Identification of the information asset container is 
essential for generating mission to supporting system mapping.  In relatively stove-piped 
systems, this support may be self evident, but in many mission processes that depend 
upon information assets shared over a network, the physical location of the information 
asset may not be as readily known.  Knowing which system contains the asset is 
especially important during incident response.  Incident responders, by necessity, will 
perform response activities to assess damage to the technological infrastructure resulting 
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from a cyber incident.  Container documentation in the information asset profile will 
facilitate a more rapid understanding of potential mission impact by bridging the gap 
between the system and the information asset, which will lead to more efficient 
assessment of mission capability impact. 
Critical Process Documentation. 
 All aspects of an organization’s information assets must be well documented to be 
an effective tool for damage assessment. This includes documentation of the critical 
mission operational and information processes that the organization relies upon.  
Documentation of these processes is critical to the success of damage and impact 
assessment since such documentation provides mapping from the asset to the mission.   
Documenting Critical Mission Processes. 
Accurate and effective mission process documentation must be accomplished 
first.  The information owner should use the proposed worksheet (see Figure 25, 
Appendix B) to ensure all important information is captured.  By this time the 
information owner will hold an understanding of the processes critical to the 
organization’s mission.  Specifically, the mission process should be provided a unique 
mission process identifier (MPID) prevent any confusion between mission processes.  It 
is also important that the agent responsible for the mission process is documents, to 
include contact information.  This agent may prove valuable in the identification and 
valuation process, as well as damage and mission impact assessment following an 
incident.  Any known impact to the mission must be documented, as this is an important 
factor in understanding the process’ criticality to the mission.  This worksheet must be 
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maintained to assist in the drill-down process to identify the organization’s critical 
information assets. 
Documenting the Critical Information Processes. 
Documentation of the critical information processes is similar to the documentation 
of mission processes.  The goal is to identify the information processes providing critical 
support to the organization’s mission processes and to discover and document the 
information assets on which the organization’s mission ultimately depends.  The 
information owner should utilize the proposed worksheet (see Figure 26, Appendix B) to 
identify the important information about the critical information processes.  It is 
important that the information process be enumerated and given an information process 
identifier (IPID) to uniquely identify and distinguish the information process.  As with 
the mission process, establishing processes ownership is very important.  The attached 
worksheet should be used to assist in documenting information processes within the 
organization. 
Critical Information Asset Profile Documentation. 
 Documentation of the critical information assets is the foundation of damage and 
mission impact assessment.  It is important that the information owner capture the 
appropriate information about both the information asset and the system on which the 
asset resides.  As with process documentation, a set of worksheets is proposed to aid the 
information owner in this task.  Asset and container documentation form the core of the 
Critical Information Asset Profile (CIAP).  The CIAP contains all documentation used in 




Documenting the Critical Information Assets. 
 All key aspects of the critical information asset must be documented.  At 
minimum, the following information is essential to documenting information in a manner 
which facilitates the capability to perform damage and mission impact assessment 
following an incident: 
• Information owner and custodian, with contact information 
• Information producer and consumers, if known 
• Supported mission critical process(es) 
• Criticality rating (value) 
• A description of how the information asset is used 
• The asset’s container 
• Additional important information  
The proposed worksheets  (see Figures 27 and 28, Appendix B) should be used to 
assist the information owner in this task of collecting the basic, but essential information 
about the asset.  It is during the identification and documentation phase that the 
information owner must determine and document the value of the asset to the 
organization.  The worksheet also assists the information owner in determining the value 
for the asset through criticality rating values assigned to its value constructs. 
Documenting the Critical Asset Containers. 
 Thorough documentation of the critical asset containers is also extremely 
important.  The container is the system on which the asset is physically located.  
Incidents that impact the container will likely impact the information asset.  Documenting 
the relationship between the container and the information asset is important to the 
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information owner attempting to determine mission impact from the technical assessment 
information provided by the incident response agent.  It is important that the information 
owner document such important information as the ID and location of the container, the 
contact information about the custodian responsible for the maintenance of the container, 
important technical details about the container, and any other information that may help 
map technical information to the information asset.  The proposed worksheets (see 
Figures 29 and 30, Appendix B) will help the information owner document the important 
information about the container. 
Information Asset Valuation. 
 Valuation of the asset is a qualitative estimation of the utility of the asset within 
the organization.  The assumption is at the stage that the assets identified are critical to 
the organization.  Not all recognized value constructs may have the same criticality to the 
mission, so the criticality of each must be considered independently.  Unless there is 
information to indicate otherwise, it is assumed that no external factors are present to 
influence the value of any constructs at the time of valuation.  The value assigned to each 
construct must reflect the criticality of that construct in its relative support for the 
mission.  The proposed worksheet will assist the information owner in appropriately 
assigning value to each value construct. 
Mission Binding Valuation. 
 The mission binding construct reflects the criticality of the asset to the 
organization’s mission.  Assets critical to critical information processes, which support 
critical mission processes will inherently be critical.  This construct is relatively constant 




 The age value of an asset is a reflection how quickly it loses relevance in the 
organization.  Most assets do not age beyond operational relevance excessively fast, 
however there are some such as weather reports that do.  Age is not considered in 
operational and tactical damage assessment, because it is a temporal function generally 
unaffected by a cyber incident.  But if the asset’s age decay could cause impact to the 
mission, the information owner should value this construct at a rating that reflects this 
criticality.  Those assets that do age rapidly should be annotated as requiring a periodic 
refreshment, with the defined refresh period also annotated.  For example, a weather 
report may be provided hourly, with each successive report superseding the previous.  
The information owner must annotate this on the construct value worksheet that the asset 
is refreshed every hour.   
Confidentiality Valuation. 
 If a compromise of this asset’s confidentiality would have an impact on the 
mission, the information owner must value this construct accordingly.  Also, it is 
important for the information owner to annotate on the worksheet how the mission would 
be impacted to the best of his/her understanding.   
Integrity Valuation. 
 If a change in the data may cause impact to the mission the asset supports, the 
information owner must value the construct accordingly.  The information owner must 
not consider the potential for back up and recovery when valuating the asset, but must 
assign the value as to the impact to the mission before any remediation or recovery 




 The information owner must assign a value to the importance of the availability of 
this asset to the mission.  The owner must annotate the mission impact to the best of 
his/her understanding should the asset be lost.  In many cases, short term loss of an 
information asset may not have great mission impact; with these affects being realized 
over time.  At the time of valuation the information owner must valuate the asset with not 
assumptions of restoration.  This will aid in determining the potential impact when an 
incident occurs.  
  Asset Profile Maintenance. 
 There are several concerns about the maintenance of information asset profiles.  
Once completed, these CIAPs will contain a large amount of information about the 
critical assets for the organization.  All of an organization’s CIAPs will be compiled into 
the organization’s Critical Cyber Asset Portfolio (C-CAP).  The C-CAP is simply the 
collection of all critical processes and cyber assets on which the organization depends. 
This introduces a new avenue of risk to the organization, as unauthorized access to the 
organization’s C-CAP would provide a malicious actor a roadmap for targeting and 
attacking the critical assets that could cripple the organization’s mission.  For this reason, 
the organization’s C-CAP must be maintained in some location safe from unauthorized 
access, but where the information owner has ready and immediate to the C-CAP access in 
the event of a successful cyber incident, to include catastrophic network failure. 
 Security issues aside, the issue of the sensitivity of the information about 
contained in the C-CAP the organization gives rise to a second issue that is equally 
important to the effectiveness of mission capability the CDA-D/MIA.  This issue is 
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whether the C-CAP is maintained locally, or by a centralized agency, such as the AFNOC 
NCD with its responsibility for maintaining continual network operations and security.   
Local C-CAP Maintenance. 
 When a cyber incident occurs, the information owner needs access to the 
information within the C-CAP immediately.  In many cases, this may allow the decision 
maker to know the immediate potential mission capability impact, assuming that the 
critical information asset profiles are current and accurate estimations of the asset’s state 
and value.  Local storage would ensure expedited access to this valuable tool, allowing 
the commander to have almost immediate situational awareness of the threat to the 
mission.  The downside is that by keeping the information local, notification of the 
damage an asset on which other agencies depend may be delayed.  Having an agency 
with enterprise NETOPS authority and responsibility maintain all C-CAPs for the 
organizations in the enterprise may allow more rapid downstream incident damage and 
mission impact assessment. 
Centralized C-CAP Maintenance. 
 While centralized management and maintenance of C-CAPs for all organizations 
in the enterprise may expedite damage and mission capability impact assessment, it re-
introduces the problem of risk.  As previously mentioned, the C-CAP could potentially 
provide a malicious actor a goldmine of information about where to attack the network to 
optimize mission impacting effects.  If all the C-CAPs of all organizations within the 
enterprise are located in centralized storage and the security controls are defeated, the 
malicious actor would have not just a target map for one organization, but for the entire 
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enterprise.  Aside from security risks, there may be political complications associated 
with releasing sensitive information of the organization to another. 
 For these reasons, the research proposes localized maintenance of an 
organization’s critical information asset portfolios. 
Automation of Profile Maintenance. 
 Whether stored locally or centrally, the organization’s C-CAP must be automated.  
The proposed worksheets allow the information owner to collect the information needed 
to load a relational database for more rapid access to the organization’s C-CAP for faster 
determination of mission impact.  A notional ERD based on the data collected from the 
worksheets (see Figure 21 below) demonstrates how such a database would automatically 
link critical dependencies within the organization.  This ERD is intentionally very high 
level and elementary, but it is easy to see how automation can allow a better 
understanding of information asset dependencies within the organization.  Ideally, such 
database deployed across the enterprise, would lay the foundation for nearly 
instantaneous mission impact assessment, both predictive and actual.  
 
Figure 21. Notional Entity Relationship Diagram for C-CAP Automation 
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Incident Damage and Mission Impact Assessment Activities. 
In the CDA-D/MIA framework, there is no noticeable change to the function and 
activities of incident response, as currently implemented in the Air Force.  IR function 
will remain focused on the traditional activities of response, remediation, and forensic 
investigation.  However, rather than being tasked with determining the impact of an 
information incident to an organization’s mission, the IR function will work closely with 
the information owner,  providing the technical details to allow the information owner to 
perform damage assessment at the site of the incident.  The constructs of an asset-focused 
pre-incident valuation will allow the IRT and information owner to determine asset 
devaluation resulting from not only asset availability but also confidentiality and/or 
integrity compromise—an aspect not attainable under the current, infrastructure-focused 
assessment implementation.   
This section will discuss the roles and responsibilities of those agencies involved 
with incident response, damage and mission impact assessment, and initial reporting and 
the conceptual implementation of these tasks. 
Responsibilities for Damage and Mission Impact Assessment. 
There are two aspects to performing defensive damage assessment: technical 
assessment and asset damage assessment.  Technical damage assessment is the evaluation 
of damage to the organization’s cyber infrastructure.  It reveals such important evidence 
as how the attack occurred and what, how long, and by whom information assets were 
accessed, attack vectors in malicious cases, or the number of passwords compromised.   
Technical assessment must be accomplished to enable accurate asset damage assessment, 
but cannot tell the information owner the degree of value loss in the affected asset.  The 
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technical assessment allows the information owner to determine this through asset 
damage assessment, which allows damage to be mapped to mission impact.  This section 
will discuss the responsibilities for each of these important activities. 
Technical Damage Assessment. 
The technical damage assessment is critical to establishing what information 
assets were affected during a cyber incident.  The technical assessment is a direct carry 
over of the damage assessment practices currently implemented on Air Force networks.  
It was previously stated that these assessments do not produce results usable for 
operational or tactical decision making.  This statement is true, because technical 
assessment evaluates the very important aspect of impact to the infrastructure; but it 
cannot evaluate the impact to the information asset.  Therefore, technical assessment is 
only the critical first piece of damage and mission impact assessment. 
AFNOC NSD’s Incident Response Team (IRT) is responsible for technical 
assessment of incidents on Air Force networks.  The Air Force’s IRT is a group of highly 
trained experts in cyber incident response activities.  The IRT works through the AFNOC 
NSD with AFNOC NCD to coordinate and control all incident response activities on Air 
Force networks.  The IRT is tasked to be the technical lead on these activities and is 
responsible for the post-incident response, handling and technical damage assessment of 
cyber incidents.  As the technical lead, the IRT is also responsible for coordinating 
centralized incident reporting throughout incident life cycle.   
Because the CDA-D/MIA methodology operates across all operational domains, 
there are some cases in which the time constraints of the tactical domain may preclude 
traditional IRT technical assessment.  In such situations, the mission cannot allow the 
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affected system to impair the mission long enough for traditional IRT response and 
technical assessment. In this case, another agent must act as an incident response(IR) 
agent to perform stop-gap technical assessment to provide the information owner 
information about the systems affected by the event or incident, and conduct immediate 
response and remediation efforts to ensure mission continuity.  For example, in some 
tactical situations, time constraints may require that the extent of technical assessment be 
the server room technician providing the information owner limited details on which 
servers have failed.  For this reason, the agent responsible for providing technical damage 
assessment is called the IR agent. 
Under the CDA-D/MIA methodology, the IR agent would continue to perform its 
assessment and provide the result to the information owner at the site of the incident. As 
mentioned, the IR agent is already performing excellent technical assessment following 
cyber incidents.  The IR agent also currently works directly with the local information 
owner in an attempt to better determine impact.  Therefore, the implementation of a 
CDA-D/MIA methodology for damage assessment would add no new tasks to the IR 
agent’s current responsibilities.  Rather the CDA-D/MIA delineates the roles of both the 
IR agent and the information owner in determining damage following a cyber security 
incident. 
Asset Damage Assessment. 
The information owner bears the responsibility for both asset valuation and asset 
damage assessment.  The information owner is the only entity with the perspective to 
determine the value of an information asset to the organization.  The information owner 
will work with the IR agent to understand the technical assessment and how best to apply 
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the technical assessment to determine the extent of damage to the information assets.  
The information owner will assign a damage assessment based on the reduction in the 
assets utility resulting from the incident.  This damage assessment will be used to 
perform the mission impact assessment that will be reported. 
Mission Impact Assessment. 
The mission impact assessment is the most important aspect of the CDA-D/MIA 
methodology.  This assessment must be accomplished by an agency with appropriate 
perspective of how the damage will affect mission capability.  Only the information 
owner can make such a determination.  The information owner is responsible for using 
documented mission criticality and asset attribute information in the C-CAP to determine 
what missions may be affected by the damage incurred in the information asset. 
Mission impact assessment will initially be predictive, based on the potential 
mission impact expected during the initial information valuation in the pre-incident risk 
assessment activity.  However, as the IR agent continues to work with the information 
owner, providing more refined interim technical assessment, the actual mission impact 
may be realized as less than initial expected.  The information owner is responsible for 
reporting this refined mission impact assessment in each interim incident report.  
Although the information owner is responsible for mission impact assessment, it must 
work closely with the IR agent to ensure updated and accurate interim reporting. 
Responsibilities for Assessment Reporting. 
 Incident and impact reporting (IIR) is as important as the assessment itself.  
Current reporting contains only technical assessment information.  The IIR mechanism 
extends existing reporting content to contain the necessary impact assessment provided 
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by the information owner.  The report must convey the nature and impact of the cyber 
incident as quickly as possible to the decision maker in a way that may be easily 
assimilated into the decision making process.  Both the IRT and the information are 
responsible for working together to compile and release an accurate report in a timely 
manner.  There are three basic reports to be presented to the decision maker:  initial 
report, interim report, and final report.  The initial report is the initial notification of the 
incident.  This report must declare the nature and classification of the incident and known 
technical information to facilitate rapid response action.  However, under the CDA-
D/MIA methodology, the initial report will also contain potential mission impact to 
advise the decision makers and NETOPS community of potential mission impact, thus 
provide an additional degree of battlespace awareness that currently does not exist.  It is 
the responsibility of IR agent and the information owner to compile this information 
quickly.  The potential mission impact is based on the assumption that the information 
assets’ value and mission relationships were correctly assessed and documented in the C-
CAP.  The initial report will be followed by any number of interim IIRs which provide 
updated information on the status of the incident investigation, remediation and recovery 
efforts, and refined mission impact.  Again, the information owner must work closely 
with the IR agent to develop the most accurate mission impact assessment.  The final IIR 
provides the decision maker with notification of incident closure.   
Conceptual Damage and Mission Impact Assessment Implementation. 
This section describes in further detail how damage and mission impact are 
conceptually conducted in the CDA-D/MIA methodology.  It is important to remember 
that the CDA-D/MIA methodology is intended to assess damage and mission impact in 
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the organization where the incident occurred and provide rapid reporting of the 
assessment results to both the local decision maker, NETOPS command and control 
structure, and the appropriate interested report consumers.  
Incident Declaration and Predictive Mission Impact Assessment. 
Damage assessment is an inherently post-incident activity.  Under the current 
damage assessment methodology the commander is can gain neither a timely nor accurate 
understanding of the potential mission impact resulting from an actual or suspected cyber 
incident.  The CDA-D/MIA methodology, as applied in the tactical domain of operations 
(see Figure 22 below), offers the decision maker predictive mission impact assessment in 
that time period between detection of a suspicious network event by the network defender 
(Te) and the declaration of cyber incident by the incident response agency.  The 
information owner cannot act upon a suspicious event until notified.  Once the 
information owner is notified of suspicious activity on a system or systems identified to 
contain information assets (T0), the decision maker is provided awareness of the potential 
impact to the mission.  While investigation into the event is concurrently conducted, the 
information owner makes a predictive mission impact assessment based on the predictive 
valuation of the information assets potentially impacted by the suspicious event.  The 
network defenders will only be able to provide technical information to identify what 
systems may be involved in the suspicious activity.  Assuming the asset container was 
correctly assigned to the information asset and documented in CIAP and stored in the C-
CAP, mapping the system to the critical asset is elementary.  The information owner can 
determine if the system is a critical container, determine which critical assets are 
threatened, and determine a potential mission impact.  At this point, mission impact is 
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predictive and will be equal to the maximum impact assigned during pre-incident 
valuation (T1).  The decision maker will now be able to make decisions based on this 
potential mission impact (T2), allowing greater situational awareness in decision making 
in this interim period until more granular damage and mission impact assessment may be 
conducted.  This tentative mission impact assessment is kept locally until such time the 
event investigation reveals incident threshold is meet and an incident declared by the IR 
agent activity.  At this time, the predictive mission impact assessment is included in the 
initial Incident and Impact Report (IIR) provided to the Netops community through the 




Figure 22. Mission Impact Assessment in the Tactical and Operational Domains 
 
Incident Response and Damage Assessment. 
 Incident response officially begins with the declaration of an incident. Incident 
response, therefore, is inherently post-incident.  Incident response, particularly the 
technical assessment, must occur for actual damage and mission impact to be assessed.  
This does not imply that IR agent personnel have no role in event investigation.  In fact, 
the IR agent must be involved to ensure the event meets the threshold of escalation to 
incident declaration.  However, IR agent activities cannot begin until post-incident; 
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specifically including technical damage assessment.  This is especially true in incidents 
caused by non-malicious events.   
 With incident declaration, the IR agent will coordinate with the information 
owner to help establish initial damage and mission impact resulting from the incident (see 
Figure 23 below).  The technical impact assessment will be provided to the information 
owner by the IR agent.  The information owner uses the technical assessment to 
understand which information asset containers may be affected by the incident in the 
initial technical assessment, and the degree of exposure that may have occurred based on 
interim technical assessments.  Based on these technical assessments the information 
owner can begin to estimate damage by comparing the amount of critical information 
asset exposure to the threat.  The information owner and the IR agent work together to 




Figure 23. Notional CDA-D/MIA/MIA Incident and Impact Reporting  
 
  As previously discussed, damage to the asset is reflected in terms of reduction in 
utility; therefore if any reduction in the asset’s usability to the organization results from 
the incident, the assets value is potentially reduced and reflected as damage to the asset.  
The amount of damage is based on the original valuation performed in the strategic pre-
incident phase and recorded in the CIAP, stored in the organization’s C-CAP.  Any 
damage reflects a reduction of the actionable value of the information asset.  The 
potential value as documented in the asset’s CIAP, however, remains constant for the 
duration of the incident.   
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Value is reflected and shifted using the established five-point value scale.  The 
information owner must consider the individual constructs of the value model when 
determining damage.  If the technical assessment indicates a compromise of 
confidentiality, the information owner must consider what extent this construct was 
damaged and adjust the construct value accordingly to accurately reflect the resulting 
immediate utility of the asset.  Damage can only be accurately assessed by the 
information owner by working with the IR agent to determine the type and extent of 
exposure the asset experienced.  In this sense, damage may be as contextual as 
information valuation. 
As more technical information about the incident becomes available to the 
information owner through interaction with the IR agent, this damage assessment can be 
reflect less damage than initially thought.  Before any critical information asset damage 
assessment becomes truly useful, however, it must be mapped to mission impact. 
Mission Impact Assessment. 
 Damage assessment cannot provide the organization’s decision maker actionable 
information on which to make mission decisions following a cyber incident.  Therefore, 
the information owner must be able to understand how the incident impacts the 
organization’s ability to accomplish mission objectives following an incident.  
Determining asset damage must be accomplished to allow the information owner to 
determine the impact to the mission.   
Mission impact assessment is a function of the damage assessment process.  
Therefore mission impact assessment may be revised over time and as more information 
about the incident becomes available (see Figure 24 below).  The goal of mission impact 
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assessment is to provide the organizational decision maker with situational awareness 
about actual mission impact resulting form a cyber incident.  However, actual mission 
impact may not be fully determined until the full extent of technical damage is known. 
 
Figure 24. Graduated Refinement of Mission Impact Reporting Over Time 
 
 Mission impact assessment cannot begin until after the information owner is 
notified of either suspicious activity on the network, or that an incident has occurred (T0).  
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After notification, the information owner can immediately perform an initial mission 
impact assessment (T1).  Because only basic information is known about the event or 
incident, the information owner must assume the actual impact to be equal to the 
potential impact established during strategic pre-incident asset documentation.  However, 
as time progresses and more technical information is made available through 
coordination with the IR AGENT, the mission impact may be revised and show that 
actual impact is less than originally estimated.  This revised actual mission impact 
assessment is provided included in interim IIR updates (TIIR1…IIR_n) which continue 
indefinitely until the incident is closed and the final IIR report of closure (TRC) is 
submitted.  Mission impact is assigned by the information owner using the five-point 
impact scale previously established in this paper.               
Incident and Impact Reporting. 
 The IIR is the vehicle in which situational awareness relating to cyber information 
is provided to the organizational decision maker.  The IIR presents both technical 
information pertaining to the incident and the resulting mission impact.  IIR reporting 
also serves the purpose of advising other organizations of potential second order effects 
resulting from the mission impact.  The IIR is the product of the technical assessment 
details provided by the incident response agent and the most current mission impact 
assessment provided by the information owner.  In nearly all cases, the IIR will be 
compiled and entered into a consolidated reporting database by the response agent tasked 
by the NETOPS command and control agency.  On Air Force networks, this means that 
the AFNOC NSD IRT would work directly with the information owner on all IIRs to 
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ensure the IIR submitted timely and appropriately.  The three forms of IIRs are discussed 
further here. 
Initial IIR. 
 The initial IIR must be submitted in a very timely manner after incident 
declaration.  Air Force NETOPS guidance requires initial incident report submission 
within one hour after incident declaration.  The initial IIR serves to notify the all 
interested parties in the NETOPS community of an incident on the organization’s 
networks.  As previously mentioned, it serves to provide situational awareness to the 
local organizational decision maker about potential mission impact.  However, this 
situational awareness through impact reporting also alerts the NETOPS command and 
control and higher command authority of a mission impact incident on the organization’s 
networks.  This provides agencies in all directions situational awareness of potential 
second order effects from potential mission impact at the site of the incident.  
Additionally, agencies that may have dependencies on the information assets damaged by 
the cyber incident may elect to perform local defensive cyber damage assessment to 
determine any immediate impact resulting from the incident that occurred outside of their 
organization. 
 As previously stated, the initial IIR contains only limited technical assessment and 
potential mission impact, based on the potential mission impacted documented in the pre-
incident risk assessment activities.  The initial IIR provides situational awareness and 
allows the local organization and agencies throughout the enterprise to posture for 




 In most cases remediation and recovery will begin as early as possible, thus 
allowing less down time and increased mission continuity.  Investigation by the IR 
function during the incident response stage will facilitate determination of the 
compromise cause and size.   
The interim IIRs are essentially updates that provide more detailed information relating to 
the cyber incident.  The interim IIR is released by the NETOPS ordained IR agent, which 
on Air Force networks is the AFNOSC NSD.  In the first interim IIR the designated IR 
agent has accomplished some degree of technical investigation and incident response that 
facilitates more refined damage and mission impact assessment by the information 
owner.  Each subsequent IIR may be an additional refinement, and provide the 
organization decision maker and all parties of interest a more accurate picture of the 
actual damage and mission impact that resulted from the cyber incident.  Interim IIRs 
will be issued at set intervals as need or NETOPS authority dictates until the incident is 
closed. 
Final IIRs. 
The final IIR is released at the closure of the incident investigation.  It signifies 
that all technical actions, such as investigation, remediation, and recovery, have been 
completed. It is highly unlikely that new information will become available at this time 
that is relevant to the information owner’s responsibility to determine additional mission 
impact.  The final IIR will contain a full summary of events and technical assessment 




The post-incident activities of the CDA-D/MIA framework are important 
contributors to the continuity of effective CDA-D/MIA operations and cyber security 
efforts as a whole.  The research emphasizes two critical activities that must be achieved 
following the remediation, recovery, and closure of a cyber incident.   
Strategic Accountability Reporting. 
Accountability and lesson learned from the incident can have influence on future 
IT and security planning and investment.  Failure to assess the long term impact can 
hamper efforts to determine such important economic impact factors as, customer 
confidence, which potentially affects long-term income.  From a military perspective, 
strategic reporting will focus on accountability not only to prevent future occurrences of 
an information incident, but also assess potential budget impact.  The strategic domain of 
operations is the one place where understanding the cost loss of a cyber incident may be 
useful to a decision maker. 
When a mishap occurs on the flight line, an after actions report is submitted to 
report the results of how and why the mishap occurred and includes the cost of the 
mishap in economic terms.  The information from these reports are collected and tracked 
for trends analysis, but are used most importantly for accountability and prevention.  For 
this reason, this research recognizes the need for enterprise post-incident accountability 
reporting following an incident.  Such reporting can reveal trends that may lead to 
improved security practices and reduction in risk to information assets.  Additionally, it 
can help the Air Force understand the enormous cost of repeated incidents in a time when 
budgetary constraints force more frugal investment.  Most importantly, post-incident 
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accountability reporting will hold those accountable who disregard security controls or 
otherwise introduce unnecessary and actualized risk against the critical information assets 
on which mission operations depend.  Strategic post-incident accountability reporting 
would offer the Air Force enterprise several advantages in understanding and preventing 
cyber incidents that it currently does not enjoy. 
Periodic Asset Valuation. 
Events may occur that result in an asset identified as critical to experience 
reduction in its utility by the organization to such an extent that it may no longer be as 
important to the organization.  Events such as shifts in the organization’s mission, 
lifecycle issues that have caused a the asset to outlive its usefulness, an incident that has 
irreparably damaged an asset’s confidentially value, or bringing a new system online that 
contains information assets and data stores that replace the existing can all result in 
permanent devaluation of the information asset.  For any of these reasons, it is critical 
that the organization establish a periodic and scheduled re-visitation of the risk 
assessment activity.  This is not only a good security and risk management practice, but it 
ensures that all critical assets continue to be identified within the organization and the 
value documentation in the asset’s CIAP is maintained accurately. 
 
Limitations.  
 All research maintains some limitations despite the best efforts of the researcher.  
This research effort is no exception.  One such limitation was bias.  The investigator was 
motivated to this research by experiences gained while professionally employed in 
network defense incident response operations.  Despite great and sincere efforts to remain 
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objective, there is a high probability that some degree of investigator bias was introduced 
by the researcher’s experience.  Additionally, sample bias imposed limitations on this 
research effort.  The targeted population was limited to 18-20 possible interviewees to 
ensure the integrity of response data.  Most research efforts would prefer a larger sample.  
This issue was compounded by non-response bias.  Since the sample was self-selected 
through voluntary participation, only 9 personnel elected to participate.  This represented 
only half of the targeted population, and potentially resulted in failure to collect important 
relevant responds data. 
 Another limitation of this research was the scope.  The problem of damage and 
mission impact assessment is complex, and consists of many activities with strong 
interdependencies.  Failure to accurately and effectively accomplish one of these 
activities creates a ripple effect that taints the quality of the systems of activities that 
comprise cyber damage and mission impact assessment.  No study exists that looks at the 
entire process.  Therefore this scope of this research project is large by necessity.  This 
fact limits the ability to examine the components in great detail, as deserving of such an 
important area of research. 
Recommendations. 
 This research has made of number of recommendations for improvement to the 
current damage and mission impact assessment methodology by proposing a new 
methodology to do this.  The prevailing theme throughout the research was the need to 
relax the exclusive focus on technology to allow a more comprehensive understanding of 
cyber protection and mission impact assessment.  The Air Force, and indeed, the DoD 
 
215 
must understand the purposes of network defense is not to protect the network for the 
network’s sake.  Rather, its purpose is to protect the information assets on the network.  It 
is the information on the network that allows the bombs to drop on target and allows to 
commander to make the right decisions in the battlespace.   
 As the Air Force moves towards standing up a new Cyber Command, it is 
imperative that information takes center stage in cyber operations.  Many sections of 
private sector industry have been moving in this direction of several years.  The Air Force 
would be wise to understand industry “best practices” will work in the unique 
environment of military operations. Failure to do so may cause continuation of 
limitations that currently plague Air Force network operations, and especially defensive 
cyber damage and mission impact assessment efforts. 
Areas for Future Research. 
 The scope of this research was very high level by necessity.  The goal of the 
research was understand the current state of damage and mission impact assessment in 
order to propose a methodology offering improvements over the current implementation.  
It was necessary to abstract many functions, which leaves considerable room for 
additional research.   
Operational Validation. 
 The proposed methodology is conceptual.  To ensure that an operationalized 
methodology is attainable, the concepts of this proposed CDA-D/MIA methodology most 
be validated.  Ideally, performing the proposed risk assessment activities to identify the 
assets in a mock operational arena, such as a test Combined Air Operations Center at 
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Nellis Air Force Base (CAOC-N) would be an ideal scenario to test the proposed 
methodology and concepts.  Both shortcomings and successes of the conceptual 
methodology would quickly be revealed in all aspects of the methodology, but especially 
in the damage assessment and mission impact reporting areas. 
 The recommended approach would be to “artificially” identify a small quantity of 
assets.  By artificial identification, it is meant that the CAOC system, associated 
information assets on the system, and mission relationships are known quantities and not 
discovered through risk assessment.  Test scenarios may be run against the systems to 
accurately evaluate the methodology’s effectiveness at assessing damage and mission 
impact; and the quality and accuracy of mission impact reporting. 
Automation of Assessment and Reporting. 
The conceptual methodology is extremely human labor-intensive.  Certainly, an 
effective methodology can not completely separate itself from human involvement, 
especially in the areas of risk assessment and asset identification, but there are some 
aspects that are suitable for automation.  Further research into the development of 
damage and mission impact automation and reporting is recommended.  The pre-incident 
loading activities of asset identification, value determination, and attribute documentation 
are highly subjective and will very greatly from organization to organization.  These 
activities must necessarily maintain a high human involvement.  However, once these 
values are loaded, the possibilities for automated damage detection and assessment, and 
subsequent mission impact assessment and reporting, are great.  Recommended research 
in this area is database development that would facilitate asset attribute loading to enable 
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dynamic asset dependency mappings from system to asset, but also easier mapping of 
trans-asset dependencies. 
Asset Value Models. 
 This research has proposed a new approach to establishing value handles to the 
intangible value qualities of information assets.  This approach seeks to assess asset value 
as a function of the relationship the asset holds to the mission, and is based on the 
constructs established in the proposed conceptual construct model.  The value rating scale 
is intentionally simplistic for the purposes of illustrating how the relative value the asset 
maintains can be estimated and reflected with minimal complexity of use.  However, 
further research in developing more mature value models is recommended. 
 Future models should hold true to the concept of value as a reflection of utility, 
and value assignment as an estimation of the approximate “strength” of this relationship.  
Development of such a value model may have a profound impact on the assessment of 
information value in areas beyond military networks. 
Asset-Focused Risk Assessment and Asset Identification. 
 This research found that accurate identification, valuation, and documentation is 
the foundation for any subsequent damage and mission impact assessment activities.  
This critical activity is not being accomplished effectively for Air Force cyber 
information.  Further research in improved methodology for information asset 
identification would be beneficial to only damage and mission impact methodology, but 
to all aspects of Air Force cyber security.  There are many avenues from which to begin 
such research, but it is important that the research focus on development on a risk 
identification and assessment methodology that focuses on information as an asset. 
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Chapter Summary  
This chapter proposed conceptual methodology for defensive cyber damage and 
mission impact assessment.  The chapter opened with a discussion of foundational 
concepts critical to the establishment of such a proposed model.  This proposal was the 
result of the extensive literature review of publications, thorough examination of related 
research of damage assessment on Air Force networks, and interviews with personnel 
professional involved with the current damage and mission impact assessment efforts.  
The purpose of this research is to establish a comprehensive understanding of the state of 





























Case Study Interview Questions 
 
 
SECTION 1: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
 
1. Interviewee #: 
 
2. Are you currently or have you been professionally involved with Network Warfare 
Operations (NWO) or Network Defense (NetD) activities on Air Force networks? 
NWO is defined by AFDD 2-5. 
 
 
SECTION 2: INCIDENT DAMAGE /MISSION IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
 
1. In your experience, does current incident damage assessment methodology on Air 
Force networks comply with the requirement of CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 Annex A to 
Appendix B to Enclosure B prescribing operational impact assessment of a DoD 




2. In your experience, how well are responsible Net-D activities (incident response, 
forensics activities, etc.) able to estimate the impact to an organization’s mission 




3. Based on your response to question #3, what factors, if any, contribute to the level of 
effectiveness estimating the impact to an organization’s mission capability resulting 














Information Asset Profile Worksheets  
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